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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 Structure of the thesis
This thesis is divided in three papers on regional economics. The first paper is concerned
with the short-run (risk-sharing) and long-run (redistributive) effects of inter-regional
redistribution among Italian regions. The latter two papers are focused on obstacles to
innovation in the Italian region Friuli Venezia Giulia, which is an important aspect to
understand the capacity for economic recovery of a regional territory after the crises of
2007 and 2011. Financial and market obstacles to innovation and preference for internal
funds have been found to be relevant in the region and, thus, financing innovation through
public structures become more important to face long periods of economic crisis. Beside
belonging to the same field of economics, the topics covered by these three papers are
deeply interconnected as the redistribution of resources across regions could play an
important role for allowing lagging regions to receive financial resources that could be
targeted to the support of their own regional systems of innovation. In the future this
latter point will deserve an in-depth study as it is widely accepted among scholars and
policy makers that innovation is pivotal for the economic growth of territories and for
their resilience especially when long-standing recessions hit the economy.
1.2 Overview of the papers
The first paper studies, for the period 1983-2015, the impact of the Central Govern-
ment’s fiscal policy on redistributive (long-run) and risk-sharing (short-run) effects of
inter-regional redistribution among Italian regions. This assessment is relevant from a
policy-making point of view as The MacDougall Report (1977) pointed out that the
short-run objective of inter-regional redistribution is to allow the poorest areas to reach
the consumption level of the richest areas, while in the long-run, it should aim at the
convergence of regions in terms of economic growth. By following a narrative approach to
isolate meaningful changes in fiscal policy paradigms, we focus on the spans 1983-1995,
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1996-2007 and the period covering the unfolding of the economic and sovereign debts
crises, 2008-2015. Our study presents several original contributions to the extant empir-
ical literature on the redistributive (long-run) and the risk-sharing (short-run) features
of inter-regional redistribution. First, we develop an empirical framework that allows us
to disentangle the regional fiscal flow in its horizontal and vertical components1 as well
as to maintain the distinction between the redistributive (long-run) and the risk-sharing
(short-run) features of redistribution. We focus on horizontal fiscal flows as we want to
isolate the dimension of fiscal transfers among regions and to do so we have to control for
the intertemporal dimension of inter-regional redistribution arising when at country-level
we observe either a surplus or a deficit. In doing so we point out that the redistributive
and risk-sharing effects of horizontal fiscal flows are tightly linked to the dimension of
the primary balance for which the Italian Central Government is responsible. Second, we
model the relevant equations in a way that allows us to avoid the over-fitting problems
that affect previous studies on the topic. Third, we construct a database of regional
fiscal variables covering over thirty years - obtained using homogenous data sources -
that allows us to test whether the ability of horizontal fiscal flows to mitigate long-run
differences and region-specific temporary shocks to economic activity changed over time.
Finally, we estimate to what extent the expenditure and the revenue items of the hori-
zontal fiscal flows among regions contribute to mitigate short- and long-term differences
in Italian regions’ per capita GDP. Regional fiscal variables are constructed following a
top-down approach based on territorial statistical sources that are consistent with the
benefit principle. Regarding the redistributive effects, we present evidence that the abil-
ity of horizontal fiscal flows to reduce long-run income disparities among Italian regions,
albeit substantial, declined over time because of the increasing contributions of Italian
regions to country-level fiscal adjustments that have been going on since the 1990s to
control the huge public debt. We found evidence that the main drivers of the reduction
in redistributive effects have been the expenditure for social protection and investment
purposes that in relative terms penalized the Southern Italian regions. As far as risk-
sharing is concerned, we found that the implicit insurance scheme among Italian regions,
which had been in place until the mid-1990s, disappeared during the period 1996-2007.
Finally, during the period 2008-2015, covering the years of economic and sovereign debts
crises inter-regional redistribution amplified the effects of idiosyncratic shocks on region-
level GDPs. This happened as local public finance behaved in a very pro-cyclical manner
because of the decrease in transfers from the Central Government to local governments
and the rise in taxes and duties levied by the sub-national tiers of Government after the
2011 sovereign debts’ crisis. An important implication of this study is that an explicit
insurance scheme against temporary shocks at regional level is advisable when it is not
possible to rely on automatic stabilizers.
1We focus on the horizontal fiscal flow that is obtained by decomposing the regional fiscal flow (FF) as
the sum of the vertical (VFF) and horizontal (HFF) fiscal flows, i.e. FF=HFF+VFF. In this framework,
a surplus (deficit) at the country-level will be allocated at the regional level by reducing (increasing) the
revenues (expenditures) of each region in proportion of the regions’ share of revenues (expenditures).
The VFF, that adds up to the country-level primary balance, captures either the financial flows from
the Central Government to regions or the overall contributions of regions to the country-level surplus.
Thus, the VFF is informative about the role of each region with respect to a country’s primary balance
position. The negative values of VFF provide a measure of the contribution of each region to the country-
level primary surplus or, for positive values, how much each region receives out of the national primary
deficit. In Section 2.3 we provide a simple numerical example on how to implement the methodology.
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The second paper2 focuses on financial constraints to innovation in Friuli Venezia Giulia
during the span 2005 to 2015. We assess if financial constraints to innovative firms are
more severe than for non-innovative ones, as hypothesized by the theoretical literature on
innovation financing. We rely on two data sources: the wave 2008-2010 of the Community
Innovation Survey (CIS) and the Italian Company Account Database (CAD). We use
two indicators of financial constraints: the sensitivity of physical investment to cash flow
estimated through the micro-econometric model first developed by Fazzari et al. (1988)
(indirect indicator) and the perception of financial obstacles declared by firms in the CIS
2008-2010 (direct indicator). We define broad innovators as those firms that declare to be
engaged in any innovation-related activity listed by the CIS and we further investigate on
the combined effect of innovation attitude and size as small firms are hypothesized to be
more affected by financial constraints. Results for the microeconometric analysis point
out a significant sensitivity of physical investment to cash flow both for broad innovators
and non-innovators with not significant differences between the two groups. Among broad
innovators, larger firms show a significantly higher sensitivity than smaller firms which
is at odds with the theoretical literature that hypothesizes small firms to be more likely
to suffer financial constraints. Looking at the responses of broad-innovators to the CIS
we find evidence of a significantly higher percentage of small firms that declared financial
obstacles to be of medium high importance. We explain the highest sensitivity of larger
innovators with their higher involvement in Research and Development (R&D) projects
which is the most demanding form of innovation activity which also implies higher reliance
on internal funds due to the reticence to disclose relevant information on their projects
to external financiers to get funds. Our explanation is validated by the fact that testing
the sensitivity of investment to output for R&D performers and for non-R&D performers,
the indicator is significantly higher for the first group. Moreover, among the group of
R&D performers, there is not significant difference between small and large firms.
In the third paper3 we assess the perception of of CIS listed obstacles to innovation by
potential innovators in Friuli Venezia Giulia for the period 2006 to 2015 exploiting the
CIS 2008-2010 and CIS 2010-2012 data as well as the Italian Company Account database
(CAD). We divide potential innovators in two groups: innovation-active firms, i.e. firms
that are engaged into innovation projects and deterred firms, i.e. firms that are interested
in innovation but have been deterred by some obstacles. We want to find a relationship
between the perception of obstacles to innovation and the degree of engagement into inno-
vative activities. Following the literature, we hypothesize that the higher the involvement
into innovation, the lower the perception of obstacles to innovation. We divide obstacles
in three macro classes: financial, human resources and market related. We introduce
a new qualitative measure of innovation intensity where the lowest ranked activity in
innovation is the external acquisition of technology and the highest ranked activity is
R&D which entails not only financial efforts, but also relational, human and knowledge
capital. The quantitative analysis is divided into two parts. First, we run a cross-section
analysis based on the CIS wave 2008-2010 employing a multivariate probit to assess the
relationship between the probability of perceiving as important the three groups of ob-
stacles and the intensity of engagement into innovation. We control for firms’ specific
characteristics such as size, sector and also for financial and profitability indicators as
2Other co-authors: Maria Claudia Schneider (University of Udine).
3Other co-authors: Simona Iammarino (London School of Economics and Political Science) and Tiziana
Sodano (Bank of Italy).
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they have been found to be related with the probability to suffer financial obstacles by
the empirical literature. Second, we run a panel analysis matching the firms surveyed
in both CIS waves 2008-2010 and 2010-2012 through a random effect probit model. The
results for the cross-section analysis show that financial, and market obstacles are felt
as less important by innovation-active firms with respect to deterred ones. As expected,
the perceived importance decreases with the involvement into innovation. No differences
have been found for human resources related obstacles. The panel analysis shows us that
financial obstacles are perceived as more important both by deterred firms and by R&D
firms, while results are the same as the cross-sectional analysis for market and human
resources related obstacles. Furthermore, we use our CIS-CAD 317 firms’ panel dataset
to grasp additional insights on how the relationship between the probability of perceiv-
ing barriers to innovation as important is affected by the deteriorating macroeconomic
conditions following the sovereign debt crisis. Results show that the probabilities that
all firms perceive financial and human resources obstacles as important are considerably
reduced for the years 2010-2012 indicating that in the second stage of the crisis such
barriers become more pervasive, affecting innovators and non-innovators alike. On the
contrary, the perception of market-related obstacles rose substantially in 2010-2012, par-
ticularly for non-innovators, suggesting that the worsening of the internal and external
macroeconomic environment further discourage from innovate, undermining the overall
capacity of the system to react to the crisis.
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Abstract
This paper studies, for the period 1983-2015, the impact of the Central Government’s
fiscal policy on the redistributive (long-run) and risk-sharing effects (short-run) of
horizontal fiscal flows among Italian regions. The main novelty of this study is an
empirical framework that allows us to disentangle the horizontal and vertical components
of regional fiscal flows and to test whether the redistributive and risk-sharing effects
of horizontal fiscal flows changed over time. Our estimates suggest that although the
redistributive effects of horizontal fiscal flows are substantial, their magnitude declined
after the 1990s as a consequence of the fiscal adjustments undertaken by the Italian
Government, to which regions are the ultimate contributors. We also point out that
after the unfolding of the recent economic and sovereign debts crises, the horizontal
fiscal flows started to act as a risk-enhancing device with respect to short-term shocks
to Italian regions’ economic activity.
JEL Classification Numbers: D82; D92; G32; O31; O32.
Keywords: Public Finance, Regional Fiscal Flows, Inter-regional Redistribution,
Risk-Sharing, Regional Economics.
2.1 Introduction
The redistribution of resources among territories is at the core of the debate on fiscal
federalism1 in Italy, and it is a relevant topic with respect to a reshaping of the Euro-
pean Monetary Union (EMU) governance2 that would allow for the countries of the euro
area to share a sizable supranational budget. Moreover, inter-regional redistribution is
currently on top of the political agenda in Italy3 as after the 2008 economic crisis a fur-
ther divergence occurred between Center-Northern and Southern regions in the capability
to generate tax revenues, which tend to be proportional to the gross domestic product
(GDP), and thus to finance of public spending.
It is possible to measure the size of the implicit inter-regional redistributive activity
among Italian regions by computing the regional fiscal flow, i.e. the difference between the
public spending referred to a territory and the public revenues collected from the same;
residents in regions with a positive fiscal flow are, on average, net beneficiaries of the
inter-regional redistribution carried out by the public sector, while those with a negative
flow are net contributors. It follows that a centralized system of taxes and transfers,
such as the Italian one, is capable of mitigating the long-run disparities in terms of
GDP by ensuring an almost uniform provision of public goods and services to all citizens
across territories, despite of the marked dualism in terms of economic prosperity (and
fiscal capacity) between the Northern and Southern regions. Conversely, in the short-
run, redistribution should act as a risk-sharing device that entitles a region to receive
financial transfers to offset a tax revenue loss in the event of a short-run negative shock
to a region’s economic activity, and in circumstances related to low labor force mobility
and the stickiness of the implicit exchange rate between territories4 (Blanchard et al.,
1992; Obstfeld and Peri, 1998).
According to the extant empirical literature5 and to our estimates, the long-lasting
socioeconomic dualism between Center-North and South (Figures 2.2(a) and (b)) is re-
1In 2001, the Constitutional Law No. 3 introduced fiscal federalism with the Reform of the Title V of the
Italian Constitution. In Articles 117 and 119, the Reform establishes the autonomy of sub-national tiers
of government in making decisions about taxes and expenditures within the guidelines and boundaries
defined by the laws of the Italian State. Within this framework, the Central Government has the
responsibility to coordinate the whole system of taxes and transfers to guarantee equalizing transfers to
sub-national tiers of the Government that are unable to provide with their own resources those public
services that meet a set of homogenous minimum quality and quantity standards.
2The MacDougall Report (1977) pointed out that the short-run objective of inter-regional redistribution
is to allow the poorest areas to reach the consumption level of the richest areas, while in the long-run,
it should aim at the convergence of regions in terms of economic growth.
3This is not surprising as the Articles 32, 34, 38, and 53 of the Italian Constitution prescribe that public
intervention must aim at reducing the long- and short-run socio-economic gaps among territories.
4For instance, regional GDP deflators could be used as a proxy for region-specific price levels.
5See Maggi and Piperno (1992), Agostinelli et al. (1996), Magnani (1997), Decressin (2002), Staderini
and Vadalá (2009), Cannari and Chiri (2006), Ambrosanio et al. (2010), Arachi et al. (2010), Cerea
(2013), Giannola et al. (2016) and Petraglia et al. (2017).
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flected in the implicit financial flows among Italian regions, which during the period
1983-2015 represented 4.3% of the Italian GDP on an annual basis (Figure 2.3(b)). More-
over, implicit fiscal flows among Italian regions and country-level fiscal policy are deeply
interconnected for two reasons. First, the Italian system of taxes and transfers to sub-
national entities (Regions, Provinces and Municipalities) is highly centralized and the
Central Government is directly responsible for roughly 80% of overall taxes and 70% of
public spending. Second, the Italian Central Government is directly responsible for the
country-level primary balance of which residents of Italian regions are the ultimate ben-
eficiaries, when there is a deficit, or to which they are the ultimate contributors in the
case of a surplus.
In this study, we focus on the horizontal fiscal flow that is obtained by decompos-
ing the regional fiscal flow (FF) as the sum of the vertical (VFF) and horizontal (HFF)
fiscal flows, i.e. FF = HFF + V FF .6 Our choice is consistent with the extant litera-
ture according to which inter-regional redistribution should be treated as a pure transfer
of resources among regions by neutralizing any national-level deficit/surplus (see Arachi
et al., 2010; IMF, 2011; Ruggeri, 2009). In this framework, a surplus (deficit) at the
country-level will be allocated at the regional level by reducing (increasing) the revenues
(expenditures) of each region in proportion of the regions’ share of revenues (expendi-
tures). The VFF, that adds up to the country-level primary balance, captures either the
financial flows from the Central Government to regions or the overall contributions of
regions to the country-level surplus/deficit. Thus, the VFF is informative about the role
of each region with respect to a country’s primary balance position. The negative values
of VFF provide a measure of the contribution of each region to the country-level primary
surplus or, for positive values, how much each region receives out of the national primary
deficit.
The objective of this study is to assess the impact of the Central Government’s fiscal
policy on the redistributive and risk-sharing effects of horizontal fiscal flows (HFFs) among
Italian regions during the spans 1983−1995, 1996−2007 and the period 2008−2015. The
choice of the relevant time spans followed a narrative approach and it is an attempt to
isolate meaningful changes in the paradigm of fiscal policy. The chosen periods cover the
most relevant fiscal policy breaks while preserving enough data observations for running
econometric estimates.
The first sub-period falls in the pre-EMU era and it is mostly characterized by
the lack of fiscal discipline with the Central Government running primary deficits. The
period 1996− 2007 covers the fiscal discipline imposed through the rules of the Stability
and Growth Pact introduced in 1997.7 This period also encompasses the Italian pension
6See the Appendix and Section 2.3 for more details on how regional fiscal flows have been computed.
7Italy adopted the Stability and Growth Pact with Law No. 448 in 1998.
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system reform, that represented a major shift from a retributive to a contributive pension
system8, and the fiscal decentralization introduced in 1997.9 Finally, the last period 2008-
2015 is characterized by the unfolding of the economic and sovereign debts crises.
Our study presents a number of original contributions to the extant empirical lit-
erature on the features of inter-regional redistribution pioneered by Von Hagen (1992),
Bayoumi and Masson (1995) and Mélitz and Zumer (2002). First, we develop an empiri-
cal framework that allows us to disentangle the regional fiscal flow (FF) in its horizontal
(HFF) and vertical (VFF) components as well as to maintain the distinction between
the redistributive (long-run) and the risk-sharing (short-run) features of redistribution.
Second, we model the relevant equations in a way that allows us to avoid the over-
fitting problems that in some circumstances could deliver spurious estimates. Third, the
availability of a database covering over thirty years - obtained using homogenous data
sources10 - allows us to test whether the ability of HFFs to mitigate long-run differences
and region-specific short-run shocks to economic activity changed over time. Finally, we
estimate to what extent the expenditure and the revenue items of the HFFs among re-
gions contribute to mitigate short- and long-term differences in Italian regions’ per capita
GDP.
This paper contributes to the extant literature by showing that the redistributive and
risk-sharing effects of HFFs are tightly linked to the dimension of the primary balance
for which the Italian Central Government is responsible. Our estimates suggest that
although the redistributive effects of HFFs on the economic activity of Italian regions
are substantial, their magnitude declined after the 1990s driven by VFFs, i.e., the fiscal
adjustments decided by the Central Government to which Italian regions are the ultimate
contributors. We point out that the fall of the expenditures both in capital account and
social protection, that in relative terms penalized Southern Italian regions, were the main
drivers of the reduction of the redistributive effect. We show that, after the 1990s, HFFs
did not exhibit any risk-sharing effect with respect to short-run region-specific shocks.
Moreover, after the unfolding of the recent economic and sovereign debts crises, the HFFs
started to act as a risk-enhancing device due to the sharp rise in taxes and duties levied
by the sub-national tiers of Government. Moreover, descriptive statistics support that
our findings are likely to be driven by the fiscal adjustments undertaken by the Italian
Government after the 2011 sovereign debts’ crisis.
This paper continues as follows. In Section 2.2, we review the most relevant literature
on the effects of inter-regional redistribution and some studies related to Italian regions.
8The so-called “Riforma Dini” was introduced by the Law No. 335 in 1995.
9The so-called “Riforma Bassanini” was introduced by the Laws No. 59 and 127 in 1997. The reform
went through subsequent modifications over time.
10Relying on heterogenous data sources Giannola et al. (2016) provided a reconstruction of fiscal data
at regional level for Italy for the period 1951-2010.
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In Section 2.3 we describe how to compute the HFFs and the VFFs. In Section 2.4, we
explain the model specification and the estimation methodology underlying our analysis.
In Section 2.5, we present some descriptive statistics and the results of our analysis. The
last Section concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
In this study, we focus on the redistributive (long-run) and risk-sharing (short-run)
effects of HFFs over the last thirty years in Italy. For this purpose, we provide a summary
of two main literature’s strands to give an account of the most important methodological
and empirical contributions in general and for the Italian case.
Since the seminal contribution of Musgrave (1961) on fiscal federalism unveiled the
trade- off between efficiency and equality arising when fiscal transfers take place across
heterogeneous territories within a federation, researchers and policy makers have devoted
much effort in the attempt to identify the optimal level of fiscal transfers with respect to
the social welfare function of a federation. In a nutshell, most of the empirical studies
implicitly assume that the social welfare function of a society can be proxied by an ideal
distribution of income (Cowell, 2011) that the Central Government can target through
a system of taxes and transfers. According to Buchanan (1950), the first researcher
that introduced the concept of fiscal transfer (fiscal residuum), an equitable system of
taxes and transfers should ensure that the same fiscal residual applies to taxpayers with
the same level of income (see Staderini and Vadalá, 2009, p. 1, note 1). Conversely,
from a positive point of view, there is an extensive amount of empirical literature that
has developed a methodological framework to analyze the redistributive and risk-sharing
effects of inter-regional fiscal transfers across territories. Most of these studies investigate
how much income and consumption smoothing across regions within a state, or across
states within a federal entity, is determined both in the short- and in the long-run by
inter-regional fiscal transfers rather than by market forces.
Von Hagen (1992) and Bayoumi and Masson (1995) were among the first researchers
to empirically apply the distinction between the long-run and the short-run features
of inter-regional redistribution highlighted by The MacDougall Report (1977) for EMU
countries. However, the conclusions reached by earlier empirical literature are often
contradictory. Some studies on the US and Canada found a low or no role for inter-
regional redistribution and stressed the role of market forces (Von Hagen, 1992; Asdrubali
et al., 1996). Other empirical contributions emphasized the need for federal taxes and
transfers as a major mechanism of income and consumption smoothing within monetary
unions (Sachs and Sala-i Martin, 1992; Eichengreen, 1993 and Fatás et al., 1998). More
recently, Poghosyan et al. (2016), using a single equation pooled mean group estimator,
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found that the ability of regional fiscal transfers to provide risk-sharing and redistribution
mostly depends on central budget automatic stabilizers that are transmitted to regions
through federal taxes and transfers to individuals. Their estimates suggest that fiscal
transfers have a risk-sharing effect in a 4-11% range while their redistributive effect is
between 13 and 24% of a 1% shock to per capita GDP. Poghosyan et al. (2016) suggest
either to centralize pro-cyclical spending and revenue functions or to establish a "rainy-
day" fund in those federations in which automatic stabilizers do not work properly, for
instance, at the European level.
According to Mélitz and Zumer (2002), the earlier studies lack consistency, as they
often compare narrow (broad) measures of transfers, such as direct taxes and money
transfers alone, with broad (narrow) measures of the economic activity, such as GDP
(disposable income), thus underestimating (overestimating) the effects of inter-regional
fiscal transfers on consumption smoothing. Mélitz and Zumer (2002), using a common
accounting and econometric methodology to evaluate to what extent region-specific GDP
shocks are absorbed via inter-regional transfers, provide updated estimates of five studies
on inter-regional redistribution and output/personal income stabilization. They point
out that previous studies would not have differed greatly in their estimates of the sta-
bilization effects of inter-regional transfers if they had adopted a consistent accounting
choice for fiscal variables and economic activity. Mélitz and Zumer (2002) estimated that
the stabilization of shocks to personal disposable income oscillate in a range between 12%
and 20% of a 1% shock to per capita GDP for the United Kingdom, Canada and the
United States. The use of the GDP (instead of personal income) and a broader definition
of transfers (the net fiscal transfer) delivers different coefficients for both redistribution
and risk-sharing, as the broader measure of net transfers includes fundamental in-kind
public services, such as health and education, that are financed by net transfers to lower
tiers of Governments, subsidies and other transfers to firms.
Our study improves the estimation framework proposed by Mélitz and Zumer (2002)
along two directions. First, our estimation framework allows us to disentangle the regional
fiscal flow (FF) in its horizontal (HFF) and vertical (VFF) components as well as to
maintain the distinction between the redistributive (long-run) and the risk-sharing (short-
run) features of redistribution. Second, we model the relevant equations in a way that
allows to avoid the over-fitting problems that affect previous studies on the topic.
For the Italian case, Decressin (2002) provides an interesting study on inter-regional
redistribution, for the span 1983 − 1992, using the estimation techniques proposed by
Bayoumi and Masson (1995), Obstfeld and Peri (1998) and Mélitz and Zumer (2002).
Decressin (2002) estimates that an Italian region with a per capita GDP 1% below the
Italian average ends up with a per capita GDP that is 0.65%-0.75% below the average,
i.e. a redistributive effect in a 25%-35% range. In addition, in the event of a 1% short-run
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shock to the per capita GDP of a region, the risk-sharing estimates range from an impact
of 10% to 15%. Decressin (2002) also estimates the impulse response functions of the fiscal
flow components (consumer spending, welfare spending, total expenditure and revenue)
to a shock to economic activity, by running the bivariate VAR originally proposed by
Obstfeld and Peri (1998), substantially confirming their findings. The main conclusion of
this study is that the greatest part of the redistribution and risk-sharing among Italian
regions is due to public expenditures, as the peculiar institutional framework in Italy
guarantees everyone a high and uniform access to health care and education, despite the
low level of expenditure in social protection policies. Decressin (2002) is at odds with
our study and other scholarly studies that pointed out the leading role of current tax
revenues as the main drivers of redistributive and risk-sharing effects (Sachs and Sala-i
Martin, 1992; Von Hagen, 1992).
Arachi et al. (2010) study the effects of the inter-regional redistribution among Italian
regions during the period 1996 − 2002, pointing out the importance of controlling for
the presence of regional trends and the role of different tiers of government. In their
methodological framework, conceptually close to the present study, fiscal flows are defined
for specific levels of Government as the difference between total expenditure (net of
interest payments and transfer to other levels of government) and total revenue (net of
transfers from other levels). To grasp the effect of a specific institutional profile, fiscal
flows are decomposed in vertical and horizontal flows by sterilizing the country-level
primary balance. Arachi et al. (2010) show that approximately 75% of total redistribution
is due to horizontal flows among entities of the same tier of government, while only 25%
is linked to vertical flows among different levels of government. The main finding is that
regional fiscal flows significantly smooth long-run regional differences in per capita GDP
and that 90% of total redistribution is linked to horizontal flows, while the remaining
10% is connected to vertical flows.
Giannola et al. (2016), using heterogeneous data sources, estimated a redistributive
effect of HFFs on Italian regions per capita GDP of 43.4% for the period 1985-2010 (34.4
for the period 1951-2010). They also find that being a Special Statute Region implies
a higher redistributive effect of 1%-2%. Finally, Petraglia et al. (2017) concluded that
during the period 1983-1992, with respect to their effect as a percentage of the GDP,
HFFs had a redistributive effect in a range of 19.3%-30.5% of GDP (10.3%-18.3% during
the period 1951-1965) and a risk-sharing effect of 8.9%-15.3% (4.0%-9.2% for the period
1951-1965) of a 1% shock to per capita GDP.
We contribute to the extant literature on Italy as our dataset, covering over thirty
years and obtained using homogenous data sources, allows us to test whether the ability
of HFFs to mitigate long-run differences and region-specific short-run shocks to economic
activity changed over time.
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In this study we estimate the regional fiscal flows for Italy using the methodology
proposed by Staderini and Vadalá (2009) that allows for an allocation on a regional
basis of the expenditure and revenue items of the country-level Public Administrations’
consolidated economic account released by Istat, encompassing all tiers of government.
Under the hypothesis that each region behaves as a single economy (Mundell, 1963), fiscal
variables at the regional level are constructed following a top-down approach based on
territorial statistical sources that are consistent with the benefit principle.
2.3 How to Measure Inter-Regional Redistribution:
Horizontal and Vertical Fiscal Flows
Italian regions (21 entities that include 3 Special Statute Regions and the Au-
tonomous Provinces of Trento and Bolzano) differ substantially from one another in
many respects, such as the geographic features (e.g., different cost structures for public
services), the demographic structure (e.g., welfare spending), the stock of human capital
(e.g., general education attainments), the propensity of firms to innovate, the indicators
of crime and the levels of economic activity (Table 1). In this respect, the regions of the
Center-North of Italy and the Southern ones represent two distinct clusters also in terms
of fiscal capacity (proxied by GDP). Further peculiarities emerge by looking at their insti-
tutional setup as Special statute Regions/Provinces are characterized by a higher degree
of legislative and fiscal autonomy than Ordinary Statute Regions11, that allows Special
statute entities to withhold most of the Central Government’s tax revenues levied within
their territories (see Panicara et al., 2012).
Due to the lack of official data on fiscal variables at the regional level, we resorted to
the methodology proposed by Staderini and Vadalá (2009).12 We compute for the span
1983-2015 the regional fiscal flow (FFit) by allocating on a regional basis the expenditures
(Gt) and revenues (Tt) items of the Italian Public Administrations’ consolidated economic
account (Istat).13, i.e. to estimate the Italian primary balance at the regional level.14
This accounting choice is consistent with our aim to assess the smoothing properties
of inter-regional redistribution with respect to long-run and short-run shocks to a region’s
per capita GDP. In fact, the accounting of regional fiscal flows must be consistent with
the relevant output measure (personal income vs. GDP).15
11See the Italian Constitution, Article 116.
12For other methodological approaches to the Italian case, see also Magnani (1997), Cannari and Chiri
(2006), Maggi and Piperno (1992) and Ambrosanio et al. (2010).
13The estimation of the regional fiscal flows for Italy is not straightforward because of the scarcity of
official territorial data. In the Appendix, we illustrate the details of the methodology proposed by
Staderini and Vadalá (2009).
14In the Appendix are provided more details on how regional fiscal flows have been computed.
15Mélitz and Zumer (2002) and Decressin (2002) pointed out that the way one measures economic activity
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Table 1
Italian regions’ socioeconomic statistics and indicators for the year 2015 (1)
(real euros and percentage values)
REGION AND AREA
Surface Population Demographic structure by age class Per capita GDP Innovative firms (2) Unemployment rate Net internal migration rate Households in relative poverty Crime rate (3)
(Sq. km) (millions) (0-14) (65yr) (euros) (percentage values) (percentage values) (percentage values) (percentage values) (percentage values)
Piemonte 25, 387 4.4 12.9 24.5 28, 923 34.7 10.2 0.6 6.6 6.4
Valle d’Aosta - Vallée
d’Aoste
3, 261 0.1 13.9 22.5 34, 360 25.7 8.9 −0.8 7.2 11.7
Lombardia 23, 864 10.0 14.2 21.6 35, 950 35.4 7.9 1.1 4.6 23.0
Bolzano-Bozen 7, 398 0.5 16.1 19.0 41, 215 30.7 3.8 2.1 (∗) 15.3
Trento 6, 207 0.5 15.0 20.7 34, 659 35.0 6.8 2.2 (∗) 26.6
Veneto 18, 407 4.9 14.0 21.7 30, 899 40.1 7.1 0.3 4.9 16.5
Friuli Venezia Giulia 7, 862 1.2 12.6 25.1 29, 201 38.4 8.0 0.8 8.7 29.7
Liguria 5, 416 1.6 11.5 28.0 30, 495 30.4 9.2 0.7 8.5 23.2
Emilia Romagna 22, 453 4.4 13.5 23.5 33, 620 33.1 7.7 1.9 4.8 24.0
Toscana 22, 987 3.7 12.8 24.8 29, 500 33.2 9.2 1.1 5.0 23.4
Umbria 8, 464 0.9 13.0 24.6 23, 779 29.4 10.4 0.1 (∗) 32.4
Marche 9, 401 1.5 13.2 23.7 26, 019 28.4 9.9 −0.3 7.6 29.8
Lazio 17, 232 5.9 13.8 20.7 31, 023 27.2 11.8 0.7 6.9 29.1
Abruzzo 10, 832 1.3 12.8 22.6 24, 203 22.5 12.6 −0.8 11.2 33.5
Molise 4, 461 0.3 11.9 23.4 18, 926 17.4 14.3 −2.5 21.5 30.3
Campania 13, 671 5.9 15.5 17.6 17, 219 17.5 19.8 −3.2 17.6 28.8
Puglia 19, 541 4.1 14.0 20.5 17, 197 25.3 19.7 −1.9 18.7 19.9
Basilicata 10, 073 0.6 12.7 21.6 19, 510 26.8 13.7 −3.3 25.0 31.2
Calabria 15, 222 2.0 13.8 20.2 16, 499 25.5 22.9 −3.5 28.2 29.5
Sicilia 25, 832 5.1 14.5 19.9 17, 099 21.2 21.4 −2.5 25.3 20.6
Sardegna 24, 100 1.7 11.9 21.6 19, 341 24.4 17.4 −0.9 14.9 19.7
Italy 302, 073 60.7 13.8 21.7 27, 094 31.9 11.9 −0.2 10.4 23.0
Center-Northern regions 178, 341 39.9 13.6 22.7 31, 918 33.8 9.4 0.9 6.0 22.0
Southern regions 123, 732 20.9 14.2 19.8 17, 820 21.9 19.4 −2.4 20.4 24.8
Ordinary Stature regions 227, 412 51.6 13.3 22.6 28, 014 30.2 11.0 −0.6 12.2 23.2
Special Statute regions 74, 661 9.2 14.0 21.5 21, 766 29.2 12.4 0.2 14.0 21.6
Coefficient of variation
(%)
2.5 4.1 8.3 10.8 26.6 19.3 43.8 − 75.4 30.8
Maximum value 25.832 10.0 16.1 28.0 28.0 41.215 40.1 2.2 28.2 33.5
Minimum value 3.261 0.1 11.5 17.6 17.6 16.499 17.4 −3.5 4.6 6.4
Source: Istat. (1) Base year 2010. (2) Share of firms that are attempting to introduce product or process innovation. (3) Reported crimes, per 100, 000 of the population, for which the Judicial authorities have started criminal proceedings and persons involved.
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Thus, in our study, the relevant regional fiscal flows are those that include all the
categories of public expenditures and revenues, i.e., public consumption and investments,
social protection in the form of money transfers and in-kind welfare, transfers that affect
local production and grants minus social security contributions, and direct and indirect
taxes. In this way, we are also able to isolate the spending and revenue items that are
responsible for the inter-regional redistributive activity.
Given Git and Tit, the region’s i total expenditures and total revenues at time t, the
regional fiscal flow is given by:
FFit = Git − Tit ∀i, t
By construction budget items at the regional level sum up to the corresponding national
level variables, i.e. Gt =
∑︁21
i=1Git and Tt =
∑︁21
i=1 Tit. Thus the country-level primary
balance (FFt) is the sum of regional fiscal flows:
FFt =
21∑︂
i=1
Git −
21∑︂
i=1
Tit =
21∑︂
i=1
FFit ∀i, t
As already noted, regional fiscal flows among Italian regions and country-level fiscal
policy are deeply interconnected for two reasons. First, the Italian Central Government
is directly responsible for the country-level primary balance. Second, there is a high
degree of centralization of the Italian system of taxes and transfers to sub-national enti-
ties (Regions, Provinces and Municipalities). Earlier studies (Arachi et al., 2010; IMF,
2011; Ruggeri, 2009) pointed out that if inter-regional redistribution is a pure transfer of
resources among regions, one should neutralize any national level deficit/surplus. This
choice is motivated by the circumstance that “interregional redistribution measures the
fiscal resources transferred among regions through federal intermediation. For a consis-
tent measure of interregional redistribution, the allocated federal revenues must equal the
allocated expenditures” (Ruggeri, 2009, p. 16).
Given that we treat each region as a separate economy, we must consider the HFFs
among regions as the regional fiscal flow net of its vertical component, i.e. the share of the
Central Government budget for which each region is "accountable". From an economic
point of view, a meaningful representation of the interpersonal redistribution requires
the decomposition of the regional fiscal flow with respect to its vertical and horizontal
components in order to keep into account the inter-temporal nature of the inter-regional
redistribution:
FFit = HFFit + V FFit
(GDP vs. personal income) and net transfers (broad vs. narrow measures) affect the results when we
aim to assess the implications of inter-regional redistribution.
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The vertical component (V FFit) that adds up to the country-level primary balance cap-
tures either the financial flows from the Central Government to regions or the overall
contributions of regions to the country-level surplus/deficit. Our approach is differ-
ent from the one adopted by Arachi et al. (2010), as we focus on pure inter-regional
redistribution only (HFF) and we treat the VFFs as the result of country-level fiscal
policy that can only moderate or amplify the effects of the FF on economic activity
(HFFit = FFit − V FFit). To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time that this
approach has been proposed.
The HFFs, representing the economic flows occurring among regions, are obtained
by computing the expenditures and revenues at the regional level under the constraint
that the budget at the national level is balanced all the time. Thus, if we observe a
surplus (deficit) at the country-level, it will be allocated at the regional level by reducing
(increasing) the revenues (expenditures) of each region in proportion of the regions’ share
of revenues (expenditures). By construction, at country-level, it must hold that:
FFt =
21∑︂
i=1
HFFit +
21∑︂
i=1
V FFit = V FFt ∀t
The horizontal fiscal flow HFFit, under the constraint that the government budget
at national level is balanced, must satisfy the following condition:
21∑︂
i=1
HFFit =
21∑︂
i=1
Ghit −
21∑︂
i=1
T hit = 0 ∀t
where Ghit and T
h
it are the i-th region’s budget items under the constraint that the country-
level budget is balanced at time t. It follows that:
1. If one observes a budget surplus (Gt < Tt), then the horizontal fiscal flow HFFit
for region i at time t reads:
HFFit = Git −Gt
(︃
Tit
Tt
)︃
= Ghit − T
h
it
2. If one observes a budget deficit (Gt > Tt), then the horizontal fiscal flow HFFit for
region i at time t reads:16
HFFit = Tt
(︃
Git
Gt
)︃
− Tit
= Ghit − T
h
it
16There is a third scenario in which the Central Government runs a balanced budget, but it is not
interesting.
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Finally, the vertical fiscal flow of region i at time t is computed as:
V FFit = FFit −HFFit
To clarify the methodology presented in this Section, we provide the following ex-
ample for a country with two regions (1 and 2). Let’s assume G1 = 30, G2 = 70,
T1 = 10, T2 = 190. Thus, we can compute the fiscal flows for the two regions, i.e.
FF1 = G1 − T1 = 20 and FF2 = G2 − T2 = −120. It follows that at national level we
observe a primary surplus, i.e. (G1 + G2) − (T1 + T2) = G − T = 100 − 200 = −100.
By following the procedure described above we obtain the following HFFs and VFFs for
the two regions: HFF1 = 25, V FF1 = −5, HFF2 = −25 and V FF2 = −95. It is
straightforward to verify that HFFs have been computed under the constraint that the
budget at the national level is balanced, i.e. HFF1 +HFF2 = 0. Moreover, VFFs sum
up to the national-level budget surplus as V FF1 + V FF2 = −100.
2.4 The econometric framework
In this Section, we propose a framework to estimate the redistributive and risk-
sharing effects of HFFs, based on the degree of the persistence of region-specific shocks.17
As in Bayoumi and Masson (1995), we distinguish between the redistributive (long-run)
and risk-sharing (short-run) features of inter-regional redistribution, as HFFs can reduce
long-term economic differentials and act as an insurance scheme among the territories
by smoothing out the impacts of short-run region-specific shocks to per capita GDP.
We also take into account the important implication of disentangling the HFF and VFF
components of regional fiscal flows by nesting HFF and VFF into the single equation
framework proposed by Mélitz and Zumer (2002), encompassing both short- and long-
run features of inter-regional redistribution. In the next Section we present the estimates
for the whole sample 1983-2015 and the sub-periods 1983-1995, 1996-2007 and 2008-
2015.
Our starting point is the following equation proposed by Mélitz and Zumer
(2002):18
(2.1)ff it = µ+ γxi. + ϕ (xit − xi.) + ϵit
where ffit represents the fiscal flow of region i at time t, xi. is the long-run average
of the per capita GDP over T periods, (xit − xi.) captures per capita GDP deviations
17A third case is represented by the stabilization that takes place in presence of a common shock. This
case is not relevant when talking about inter-regional redistribution, as a common shock is just a
country-level shock.
18The original equation proposed by Mélitz and Zumer (2002) is yit = αd + βdxi. + βs (xit − xi.) + ϵit.
This formulation is equivalent to equation 2.1, given that yit = xit+hffit, βd = γ− 1 and βs = ϕ− 1.
As shown in this Section, this formulation is likely to induce an over-fitting problem.
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from its long-run level and ϵit is the error term. The redistributive effect is given by −γ,
implying that each region i with a long-run per capita GDP one euro below (over) the
Italian average will receive (devolve) −γ cents from (to) other regions. The coefficient
−ϕ captures the size of risk-sharing, e.g., each region i will receive −ϕ euro cents as
a compensation for a one euro negative shock to its per capita GDP. All variables are
standardized with respect to the Italian per capita GDP in order to control for common
macroeconomic shocks.19
Our methodology is also robust to the over-fitting problem arising with the estima-
tion approach used so far in other studies. In fact, using yit = xit+ hffit (see Mélitz and
Zumer, 2002), as dependent variable, determines and over-estimation of the regression
statistics such as R2 and the t-statistics, that may affect the significance of regression
estimates. The over-fitting problem arises as yit is a composite variables that includes
the dependent variable xit itself. In Table 2 we report the estimates for the risk-sharing
effects, using both our framework and the formulation used so far in the extant literature.
Estimates are obtained using a Pooled OLS and are numerically identical. Estimates ob-
tained using the traditional approach exhibit an over-fitting problem as it delivers very
high R2, high t-stats and consequently lower p-values. This could be a serious prob-
lem when a coefficient estimate is close to be rejected as we could end up with spurious
estimated coefficient.
In the same fashion of equation 2.1 it is possible to estimate the redistributive and
risk-sharing effects of VFFs:
(2.2)vff it = µ
v + γvxi. + ϕv (xit − xi.) + ϵ
v
it
Given that HFFs are equal to hff it = ff it − vff it we can subtract the right- and
left-hand side of equation 2.2 from equation 2.1 and we obtain:
(2.3)hff it = µ
h + γhxi. + ϕh (xit − xi.) + ϵ
h
it
where γh = (γ − γv) and ϕh = (ϕ− ϕv), ϵ
h
it = (ϵit − ϵ
v
it) and µ
h = (µ− µv); in the
absence of country-level fiscal adjustments or deficits (i.e., vffit = 0 for all i, t that imply
γv = 0 and ϕv = 0) we would observe γh = γ and ϕh = ϕ that can be estimated using
equation 2.1. Equation 2.3 disentangles the HFF and VFF components of regional fiscal
flows, capturing the country-level fiscal adjustments that may moderate or amplify the
redistributive and risk-sharing features of inter-regional redistribution.
The redistributive and risk-sharing effects captured by equation 2.3 can also be
estimated separately in order to have more flexibility in the choice of the most suitable
19For a given region i at time t and a generic variable Zit in per capita terms, we standardize Zit as
zit =
Zit
Xt
, where Xt is the country level per capita GDP.
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estimator. To estimate the redistributive effects of HFF, we exploit the cross-sectional
dimension of our dataset:
(2.4)hff i. = µ
h + γhxi. + κ
h
i
while the risk-sharing equation is estimated exploiting also the time dimension of
our panel:
(2.5)hff it = α
h
i + ϕhxit + u
h
it
where αhi = hff i. − ϕhxi. is the region-specific fixed effect. Finally, the error terms of
equations 2.4 and 2.5 are such that ϵit = κ
h
i + µ
h
it.
To allow for the testing of the redistributive effects over sub-periods we decided to
use an approximation of equation 2.4:
(2.6)hff it = µ
h + γh · xit + λt + υ
h
it
To choose the most appropriated estimation methodology for equations 2.5 and 2.6,
we preliminarily investigated the behavior of our data. Equation 2.6 can be estimated
by using a simple OLS with robust standard errors. To keep into account the presence
of outliers, we run equation 2.6 using the whole set of regions and iteratively excluding
one region at time. We determined that Valle d’Aosta heavily affects the magnitude
of estimates, and we decided to eliminate this small influential region (see Figure 2.1
that reports the regression lines excluding only three regions to highlight the outlier
problem).20
To estimate equation 2.5, we decided to exclude capital account’s items from the
fiscal variables, as they are extremely volatile. To use variables in level, we resorted
to the estimation technique used by Canova and Ravn (1996) and Arachi et al. (2010)
that allows us to run a simple OLS, using as variables the cycle components of Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) filtered variables with a penalty parameter equal to 7. Thus, equation 2.5
becomes:
(2.7)
(︂
hffit − ˜hff it
)︂
= ϕh · (xit − x˜it) + λt + u
h
it
where (xit − x˜it) denotes the cycle component of the HP-filtered xit and x˜it is its
trend component. Results obtained comparing our estimates for Equation 2.7 with other
estimation strategies for risk-sharing are described in Subsection 2.5.3 and reported in
Table 7.
20The other regression lines, obtained excluding iteratively the other Italian regions are available upon
request.
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Figure 2.1: Redistributive effects under different samples - Period 1983-1995
From a policy-making point of view, it seems desirable to test how redistributive
and risk-sharing effects of HFFs changed over time. To do so, we considered the following
modified version of equations 2.6 and 2.7:
(2.8)hff it = µ
h +
3∑︂
j=1
γjh · g
j · xit + λt + κ
h
i
and
(2.9)
(︂
hffit − ˜hff it
)︂
=
3∑︂
j=1
ϕjh · g
j · (xit − x˜it) + λt + u
h
it
where gj is a time dummy taking a value of 1 over the sub-periods 1983-1995, 1996-
2007 and over the 2008-2015 span, 0 otherwise. We can also decompose the HFF redis-
tributive and risk-sharing effects modeled in equations 2.6 and 2.7 to isolate the mod-
erating/magnifying effect of the VFF both for redistributive and risk-sharing effects, by
running a simple OLS on equations 2.8 and 2.9.
2.4.1 Assessing the role of regional fiscal flow items with respect
to the overall redistributive and risk-sharing effect
In order to measure the individual impact of various expenditure and revenue items
of the HFF, we also run a series of partial regressions by exploiting the fact that hff it is
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Table 2
Estimation of risk-sharing effects and over-fitting problems - Period: 2008-2015
Dependent variable
Explanatory variables
(︂
hffit − ˜hff it
)︂
(yit − y˜it)
Coefficient t-.stat Coefficient t-stat
ϕh 0.269
** (0.12) 2.17 0.269*** (0.12) 10.22
R2 0.16 0.53
Number of observations 160 160
Number of regions 20 20
Per region observations 8 8
Our Equation 2.7:
(︂
hffit − ˜hff it
)︂
= ϕh · (xit − x˜it) + λt + u
h
it.
Extant literature approach: (yit − y˜it) = (1− ϕh) · (xit − x˜it) + λt + u
h
it where yit = xit + hffit.
Estimates have been obtained running a pooled OLS with robust standard errors. Yearly dummies (λt) have been included.
The sample does not include Valle d’Aosta and all variables are in per capita terms and standardized with respect to the
Italian per capita GDP. Coefficients’ significance level: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
a composite variable given by the algebraic sum of the HFF items. To do so, we use the
following decomposition of the HFF for the i-th region at time t:
(2.10)
hff it = g
h
it − t
h
it
=
3∑︂
e=1
ghiet −
2∑︂
r=1
thirt
In this way, it is possible to isolate the contributions of each expenditure (social pro-
tection expenditures, other current expenditures and investments) and revenue (social
contributions, other current revenues and capital account revenues) items of HFF for
equations 2.6 and 2.7.
2.5 Results
In this Section we present the dataset’s variables and the estimation results concern-
ing the decomposition of the HFF and VFF redistributive and risk-sharing effects for
the whole sample and the three sub-periods 1983-1995, 1996-2007 and 2008-2015. The
relevant periods have been chosen on a narrative basis, i.e. according to the main breaks
in the paradigm of the Italian fiscal policy that affected the system of taxes and trans-
fers, and allow to have enough data observations for running econometric estimates (see
Introduction).
We also provide an assessment of the contributions of the various items of HFFs
to the the overall redistributive and risk-sharing effect. We report the estimates for the
whole period 1983-2015; we decided not to present the results on the whole period as they
22
are not very informative, being nothing more than averages of the coefficients estimated
across the sub-periods.
2.5.1 The North-South economic dualism and the horizontal
flows among regions
Inter-regional redistribution in Italy is a relevant policy-making issue, as regional
differences, especially in the levels of economic activity, are striking and long-lasting.
For the period 1983-2015, Figure 2.2(a) reports the ranking of Italian regions in terms
of standardized per capita GDPs; the richest region was the Autonomous Province of
Bolzano, with a value of 133.0, while the poorest region was Calabria, with a value of
60.5. During the same period, the average per capita GDP of the Southern regions and
the Center-Northern regions was equal to 68.6 and 117.3, respectively. Tables A.3-A.5
show that the dispersion of Italian regions’ standardized per capita GDPs, as measured
by the coefficient of variation, is ample and increasing over time.
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(a) Italian regions per capita GDP - Period 1983-2015.
Source: Own elaborations on Istat data and various data sources (see
the Appendix and Section 2.3). Base year 2010.
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Figure 2.2
During the 1980s, the well-known dualism between Southern and Center-Northern
Italian regions in the levels of economic activity widened. After a period of relative sta-
bility that followed the takeover in 1999 of monetary policy decisions by the Governing
Council of the European Central Bank (ECB), the GDP gap became even more ample
with the unfolding of the sovereign debts crisis in 2011 when the Italian Central Gov-
ernment was forced to undertake fierce fiscal consolidation measures21 to re-establish the
21Three fiscal packages were introduced between July and December 2011 to ensure the long-run sustain-
ability of the Italian public debt (roughly 130% of Italian GDP). One of these packages was aimed at
ensuring the pension system sustainability by tying work-life duration to life expectancy and weakening
employment and insurance schemes. For an extensive analysis of the macroeconomic and fiscal policy
developments in Italy during the 2000s, see Bassanetti et al. (2013).
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confidence of the financial markets in the sustainability of the public debt. Figure 2.2(b)
reports both the Central Government’s primary balance and a proxy for the economic
development gap computed as the ratio between the Southern and the Center-Northern
regions’ per capita GDPs. After 2011, Italy went through a severe fiscal adjustment,
despite the worsening of the gap between the Center-North and South of Italy in terms
of relative per capita GDPs.
Our data evidence that HFFs routed from Center-Northern Italian regions to South-
ern ones are substantial and seem closely linked to the persistent economic dualism be-
tween Center-Northern and Southern regions (Tables A.3-A.5). These implicit financial
transfers, carried out by the Italian system of taxes and transfers, resulted in an “inter-
personal” redistribution with equalization purposes and contributed to financial cohesion
policies aimed at re-balancing the socio-economic differences between territories. During
the period 1983-2015, HFFs roughly equal to 4.3% of the Italian GDP per year (Figure
2.3(b)), allowed for the Southern regions’ citizens to enjoy levels of per capita public
spending that exceeded tax revenues that were collected in their territories (fiscal capa-
bility). Looking at Figure 2.3(a) that reports a box-plot of HFFs for each Italian region
over the period 1983-2015. It emerges that Southern regions have constantly been the
major beneficiaries of inter-regional redistribution (together with the special statute re-
gions and the smallest regions), while all the Center-Northern ordinary statute regions
have been the main contributors. As reported in Tables A.3-A.5 and Figure 2.3(a), during
the period 1983-1995 (1996-2007), HFFs represented the 17.4% (18.0%) share of the per
capita GDP of Southern regions’ area. During the period 2008-2015, this value has risen
to 19.2% of the area GDP, reflecting the large downfall in the levels of economic activity
during the crisis. For Center-Northern regions, HFFs have been negative and roughly
steady over the three periods, ranging from −5.7 to −5.9% of the area’s GDP.
Looking at the single items of inter-regional redistribution, we observed that differ-
ences in public expenditures have been less striking than those observed for tax revenues
(Tables A.3-A.5), even if over the 1983-2015 period, the per capita public expenditure of
the Center-Northern regions has been on average 10 percentage points above that of the
Southern regions (Figure 2.4(a)). During the same time span, the tax revenues of the
Center-Northern regions have been 35 percentage points above the Southern regions’ lev-
els (Figure 2.4(c)). Moreover, throughout the whole period, the standardized per capita
primary public expenditures were less dispersed (18.4% in the period 1983-1995, 22.4%
during the period 1996-2007 and 19.0% during the period 2008-2015) than tax revenues
were (27.5% for the span 1983-1995, 28.0% for the span 1996-2007 and 25.8% during the
period 2008-2015).
HFFs must also be confronted with the VFFs, i.e., the repartition on a regional basis
of the primary balance for which the Central Government is ultimately responsible. Figure
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(a) Horizontal fiscal flows over regional GDPs - Period 1983-2015.
Source: Own elaborations on Istat data and Regional Public Accounts
data (see the Appendix and Section 2.3). Base year 2010.
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a ratio of GDP is given by V FFCN
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t
. Negative values of
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t
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t
measure the area’s contribution to country-level
fiscal adjustments, while positive amounts represent the part of the
country-level deficit that is routed to each area. Source: Own elab-
orations on Istat data and Regional Public Accounts data (see the
Appendix and Section 2.3). Base year 2010.
Figure 2.3
2.3(b) reports the decomposition of regional fiscal flows in their horizontal and vertical
components as a percentage of Italian GDP for the span 1983-2015. During the 1980s,
Italy ran primary deficits that were implicitly routed to inter-regional redistribution in the
form of VFFs. Conversely, since the 1990s, the Italian Central Government has started
to run primary surpluses to control its huge public debt, and both Center-Northern
and Southern regions have contributed to such fiscal adjustments. Across the time span
1983-1990, the Government has provided the Center-Northern and Southern regions VFF
resources representing 1.6% and 0.8%, respectively, of the Italian GDP. Conversely, the
period 1992-2008 was characterized by substantial primary surpluses, and the yearly
contribution of the Southern region and the Center-Northern region to the country-level
primary surplus has been, respectively, 0.8% and 2.6% of the Italian GDP. With the
onset of the economic crisis, during the span 2009-2011 the magnitude of the Southern
regions’ contribution to the country-level surplus decreased to 0.2% of the Italian GDP,
while the Center-Northern regions’ contribution has been equal to 0.7%. As already
highlighted, the subsequent sovereign debt crisis in 2011 forced the Italian Government
to undertake fierce fiscal consolidation measures. In this context, during the span 2012-
2015, the contribution in terms of VFFs of the Center-Northern and Southern regions
to the national primary surplus rose again to 2.0% and 0.6%, respectively, of the Italian
GDP.
Figure 2.2(b) suggests the possible existence of two channels that may magnify the
way through which inter-regional fiscal flows affect the Southern regions’ economic ac-
tivity. The first channel is represented by the economic activity’s degree of dependence
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on public spending that is proxied by the index proposed by Geri and Volpe (1993)22
reported in Figure 2.4(b), which measures the regional public spending-to-GDP ratio.
Data tell us that the index remained roughly stable for Center-Northern regions, while
it went slightly up for Southern regions, as per capita public spending in the Southern
regions exhibited a slightly upward trend during the last 15 years (Figure 2.4(a)), while
during the same period, per capita GDP went down at a faster rate. The second chan-
nel is the tax effort23 that measures the regional tax-to-GDP ratio with respect to the
country-level average. Data show that the tax burden gap between the Center-North and
the Southern regions declined from 11.3 in the span 1983-1995 to 8.6 percentage points
during the period 1996-2007. In 2008-2015 the gap was 3.8 percentage points, and in
2012, the South experienced for the first time a tax burden 0.3 percentage points above
that of the Center-North (Tables A.3-A.5 and Figure 2.4(d)).
Throughout the span 1983-2015, in fact, the Southern regions’ per capita GDP gap
and the country-level primary balance exhibited a correlation coefficient of 0.60, sug-
gesting that the path followed by the Southern regions’ per capita GDP gap and the
country-level primary deficits (Gt − Tt) can be explained in relative terms with respect
to the Center-Northern regions by both the higher degree of dependence of the Southern
regions’ economic activity on public spending and by the lower tax effort of the Southern
regions. However, the correlation coefficient between the Southern regions’ per capita
GDP gap and the country-level primary balances decreased from 0.79 over the period
1983-2001 to 0.15 during the 2002-2015 span, suggesting that since the 2000s, the higher
degree of relative dependence of the Southern regions’ economic activity on public spend-
ing (Figure 2.4(b)) has been counterbalanced by a sharp increase in the Southern regions’
tax effort (Figure 2.4(d)).
Figures 2.4(c) and (d) shows that the Center-Northern regions pay on average more
taxes than the Southern regions both in per capita terms and with respect to the size of
their GDPs (Tables A.3-A.5). This evidence is consistent with a progressive fiscal system,
such as the Italian one, in which the tax effort of richer regions is usually higher than
the one of poorer regions. Note that since the mid-1990s the tax efforts of the two areas
has progressively converged, as the Southern regions’ tax revenues grew faster than that
of the Center-Northern regions (Figure 2.4(d)). A possible explanation is that after the
2000s, local taxation has risen, forcing the Southern regions’ sub-national tiers of Gov-
ernment (Regions and Municipalities) to levy taxes at the local level (Figures 2.5(c) and
(d)) to finance an increasing share of public spending not covered anymore by Central
Government transfers (Figures 2.5(a) and (b)). This should not sound surprising as finan-
22The indicator of region i’s economic activity dependency on public spending is equal to its per capita
public expenditure divided by the Italian average, i.e., (Git/Popit)/(Gt/Popt).
23The region i tax effort is equal to its per capita tax revenue divided by the Italian average, i.e.,
(Tit/Popit)/(Tt/Popt).
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cially distressed regional health systems (Aimone Gigio et al., 2018) and Municipalities
are over-represented in the Southern regions (Degni et al., 2017).
2.5.2 Redistributive Effects
Tables 3 and 4 report the redistributive effects of the HFF on the GDP, obtained
from estimating equations 2.6 and 2.8 using a pooled OLS with yearly dummies over
the three sub periods j where j = 1 for 1983-1995, j = 2 for 1996-2007 and j = 3 for
2008-2015.
In Table 3, we report the estimates obtained for equation 2.8 and present a decompo-
sition of HFF redistributive effects that allows us to disentangle the overall redistributive
activity (FF) among Italian regions from the VFF component that captures the ampli-
fier/moderator role played by the country-level primary balance on the HFF redistributive
effects. We estimated the decomposition of HFF redistributive effects (−γjh = −(γ
j−γjv))
by estimating equation 2.8 for HFF, FF and VFF given that HFF=FF-VFF. We also con-
ducted a series of Wald tests on the estimated coefficients to assess if their values are
statistically different from one period to another.
Looking at the time profile of the estimated redistributive effects of HFFs (−γjh)
reported in the second column of Table 3, we notice that the ability of HFFs to smooth
long-run differentials in the regions’ levels of economic activity decreased over time from
35.8% in the period 1983-1995 to 28.9% during the span 1996-2007. Finally, during the
period 2007-2015, which covers also the economic and sovereign debts crises, we found
a redistributive effect of HFF of 29.9% of the standardized per capita GDP. The Wald
tests suggest that the changes in the redistributive effects over time are statistically
different only when we compare the first span 1983-1995 with the second and the third
sub-period.
Considering that HFFs are obtained as the difference among overall inter-regional
flows (FF) and VFFs (see Section 2.3), a further investigation of our estimates (−γjh)
suggests that after the mid-1990s the HFFs’ redistributive effects went down due to the
VFF component that captures the contribution that Italian regions were implicitly re-
quired to give to the country-level primary surpluses run by the Central Government.
In the Italian case, VFFs contributed to moderate the redistributive effects that would
have been reached in a country-level balanced budget situation. As reported in column
4 of Table 3, VFFs had a slight moderating role (−γjv) on the HFFs redistributive effects
during the span 1983-1995, i.e. VFFs contributed to a 1% amplification of an existing
1% long-run differential in regional GDP levels. During the two subsequent sub-periods,
VFFs exhibited a moderating effect of 4.3% during the period 1996-2007 and 2.0% for the
2008-2015 crisis period. Wald tests suggest that the estimates of γjv are statistically dif-
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ferent across the sub-periods of our analysis. Our estimates highlight that inter-regional
redistribution is closely tied to nation-wide fiscal policy, especially when a country is
forced to run primary surpluses year after year as a consequence of its huge public debt.
During bad times, this implies that a country has limited room to let automatic stabi-
lizers work; thus, all territories are called to contribute to primary surpluses. A possible
explanation is that redistributive effects after the mid-1990s have been pushed down by
a tighter country-level fiscal discipline that indirectly contributed to amplify the long-
lasting economic dualism between Center-Northern and Southern Italian regions (Figure
2.2(a)) whose GDP is highly dependent on public spending (Figure 2.4(a)).
Table 3
Testing redistributive effects over time (Equation 2.8)
Dependent variable
Explanatory variables
HFF: ffh
it
FF: ffit VFF: ff
v
it
Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e.
γ -0.315*** 0.01 -0.340*** 0.01 0.025*** 0.00
γ1 -0.358*** 0.05 -0.368*** 0.05 0.010*** 0.00
γ2 -0.289*** 0.08 -0.332*** 0.08 0.043*** 0.00
γ3 -0.295*** 0.08 -0.315*** 0.08 0.020*** 0.00
µ 0.389*** 0.05 0.421*** 0.05 -0.032*** 0.00
Wald tests across sub-periods (p-value)
γ1 = γ2 0.02 0.21 0.00
γ1 = γ3 0.05 0.11 0.00
γ2 = γ3 0.87 0.66 0.00
R2 0.65 0.64 0.97
Number of observations 660 660 660
Number of regions 20 20 20
Per region observations 33 33 33
We estimate the following versions of Equation 2.8: zit = µ +
∑︁3
j=1 γ
j
· gj · xit + λt + κit where zit =
{︁
ffhit, ffit, ff
v
it
}︁
;
γj · gj=γ1 if t=1983-1995; γ2 if t=1996-2007; γ3 if t=2008-2015; γ if t=1983-2015. Estimates have been obtained running
a pooled OLS with robust standard errors. Yearly dummies (λt) have been included. The sample does not include Valle
d’Aosta and all variables are in per capita terms and standardized with respect to the Italian per capita GDP. Coefficients’
significance level: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
It is also important to assess which are the fiscal items that have been responsible
for the reduction in the redistributive effects after the mid-1990s, as the results of the
assessment has important policy implications. In Table 4, we present the results obtained
by running a several partial regressions for equation 2.6, using the spending and revenue
items of HFFs to isolate the contributions each item to the overall redistributive effect
that we have already presented. Our estimates suggest that redistributive effects for
Italian regional economies are reached through the tax system while expenditure items
tend to amplify long-run differentials in regional GDPs. We found that tax revenues
are the only drivers of inter-regional redistribution across the sub periods under scrutiny
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Table 4
Decomposition of HFF hff it redistributive effects’ components (Equation 2.6)
Period
Dependent variables
1983-1995 1996-2007 2008-2015
Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e.
Social expenditures 0.072*** 0.00 0.082*** 0.01 0.065*** 0.01
Other current expenditures 0.031*** 0.02 0.035*** 0.01 0.036** 0.02
Capital expenditures -0.010 0.01 0.036*** 0.01 0.047*** 0.01
Primary expenditures (git) 0.093
*** 0.02 0.153*** 0.02 0.148*** 0.02
Contributive revenues -0.146*** 0.00 -0.124*** 0.00 -0.141*** 0.01
Other current revenues -0.305*** 0.01 -0.315*** 0.01 -0.300*** 0.01
Total revenues (−tit) -0.451
*** 0.01 -0.441*** 0.01 -0.443*** 0.01
Horizontal fiscal flow (git − tit) -0.358
*** 0.02 -0.289*** 0.02 -0.295*** 0.03
Number of observations 260 240 160
Number of regions 20 20 20
Per region observations 13 12 8
Equation 2.6 has been estimated recursively using the decomposition shown in Equation 2.10. Note: Estimates have been
obtained by using pooled OLS with robust standard errors. Yearly dummies have been included. All variables are in
per capita terms and standardized with respect to the Italian per capita GDP. Coefficients’ significance level: *p < 0.10,
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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(45.1%, 44.1% and 44.3% of per capita GDP), while expenditures tend to restrain redis-
tributive effects (−9.3%, −15.3% and −14.8% of per capita GDP). This result is at odds
with the findings of Decressin (2002) and Arachi et al. (2010) for Italy and is due to a
different decomposition approach we decided to employ to disentangle the contributions
of expenditures and revenues to the overall estimate.24 This interpretation is consistent
with our descriptive statistics that highlighted that Southern regions levels of spending
are constantly below the ones of Center-Northern regions, although public spending in
Italian regions is less dispersed than taxes.
During the span 1983-1995, the redistributive effect has been positively affected by
social contributions (14.6%) and other current revenues (30.5%) that include direct and
indirect revenues, while the role of revenues in capital account was negligible. Social
protection and other current expenditures negatively affected redistribution (−7.2% and
−3.1%, respectively), while the contribution of capital account expenditures was not
significant. For the period 1996-2007, we found that the positive effect of revenues on
redistribution is more or less stable, while public expenditures accounted for the fall of
redistribution with respect to the 1983-1995 span. Again, the redistributive effects were
driven by social contributions (12.4%) and other current revenues that include direct,
and indirect revenues (31.5%), while the contribution of revenues in capital account is
negligible. Social protection, other current expenditures and capital account expenditure
negatively affected redistribution (−8.2%, −3.5% and −3.6%, respectively). Finally, for
the period 2008-2015, we observed a further reduction in the HFF’s redistributive effect
that was driven by capital account spending.
A plausible explanation of our results is that that the ability of the Italian system
of taxation and transfers to reduce per capita GDP disparities among Italian regions
declined over time because of the increased divergence of Italian regions in terms of
expenditures for social protection and in capital account (see Tables 4 and A.3-A.5). Our
findings are consistent with the descriptive statistics in which we highlighted how the tax
burden of Southern regions increased over time in connection with the increase in the
share of locally financed public spending as a consequence of a substantial reduction in
the transfers from the Central Government to sub-national tiers of Government (Figures
2.5 (a) and (b)). It seems plausible that the sub-national tiers of government, especially
the Municipalities, started to decrease non-current expenditures that are notoriously
more difficult to cut and started to raise local taxation (Figure 2.5 (c) and (d)) to fit the
Internal Stability Pact rules that are a direct consequence of the budgetary target followed
by the Italian Government to comply with the Stability and Growth Pact introduced
24In running partial regressions, we decided to re-scale variables with respect to the Italian per capita
GDP, while in Decressin (2002) and Arachi et al. (2010), each variable is scaled by the corresponding
country-level per capita value.
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with the Maastricht Treaty (Balassone and Franco, 2003). From a policy-making point
of view, this evidence raises a crucial policy issue regarding the need for the Italian
Central Government to setup a mechanism to foster public investment spending that is
pivotal for growth. Looking at the data, we see that the capital spending of Southern
regions is well below that of the Center-Northern ones and went down at a higher pace,
especially during the 2008-2015 period with the exception of 2015, when the sharp rise
in the Southern regions’ capital spending was driven by the need to spend the greatest
part of the European funds (ERDF/ESF Funds) associated with cohesion policies for the
programming period 2007-2013 (Banca d’Italia, 2016).
2.5.3 Risk-Sharing effects
To assess risk-sharing effects of HFFs, i.e. the ability of HFFs to smooth short-run
region-specific shocks hitting the Italian regions’ GDP, we estimated equations 2.7 and
2.9 using a pooled OLS on variables taken as the cycle components of the corresponding
variables that we have used to evaluate redistributive effects. As in Canova and Ravn
(1996) and Arachi et al. (2010), we used a HP-filter with a penalty parameter equal to
7. As already mentioned in Section 2.4, in estimating risk-sharing effects we decided to
exclude from the analysis the region Valle d’Aosta and capital account items, as they are
extremely volatile. The results are reported Tables 5 and 6.
Looking at the risk-sharing effects of HFFs (−ϕjh = −(ϕ
j − ϕjv)) obtained by es-
timating equation 2.9 for each component of the coefficient (i.e. HFF, FF and VFF),
reported in Table 5, we found that an insurance scheme for stabilizing short-run eco-
nomic to a region’s GDP was implicitly in place until mid-1990s (13.1%), confirming the
findings of Decressin (2002), while we did not find any risk-sharing effect for the period
1996-2007. Finally, during the period 2008-2015, our results suggest that HFFs acted as
a risk-enhancing device, i.e. they amplified short-run shocks to regional GDPs (−26.7%).
We find evidence that while during the period 1996-2007, VFFs acted as a risk-enhancing
device and thus as an amplifier of the risk-enhancing effect among Italian regions observed
for fiscal flows (FF) to amplify risk-sharing; during the 2008-2015 period we found that
the risk-sharing effect of VFFs is not statistically significant.
Looking at the decomposition of the risk-sharing effect of HFFs (Table 6) obtained by
estimating equation 2.7, we observe that during the span 1983-1995, social expenditures
contributed to smooth short-run shocks to regional GDPs (2.1%), while this function
disappeared during the subsequent time spans. Once again, the drivers of stabilization
effects are the taxation items. During the period 1983-1995, all revenue items contributed
to smooth regional shocks, while for period 1996-2007, we observe that only contributive
revenues acted as a risk-sharing mechanism. Finally, for the span 2008-2015, we found
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Table 5
Testing risk-sharing effects over time (Equation 2.9)
Dependent variable
Explanatory variables
HFF:
(︂
hffit − ˜hff it
)︂
FF:
(︂
ffit − f˜f it
)︂
VFF:
(︂
hffv
it
− ˜hff
v
it
)︂
Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e.
ϕ 0.008 0.05 0.011 0.05 -0.003 0.01
ϕ1 -0.131*** 0.02 -0.125*** 0.03 -0.006 0.01
ϕ2 0.002 0.13 0.041 0.14 -0.040** 0.02
ϕ3 0.267** 0.12 0.232* 0.12 0.034 0.02
Wald tests across sub-periods (p-value)
ϕ1 = ϕ2 − − −
ϕ1 = ϕ3 0.00 0.00 −
ϕ2 = ϕ3 − − −
R2 0.15 0.24 0.90
Number of observations 660 660 660
Number of regions 20 20 20
Per region observations 33 33 33
We estimate the following versions of Equation 2.9: (zit − z˜it) =
∑︁3
j=1 ϕ
j
· gj · (xit − x˜it) + λt + uit where zit ={︁
ffhit, ffit, ff
v
it
}︁
; ϕj · gj=ϕ1 if t=1983-1995; ϕ2 if t=1996-2007; ϕ3 if t=2008-2015; ϕ if t=1983-2015.
Estimates have been obtained running a pooled OLS with robust standard errors. Yearly dummies (λt) have been included.
The sample does not include Valle d’Aosta and all variables are in per capita terms and standardized with respect to the
Italian per capita GDP. Coefficients’ significance level: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
that other current revenues acted as a risk-enhancing device (24.1%). Looking more in
detail to this taxation item, we see that it encompasses direct and indirect taxation,
including consumption and property taxes that are partially levied by sub-national tiers
of Government. A possible explanation for these results is that during the last 10 years
the Italian Central Government did not set up any insurance scheme to cope with difficult
economic cycles, leaving sub-national entities to deal with the negative effects of local
economy downturns. In Italy this situation has been exacerbated by the impossibility of
permitting automatic stabilizers work, due to the fiscal consolidation measures that have
been introduced to control the path of the Italian public debt.
2.5.4 Robustness checks
To verify that our estimates differ from other studies only because of the fact that we
excluded outliers from the analysis and as a consequence of our methodological choices
in computing the regional fiscal flows, we decided to compare them with those obtained
with the econometric approaches proposed by other studies. To make the comparison
as simple as possible, we decided to estimate redistributive and risk-sharing effects for
Italy during the period 1983-1992 as in Decressin (2002). Providing more detail, Arachi
et al. (2010) applied an HP filter to fiscal and economic activity variables and employed
the same techniques used by Mélitz and Zumer (2002). Conversely, Poghosyan et al.
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Table 6
Decomposition of hff it risk-sharing effects’ components (Equation 2.7)
Period
Dependent variables
1983-1995 1996-2007 2008-2015
Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e.
Social expenditures -0.021*** 0.01 -0.007 0.02 -0.006 0.02
Other current expenditures 0.001 0.02 0.002 0.03 0.021 0.03
Primary expenditures (git) -0.002 0.02 -0.005 0.03 0.015 0.05
Contributive revenues -0.048*** 0.01 -0.051** 0.02 0.013 0.04
Other current revenues -0.063*** 0.02 -0.058 0.12 0.241** 0.11
Total revenues (−tit) -0.111
*** 0.02 0.006 0.12 0.254** 0.12
Horizontal fiscal flow (git − tit) -0.131
*** 0.02 0.002 0.13 0.269** 0.12
Number of observations 260 240 160
Number of regions 20 20 20
Per region observations 13 12 8
Equation 2.7 has been estimated recursively using the decomposition shown in Equation 2.10. Note: Estimates have been
obtained by using feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) with fixed effects, allowing for an AR(1) heteroskedastic cross-
correlated error term. Yearly dummies have been included. All variables are in per capita terms and standardized with
respect to the Italian per capita GDP. Coefficients’ significance level: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. R2 and constants
have not been reported but are available upon request.
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(2016) relied on a pooled mean group estimator25 developed by Pesaran et al. (1999)
that is based on an error correction mechanism equation. We also decided to take the
first-differences of our variables, as GDP is highly persistent due to the presence of auto-
correlation, while our fiscal variables suffer non-stationarity, as suggested by unit-root
diagnostic tests. To control for the non-stationarity of our variables, equation 2.5 can be
restated using first-differenced variables:
(2.11)∆hff it = θ
h
i + ϕh∆xit + υ
h
it
where θhi captures region-specific fixed effects and controls for the presence of a drift in
the error term (see Mélitz and Zumer (2002) for more details). Estimates for equation
2.11 (see Table 7 and Table 8) are obtained using a feasible GLS (FGLS), allowing for
an AR(1) heteroskedastic cross-correlated error term and for region-specific fixed effects,
as well as by using a system GMM developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). Finally, we
estimate risk-sharing effects, relying on a system GMM estimator developed by Blundell
and Bond (1998)26 that allows us to control for the potential endogeneity of GDP with
respect to fiscal variables and to remove fixed effects. In Table 8, we report the estimates
obtained with our estimation methodology as well as those obtained with the estimation
methodologies used by Decressin (2002), Arachi et al. (2010) and Poghosyan et al. (2016).
We conclude that our estimation strategy is quite robust, as we did not observe any
improvement in the quality of estimates by using alternative methodologies. Note that
our estimate of inter-regional redistribution for the period 1983−1995 is much higher than
the 27.5% originally found by Decressin (2002) for the span 1983-1992. The difference
is due to our choice of eliminating a small influential region from the analysis (Valle
d’Aosta); otherwise, we would have obtained similar results. In Section 2.2 are presented
the original results obtained in the existing literature.
2.6 Conclusions
Our estimates indicate that the redistributive power of horizontal fiscal flows among
Italian regions is substantial, and we present evidence that its magnitude declined over
25We estimated the following equation:
∆hffit = φ
h
i
[hffit−1 − θh − γhxit−1 + ψh · time] + ϕh∆xit + η
h
it
This equation encompasses the redistributive features of inter-regional redistribution (−γh) as well as
the risk-sharing effect (−ϕh) following a short-run deviations of GDP from its long-run value. This
framework allows for the assessment of both redistributive and risk-sharing effects, relying on a single-
step estimation procedure.
26The Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator is a refinement of the original GMM methodology pioneered
by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991).
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Table 7
Different estimators to assess risk-sharing effects
Dependent variable
Explanatory variables
(a) FGLS: ∆hffit (b) System GMM: ∆hffit (c) OLS:
(︂
hffit − ˜hff it
)︂
Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e.
ϕh -0.046
*** 0.01 0.020 0.05 -0.008 0.05
ϕ1
h
-0.079*** 0.02 -0.082* 0.04 -0.131*** 0.02
ϕ2
h
0.023 0.03 0.051 0.07 0.002 0.13
ϕ3
h
0.050* 0.03 0.019 0.10 0.269** 0.12
Hansen test (p-value) 1.00
Test AR(1) first diff.(p-value) 0.01
Test AR(2) first diff.(p-value) 0.63
Number of observations 640 640 660
Number of regions 20 20 20
Per region observations 32 32 33
Equation 2.11: ∆hff it = θ
h
i +
∑︁3
j=1 ϕ
j
h · g
j
·∆xit + λt + υ
h
it where ϕ
j
h · g
j=ϕ1h if t=1983-1995; ϕ
2
h if t=1996-2007; ϕ
3
h if
t=2008-2015. ϕh if t=1983-2015.
(a) Estimates for Equation 2.11 have been obtained by using feasible generalized least squares (FGLS), allowing for an
AR(1) heteroskedastic cross-correlated error term. Yearly dummies (λt) have been included.
(b) Equation 2.11. Note: Instruments for the Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM estimator are given by lags 1-2 of
the explanatory variable levels and first differences. Yearly dummies (λt) have been included.
(c) Equation 2.7:
(︂
hffit − ˜hff it
)︂
= γh (xit − x˜it) + λt + u
h
it, using the cycle components of the corresponding HP filtered
variables (penalty parameter equal to 7) obtained by subtracting from each variable its trend component (i.e., ˜hff it and
x˜it). Yearly dummies (λt) have been included.
The sample does not include Valle d’Aosta and all variables are in per capita terms and standardized with respect to the
Italian per capita GDP. Coefficients’ significance level: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Table 8
Redistributive and risk-sharing effects - Period: 1983-1992
Dependent variables: HFF
Estimation methodology
Our estimates Decressin (2002) Arachi et al. (2010) Poghosyan et al. (2016)
−γh −ϕh −γh −ϕh −γh −ϕh −ϕh −ϕh
Equation 2.6: Pooled
OLS
-
0.350***
-
0.350***
Equation 2.5: FGLS
with Fixed Effects and
AR(1) error
-
0.276***
Equation 2.5: System
GMM
-
0.086***
Equation 2.5: Fixed
Effects
-
0.219***
Equation 2.4: OLS -
0.350***
Equation 2.11: FGLS
with Fixed Effects and
AR(1) error
-
0.088***
Equation 2.11: Fixed
Effects
-0.093**
Equation 2.7: OLS -0.089**
ECM Equation: PMG -
0.315***
-
0.080***
The sample does not include Valle d’Aosta and all variables are in per capita terms and standardized with respect to the Italian per capita GDP. Yearly dummies
have been included.
Coefficients’ significance level: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Equation 2.6: hff it = µ
h+ γhxit+λt+υ
h
it. For Arachi et al. (2010), we estimated an equation with the trend component of HP filtered variables with a penalty
parameter equal to 7: ˜hff it = µ
h + γhx˜it + ϵ
h
it.
Equation 2.5: hff it = α
h
i + ϕhxit + u
h
it.
Equation 2.4: hff i. = µ
h + γhxi. + κ
h
i .
Equation 2.11: ∆hff it = θ
h
i + ϕh∆xit + υ
h
it.
Equation 2.7:
(︂
hffit − ˜hff it
)︂
= ϕh (xit − x˜it) + λt + u
h
it where we
(︂
hffit − ˜hff it
)︂
and (xit − x˜it) are the cyclical components of HP filtered variables (with
penalty parameter equal to 7) as in Arachi et al. (2010).
ECM equation: ∆hffit = φ
h
i [hffit−1 − θh − γhxit−1 + ψh · time] + ϕh∆xit + η
h
it.
Note: Instruments for Equation 2 are given by lags 1-2 of the explanatory variable levels and first differences. Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences:
H0 accepted with a p-value of 0.79.
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time because of the contributions of Italian regions to country-level fiscal adjustments that
have been going on since the 1990s. We also show that after the 2011 sovereign debts’
crisis, fiscal flows acted as a risk-enhancing device with respect to short-run region-specific
shocks to economic activity.
In a nutshell, the emerging picture is that the ability of HFFs to reduce long-run
income disparities among Italian regions declined over time for several reasons. First,
since the 1990s, the Italian Central Government’s need to run primary surpluses to control
the huge public debt has been moderated by the redistributive effects of HFFs. Looking at
the channels that determined the restraining of redistributive effects, we found evidence
that the main drivers have been the expenditure for social protection and investment
purposes that in relative terms penalized the Southern Italian regions.
As far as risk-sharing is concerned, we found that the implicit insurance scheme
among Italian regions, which had been in place until the mid-1990s, disappeared during
the period 1996-2007 and turned into a risk-enhancing mechanism during the period 2008-
2015, covering the years of economic and sovereign debts crises. During the crisis, HFFs
amplified the effects of short-run shocks on a region’s per capita GDPs. We present
evidence that this happened through the channel of direct and indirect taxation, that
includes revenues levied directly by sub-national levels of government such as Regions and
Municipalities, implying that local public finance behaved in a very pro-cyclical manner
due also to the decrease of transfers from the Central Government to sub-national tiers
of government.
An important policy implication of this study is that an explicit insurance scheme to
smooth region-specific shocks is advisable in those countries or federations in which it is
not possible to let automatic stabilizers work. This is likely to happen in those situations
characterized by a huge public debt, as in Italy, or because of an incomplete governance
framework due, for instance, to the fragmentation of national fiscal policies in a situation
in which there is a single monetary authority, as is the case in Eurozone countries within
the European Union. Defining an optimal insurance scheme, either public or market-
based, is one of the main challenges for national governments and for a federation of
states, such as the European Union, in order to accelerate the integration process of the
national economies’ budgetary governance.
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Appendix: Regionalization of the Public Administra-
tions’ consolidated account and other data sources
In this Section we provide a detailed explanation of the methodology, proposed by
Staderini and Vadalá (2009), that we follow to estimate fiscal variables for the Italian
regions. The starting point is a reclassification scheme of the Public Administrations’
consolidated economic account27 (see Table A.2) that takes into account the primary
balance (FFt = Gt − Tt) net of international financial flows (EUt). The regionalization
of the country-level fiscal variables requires an estimation of the relevant "regionalization
coefficients" based on territorial statistical sources that are consistent with the benefit
principle.
Following this methodology we excluded two items when generating regional fiscal
variables. First, international financial inflows and outflows, such as transfers from/to
EU and international aids, have been ruled out as they can be considered pure financial
transfers without a direct impact on Italian residents. Second, we excluded interest
payments (It), as a territorial statistical source allowing for the regionalization of this item
consistently with the benefit principle is not available (Decressin, 2002) and Staderini and
Vadalá (2009).
The allocation of revenue (Tt) items at regional level reflects, consistent with the
benefit principle, the geographical location of the taxpayer (Table A.1). Thus, social
contributions paid by workers and the main direct taxes such as personal (Irpef) and
corporate (Ires) income taxes are allocated according to the localization of income dec-
larations. Two adjustments are needed. First, the regional breakdown of corporate taxes
paid by multiregional firms is made according to the regional distribution of firms’ per-
sonnel expenditure. Second, social contributions paid directly by the firm on behalf of
workers are allocated according to the regional distribution of firms’ personnel costs. Indi-
rect taxes, such as the tax on productive activities (IRAP), value added tax (IVA), excises
on energy products and property taxes, are regionalized on the basis of the localization
of where consumption and/or production take place.
Consistent with the benefit principle, the regionalization of primary current expen-
diture (Gt) items takes into account the economic nature of each item (Table A.1). Pure
public goods (General public services, Defense, Public Order and Security, and Recre-
ational activities) are allocated on a per capita basis on the ground that all residents
are benefited in the same way. Finally, health and education expenditures are allocated
by consolidating at the regional level the balance sheets of sub-regional entities; health
27The Conto economico consolidato delle Amministrazioni Pubbliche is released by the Italian National
Institute of Statistics (Istat), and it is compliant with the rules of European System of National and
Regional Accounts (ESA 2010) defined by EU Regulation 549/2013.
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expenditures are adjusted to take into account inter-regional health mobility, while educa-
tion expenditure takes into account the regional distribution of school personnel. Capital
expenditure is allocated at the regional level according to the location of the public works
and of the beneficiaries of investment grants.
The repartition criteria to regionalize expenditures and revenues for the two spans
1983 − 1992 and 1996 − 2015 follow the benefit principle and are consistent with one
another, even if the regionalization coefficients are obtained from different data sources.
Due to the lack of territorial statistical sources, the repartition coefficients for the years
1993− 1995 are obtained by linearly interpolating data from the other two spans.
For the period 1983 − 1992, the Public Administrations’ consolidated economic ac-
count is disaggregated on a regional basis by using as regionalization coefficients the
corresponding items from the regional economic accounts (data are on accrual basis)
available from Istat (Agostinelli et al., 1996). For the span 1996− 2015, the regionaliza-
tion coefficients for the expenditure and revenue items are computed using Istat’s regional
level data28 (on accrual basis) as well as the Regional Public Accounts (on cash basis)
released by the Agency for Territorial Cohesion.29
Other regional-level variables - namely, GDP, GDP deflators and population levels
- are released and updated annually by Istat. Tables A.2-A.5 report the descriptive
statistics of all variables that are used in this study for the sub-periods 1983-1995, 1996-
2007 and 2008-2015.
28The final consumption expenditure of the Public Administrations and the subsidies to production come
from the ISTAT’s Territorial Accounts (2017). Social security benefits are taken from ISTAT’s Regional
Household disposable income for the period 1996− 98 and various issues of ISTAT’s Italian statistical
yearbook (Chapter 4) for the period 1999− 2015. Social contributions were taken from the (Regional
Public Accounts) released by the Agency for Territorial Cohesion for the period 1996 − 2001 and the
Italian statistical yearbook (Chapter 4) for the period 2002− 2015. All other expenditure and revenue
items are taken from Regional Public Accounts. The final consumption expenditures of the Public
Administrations follows the COFOG classification, and are adjusted with respect to the geographic
dislocation of school personnel.
29See Staderini and Vadalá (2009) for a more detailed description of the methodology.
42
Table A.1
Regionalization of the Istat Public Administrations’ consolidated account
Expenditure and Revenue items Regionalization criteria (Statistical Source)
1. Final consumptions by expenditure area:
• General public services, Defense, Public order and Safety, Recreation, Culture and Religion • Regional population (Istat)
• Economic affairs, Housing and Community amenities • Regional Value added by economic sector
for market firms at regional-level (Istat)a
• Environmental protection • Region-level environmental expenditure (CPT)
• Health • Expenditures of regional health systems net
of inter-regional mobility of patients (Istat)
• Education • Regional distribution of public schools staff
(Ministry of Education, Universities and Research)
• Social protection (current only) • Regional-level general Government expenditures
related to this function (Istat)
2. Production subsidies and other current transfers to enterprises Regional distribution of employees of
enterprises benefiting subsidies (Istat)
3. Social security benefits in cash and other current transfers to households and social private institutions Regional distribution of payments (Istat)
4. Gross fixed capital investments, inventory changes net acquisitions of valuables and of non-produced financial assets. Location of public works (CPT)
5. Investment grants to households and other capital transfers to households Regional destination of payments (CPT)
6. Investment grants to enterprises and other capital transfers to enterprises Regional destination of payments (CPT)
7. Direct taxes and capital taxes Residence of taxpayers (CPT)
8. Indirect taxes Residence of taxpayers (CPT)
9. Social contributions (effective and imputed) Residence of taxpayers (Istat)
10. Interest income and other forms of income and rents Residence of taxpayers (CPT)
11. Current transfers from households and enterprises Residence of taxpayers (CPT)
12. Production of goods and services for sale and for own use and residual sales Residence of taxpayers (CPT)
13. Insurance indemnities and transfers from households and public entities Residence of taxpayers (CPT)
14. Other capital transfers from households and enterprises Residence of taxpayers (CPT)
a For the construction sector non-market public investments have also been included.
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Table A.2
Reclassified Public Administrations’ consolidated account
(year 2015; current billion of euros and percentage values)
Amount As a
share of
corre-
spond-
ing
total
As a
share of
GDP
EXPENDITURE
Final consumption of Public Administrations (1) 305.5 41.5 18.6
Production subsidies and other current transfers to enterprises 29.8 4.3 1.8
Social security benefits in cash and other current transfers to households and social private institutions 341.1 46.3 20.7
Direct taxes, land rents and insurance premiums 2.4 0.3 0.1
TOTAL CURRENT EXPENDITURE 678.8 92.4 41.3
Gross fixed capital investments (2) 37.4 4.8 2.3
Investment grants to households and other capital transfers to households 3.8 0.3 0.2
Investment grants to enterprises and other capital transfers to enterprises 26.3 2.5 1.6
TOTAL CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 67.5 7.6 4.1
TOTAL EXPENDITURE (Gt) 746.3 100.0 45.4
REVENUE
Direct taxes and capital taxes (3) 244.2 32.2 14.8
Indirect taxes (4) 249.9 30.8 15.2
Social contributions (effective and imputed) 219.1 28.1 13.3
Interest income and other forms of income and rents (5) 11.1 1.5 0.7
Current transfers from households 10.8 1.4 0.7
Current transfers from enterprises 7.4 1.0 0.5
Production of goods and services for sale and for own use 24.4 3.1 1.5
Residual sales (−) 14.0 1.8 0.9
Insurance indemnities and transfers from households and public entities 0.1 0.0 0.0
TOTAL CURRENT REVENUE 780.8 99.9 47.5
Other capital transfers from households 0.3 0.0 0.0
Other capital transfers from enterprises 0.9 0.1 0.1
TOTAL CAPITAL REVENUE 1.2 0.1 0.1
TOTAL REVENUE (Tt) 782.0 100.0 47.5
PRIMARY BALANCE (FFt = Gt − Tt) -35.7 -3.2
NET FINANCIAL TRANSFERS TO INTERNATIONAL ENTITIES (EUt) 15.8 0.6
INTEREST PAYMENTS (It) 68.1 4.1
NET BORROWING (NBt = FRt + It + EUt) 44.2 2.7
Source: Own elaborations on Istat data. (1) It includes compensations of public employees,
purchases of goods and services by market producers, intermediate consumption and indi-
rect taxes. (2) It includes the following residual items: inventory changes, net acquisitions
of valuables and non-produced financial assets. (3) 90% of them come from personal in-
come taxes (Irpef), corporate income taxes (Ires), taxes on automobile possession, savings
and capital gains. (4) Almost 90% of them come from value added taxes (IVA), taxes on
productive activities (Irap), municipal property tax (Imu), waste tax (Tasi), excise duties
on energy products and legal monopolies. (5) It includes also dividends, withdrawals in-
come of quasi-corporations, reinvested earnings on direct foreign investment, land rents and
exploitation rights on raw materials sources.
44
Table A.3
Italian regions’ revenues, primary expenditures and fiscal balances (1)
(averages over the period 1983-1995; standardized real euros per capita - Italy=100)
Primary expenditures Tax Revenues Fiscal Flows-to-GDP(3)
HFF-to-GDP(3) GDP Tax Burden(4)
Total Of which: Total Of which: Total Of which:
Social security (2) Social contributions Social security balance
Piemonte 100.6 114.9 119.7 123.1 -6.9 0.6 -6.5 115.3 103.8
Valle d’Aosta - Vallée d’Aoste 168.3 129.8 134.4 116.0 10.6 3.1 10.6 127.5 105.3
Lombardia 95.0 106.2 135.9 134.4 -13.1 -1.6 -12.5 128.0 106.1
Bolzano-Bozen 139.8 105.5 134.7 115.4 1.7 0.3 2.0 126.5 106.3
Trento 130.2 103.0 117.4 117.7 4.4 -0.2 4.6 117.2 100.0
Veneto 93.3 92.7 108.9 111.6 -5.9 -0.9 -5.5 113.0 96.2
Friuli Venezia Giulia 120.4 122.2 115.1 120.3 1.6 2.1 1.8 113.1 101.8
Liguria 122.2 134.0 114.1 111.0 2.8 4.9 2.9 112.0 101.9
Emilia Romagna 106.6 116.6 125.1 120.7 -6.4 1.2 -6.0 122.6 101.7
Toscana 104.5 113.9 110.3 110.0 -2.3 2.4 -2.0 107.1 103.0
Umbria 112.5 113.4 94.8 98.6 7.7 4.3 7.7 94.1 100.8
Marche 102.5 102.4 98.4 101.8 1.4 1.8 1.5 103.3 95.1
Lazio 103.1 101.7 118.9 119.7 -5.9 -0.7 -5.5 113.4 105.1
Abruzzo 103.1 95.4 79.1 76.8 10.8 4.7 10.7 87.9 90.0
Molise 112.8 89.5 67.3 69.0 25.4 5.9 25.0 72.9 92.3
Campania 91.1 78.4 63.4 64.6 15.8 4.6 15.4 69.7 91.2
Puglia 85.1 83.1 62.4 64.5 12.6 5.6 12.3 71.5 87.3
Basilicata 113.1 83.7 59.3 62.1 34.4 6.9 33.5 62.3 95.7
Calabria 97.1 82.9 54.7 54.2 29.3 9.1 28.6 59.0 93.0
Sicilia 99.1 89.9 64.3 61.6 20.6 7.8 20.2 69.1 93.2
Sardegna 102.6 87.2 71.9 72.3 16.4 4.6 16.2 74.7 96.1
Italy (2) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 -0.2 1.7 0 100.0 100.0
Center-Northern regions 102.8 108.7 120.3 120.2 -6.3 0.2 -5.9 116.9 102.9
Southern regions 95.1 84.6 64.1 64.1 17.8 6.0 17.4 70.2 91.5
Ordinary Statute Regions (OSRs) 98.7 100.8 103.7 104.1 -2.2 1.2 -2.0 103.3 100.4
Northern OSRs 99.6 109.1 124.3 124.0 -8.5 -0.1 -8.1 120.7 102.9
Central OSRs 104.1 106.6 111.6 112.6 -3.0 0.9 -2.7 108.6 102.9
Southern OSRs 92.8 82.5 63.1 64.1 16.9 5.6 16.6 70.0 90.3
Special Statute Regions (SSRs) 107.2 95.7 79.8 77.9 13.5 4.9 13.3 82.2 97.0
Northern SSRs 128.8 115.4 120.5 118.6 2.7 1.3 2.9 117.4 102.5
Southern SSRs 100.0 89.2 66.2 64.3 19.5 7.0 19.1 70.5 94.0
Coefficient of variation (%) 18.4 15.7 27.5 25.5 − − − 23.2 5.7
Maximum value 168.3 134.0 135.9 134.4 34.4 9.1 33.5 128.0 106.3
Minimum value 85.1 78.4 54.7 54.2 -13.1 -1.6 -12.5 59.0 87.3
Source: Own elaborations on Regional Public Accounts data released by the Ministry of Economic Development. (1) Base year 2010. (2) It includes other current transfers to families and social
private institutions. (3) Taken as percentages with respect to the corresponding are GDP. (4) It is the ratio of revenues (social contributions, direct and indirect taxes) to GDP standardized for the
corresponding Italian value.
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Table A.4
Italian regions’ revenues, primary expenditures and fiscal balances (1)
(averages over the period 1996-2007; standardized real euros per capita - Italy=100)
Primary expenditures Tax Revenues Fiscal Flows-to-GDP(3)
HFF-to-GDP(3) GDP Tax Burden(4)
Total Of which: Total Of which: Total Of which:
Social security (2) Social contributions Social security balance
Piemonte 104.7 119.0 115.1 119.6 -7.6 4.4 -3.7 108.7 105.9
Valle d’Aosta - Vallée d’Aoste 180.7 113.2 146.7 118.6 6.2 2.9 10.0 134.0 109.6
Lombardia 96.4 110.3 135.1 139.7 -15.9 0.6 -12.1 129.8 104.0
Bolzano-Bozen 151.7 97.1 125.2 117.1 4.6 1.1 8.0 133.6 93.7
Trento 144.3 96.1 127.9 120.8 1.6 0.6 5.1 127.9 100.0
Veneto 92.1 95.1 110.5 115.7 -10.0 1.2 -6.4 113.8 97.1
Friuli Venezia Giulia 121.9 123.0 113.0 116.0 -0.4 5.5 3.4 107.2 105.5
Liguria 124.8 137.2 110.4 98.8 1.6 9.4 5.3 110.4 100.1
Emilia Romagna 106.1 119.7 127.1 125.4 -10.7 3.5 -6.9 121.6 104.5
Toscana 104.1 114.4 109.9 104.7 -5.9 5.5 -2.2 106.5 103.3
Umbria 116.8 116.1 95.7 92.1 5.0 7.9 8.6 98.3 97.3
Marche 100.0 102.6 98.0 97.1 -2.8 5.1 0.9 96.9 101.3
Lazio 103.3 105.9 122.2 126.2 -9.8 1.4 -6.2 123.5 99.0
Abruzzo 102.1 93.9 81.2 81.0 6.1 6.2 9.4 87.1 93.2
Molise 118.7 86.8 70.1 71.4 21.2 6.9 24.5 78.8 88.9
Campania 86.8 73.2 61.6 59.5 11.9 7.0 15.1 67.6 91.2
Puglia 84.7 82.4 61.2 59.4 11.4 9.7 14.8 64.6 94.6
Basilicata 111.9 81.8 60.6 66.2 25.8 7.4 28.9 71.3 84.9
Calabria 100.4 83.1 55.5 55.0 26.2 11.2 29.4 61.5 90.3
Sicilia 95.9 79.0 62.3 56.8 17.1 9.0 20.5 66.3 93.9
Sardegna 109.9 88.3 77.3 72.6 14.2 7.6 18.0 73.2 105.6
Italy (2) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 -3.6 4.1 0 100.0 100.0
Center-Northern regions 103.7 111.2 120.3 121.7 -9.4 2.7 -5.7 117.8 102.1
Southern regions 93.9 80.3 63.7 61.1 14.6 8.3 18.0 68.0 93.5
Ordinary Statute Regions (OSRs) 98.5 102.1 103.7 104.5 -5.7 3.7 -2.0 103.4 100.3
Northern OSRs 100.5 112.2 123.7 126.2 -11.5 2.4 -7.8 120.2 102.9
Central OSRs 104.0 108.9 113.0 112.8 -6.9 3.5 -3.2 112.6 100.4
Southern OSRs 91.3 79.9 62.6 61.4 13.8 8.2 17.1 68.0 91.9
Special Statute Regions (SSRs) 108.5 88.8 79.8 75.1 10.8 6.6 14.3 80.8 98.8
Northern SSRs 136.0 111.3 120.5 117.3 1.6 3.2 5.3 118.5 101.7
Southern SSRs 99.4 81.3 66.0 60.7 16.3 8.6 19.8 68.0 97.0
Coefficient of variation (%) 22.4 16.8 28.0 26.6 − − − 24.4 6.4
Maximum value 180.7 137.2 146.7 139.7 26.2 11.2 29.4 134.0 109.6
Minimum value 84.7 73.2 55.5 55.0 -15.9 0.6 -12.1 61.5 84.9
Source: Own elaborations on Regional Public Accounts data released by the Ministry of Economic Development. (1) Base year 2010. (2) It includes other current transfers to families and social
private institutions. (3) Taken as percentages with respect to the corresponding are GDP. (4) It is the ratio of revenues (social contributions, direct and indirect taxes) to GDP standardized for the
corresponding Italian value.
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Table A.5
Italian regions’ revenues, primary expenditures and fiscal balances (1)
(averages over the period 2008-2015; standardized real euros per capita - Italy=100)
Primary expenditures Tax Revenues Fiscal Flows-to-GDP(3)
HFF-to-GDP(3) GDP Tax Burden(4)
Total Of which: Total Of which: Total Of which:
Social security (2) Social contributions Social security balance
Piemonte 104.1 116.2 107.8 106.9 -3.6 8.0 -1.6 106.1 101.6
Valle d’Aosta - Vallée d’Aoste 165.2 107.4 133.0 110.3 8.9 4.9 11.0 128.9 103.3
Lombardia 97.7 108.6 137.1 146.3 -15.4 1.3 -13.3 131.6 104.2
Bolzano-Bozen 138.3 88.9 131.6 131.6 0.2 -0.1 2.1 142.6 92.3
Trento 146.4 97.3 120.2 122.3 7.3 2.2 9.2 125.9 95.5
Veneto 94.1 96.0 106.8 111.3 -7.0 3.5 -5.1 111.7 95.6
Friuli Venezia Giulia 119.8 118.4 107.3 111.4 3.1 7.8 5.2 106.3 100.9
Liguria 117.2 128.9 107.9 94.3 1.7 11.4 3.7 110.5 97.7
Emilia Romagna 101.7 114.3 122.8 121.9 -9.9 5.0 -7.8 121.0 101.5
Toscana 102.4 110.9 104.5 100.4 -2.9 7.7 -0.9 107.3 97.5
Umbria 106.2 112.6 92.3 86.9 4.8 11.6 6.9 90.0 102.8
Marche 96.3 103.7 92.5 92.1 -0.2 8.4 1.8 95.7 96.7
Lazio 107.9 108.1 126.0 131.5 -8.8 3.0 -6.7 122.0 103.5
Abruzzo 102.3 95.2 82.2 79.2 8.3 9.2 10.2 87.5 93.9
Molise 109.0 91.8 71.7 64.6 20.3 12.5 22.3 74.6 96.2
Campania 84.8 74.8 63.1 58.9 12.8 10.4 14.8 65.0 97.2
Puglia 87.6 86.9 64.9 59.6 13.8 14.2 15.9 63.6 102.0
Basilicata 105.9 88.9 66.9 65.2 22.2 12.0 24.1 72.0 92.9
Calabria 107.3 86.1 58.0 52.7 33.7 16.0 35.7 61.5 94.3
Sicilia 94.2 78.4 62.3 56.3 19.9 12.1 21.9 64.7 96.4
Sardegna 109.5 94.1 72.1 70.5 20.5 12.1 22.4 74.3 96.9
Italy (2) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 -2.1 6.2 0 100.0 100.0
Center-Northern regions 103.3 109.3 118.6 121.0 -7.8 4.5 -5.8 117.4 101.0
Southern regions 93.8 82.6 65.0 60.3 17.2 12.1 19.2 66.8 97.2
Ordinary Statute Regions (OSRs) 98.8 102.0 103.8 104.4 -4.3 5.8 -2.2 103.3 100.5
Northern OSRs 100.1 109.8 121.7 125.0 -10.1 4.0 -8.0 120.1 101.4
Central OSRs 104.5 108.8 112.3 113.1 -5.2 5.6 -3.1 111.5 100.8
Southern OSRs 91.8 82.7 65.1 60.5 15.8 12.2 17.9 66.7 97.5
Special Statute Regions (SSRs) 106.9 88.7 78.4 75.2 13.7 9.1 15.6 80.9 96.9
Northern SSRs 132.0 106.8 116.7 118.1 3.7 4.3 5.7 119.5 97.6
Southern SSRs 98.0 82.3 64.8 59.8 20.1 12.1 22.1 67.1 96.5
Coefficient of variation (%) 19.0 13.8 25.8 27.8 − − − 25.1 3.6
Maximum value 165.2 128.9 137.1 146.3 33.7 16.0 35.7 142.6 104.2
Minimum value 84.8 74.8 58.0 52.7 -15.4 -0.1 -13.3 61.5 92.3
Source: Own elaborations on Regional Public Accounts data released by the Ministry of Economic Development. (1) Base year 2010. (2) It includes other current transfers to families and social
private institutions. (3) Taken as percentages with respect to the corresponding are GDP. (4) It is the ratio of revenues (social contributions, direct and indirect taxes) to GDP standardized for the
corresponding Italian value.
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Abstract
This paper investigates the existence of financial constraints and the preference for
internal funding for innovative and non-innovative firms of different sizes located in the
Italian region Friuli Venezia Giulia during 2005-2015. Our analysis is based on a unique
dataset matching firm-level accounting data with information on firms’ innovation
propensities from the 2008-2010 wave of the Community Innovation Survey (CIS). We
rely both on the sensitivity of physical investment to cash flow, an indirect measure
of financial constraints, and on a CIS-based direct measure of financial constraints.
The sensitivity of investment to cash flow is higher among large firms engaged in
innovation-related activities, although this result is at odds with firms’ perceptions of
financial constraints reported in the CIS survey. A higher sensitivity is associated with
involvement in R&D projects, which determines a strict preference for internal funds
due to the reticence to disclose relevant information to external financiers.
JEL Classification Numbers: D82; D92; G32; O31; O32.
Keywords: Investments, Innovation, Finance, Financial Constraints, Small Firms,
Community, Innovation Survey.
3.1 Introduction
In the last decade, policy-makers have been attempting to remove factors that may
hamper innovation for two reasons. First, there is a consensus that innovation is pivotal
to promoting economic growth through a boost in productivity which has been decreasing
in Italy since the middle 1990s. Second, firms’ recovery in the aftermath of the latest
economic and financial crisis seems closely linked to their competitiveness in delivering
products and services that can be sold at international marketplaces. In this study,
we focus on the financial constraints faced by firms established in the Italian region
Friuli Venezia Giulia (FVG) during 2005-2015. We assess the existence and severity of
financial constraints both for innovative and non-innovative firms of different sizes, relying
on data from the 2008-2010 wave of the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) matched
with accounting data for 2005-2015 from the Italian Company Accounts Database (CAD,
Centrale dei Bilanci). Departing from the theoretical literature we expect that small
innovative firms are more likely to suffer financial constraints constraints because of their
opacity and the nature of their activity which leads to high information asymmetries in
the capital markets.
We consider two different approaches in investigating financial constraints. First,
based on the methodology in the seminal study by Fazzari et al. (1988), we test for
the sensitivity of physical investments to internal funds (cash flow) as a measure for the
financial constraint level. Other papers have used this methodology to study the effects of
financial constraints on innovation activity (Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994; Bond et al.
(2005); Ughetto, 2008; Magri, 2009; Brown et al., 2009). Following this strand of empirical
literature, we investigate on differences on physical investment sensitivity to cash flow
between innovative and non-innovative firms of different sizes by using two definitions
of innovators. Following Bond et al. (2005) and Magri (2009), we test the sensitivity of
investment to cash flow using an error correction model (ECM) for investment demand
with a system general method of moments (GMM) estimator.
Second, we use a direct indicator of financial constraints based on data from the CIS
2008-2010 wave. We use CIS descriptive statistics to assess to what extent innovative
firms perceive the lack of internal and external funds as hampering factors by following
the approach of innovation studies that have criticized the econometric tests based on
the sensitivity of physical investment to cash flow because this indicator is an indirect
measure of financial constraints that can be subject to interpretation problems (Canepa
and Stoneman, 2008; Savignac, 2008).
Since the 1960s, FVG, a small and highly industrialized region in the north-east of
Italy, has been characterized by high gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates, but the
macro-economic indicators of the region have shown several weaknesses during and after
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the recent economic and financial crisis. The region has a high incidence of innovative
firms, with a relevant presence of small and medium size enterprises (SMEs), supported by
a financial system characterized by the presence of local banks. According to the Italian
National Institute for Statistics (Istat), FVG is a leading innovation-oriented region in
Italy. In 2010, FVG was the Italian region with the highest percentage of innovators and
among the top three Italian regions in the rate of patents per million inhabitants at the
European Patent Office and R&D expenses (from public and private sectors) as a ratio
of regional GDP (Istat-Cnel, 2013; Istat, 2015, Istat, 2016 and Istat, 2017).
From the macro-economic context, the credit crunch induced by the economic and
financial crisis hit the regional economy severely and, subsequently, credit demand de-
creased, driven by a fall in investment (Banca d’Italia, 2018). In FVG, investments
decreased more severely than in the rest of Italy between 2012 and 2014. Moreover,
despite the exports of the region being above the national average prior to the crisis,
it suffered a sharper drop than the rest of Italy between 2007 and 2013, recovering only
between 2014 and 2016 FGB (2014, 2017). The economic crisis also had a severe effect on
the percentage of firms that introduced product or process innovation, which decreased
from the 58.8% in CIS wave 2010 to 42.2% in CIS wave 2014 while regarding the level of
public and private sectors’ R&D expenses as a ratio of the regional GDP, FVG remained
above the Italian regional average since the onset of the crisis as this indicator increased
from 1.4 in CIS 2010 to 1.6 in CIS 2014 (Istat-Cnel, 2013; Istat, 2015, Istat, 2016 and
Istat, 2017) due to a sharp drop in regional GDP.
The contributions of our study are as follows. First, we focus on a regional context
that provides an ideal setting to study the importance of financial constraints for innova-
tion during crises as, among European countries, Italy has been one of the most severely
hit by the recent economic downturn and financial crisis. Focusing on a specific region
allows us to overcome the problems of country-level analyses, since financial constraints
and innovation propensity are affected by region-specific factors. For instance, Guiso
(1998) and Bartoloni (2013) determine that firms located in southern Italian regions,
characterized by lower levels of per capita GDP relative to the north-central regions,
have more difficult access to external finance than firms with similar characteristics in
northern regions.
Second, we match the CIS data with accounting data in the CAD, which allows
us to use two different approaches to analyze the relevance of financial constraints to
innovation activities: one is based on micro-econometric models and the other on survey
responses on the hampering factors to innovation. Our study is the first one, to the best
of our knowledge, that matches an indirect measure of financial constraints based on the
micro-econometric approach developed by Fazzari et al. (1988) with a direct indicator
that can be inferred by responses to the CIS survey. This approach allows us to control
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for potential weaknesses in the micro-econometric model.
Finally, our dataset allows us to rely on a broad, input-based definition of innovative
firms, investigating on the existence of financial constraints for several forms of innova-
tion. Indeed, although R&D expenditure and intangible assets are the main determinants
of innovation, innovative projects require several types of other investments. The CIS
questionnaire, besides in-house R&D, also provides information on other forms of invest-
ment related to innovation, such as external R&D; acquisition of machinery, equipment,
and software; acquisition of external knowledge; expenditure training for innovative ac-
tivities; market research; and cost advertising. We compare two definitions of innovators:
we call broad innovators all firms that declare to be engaged in innovative project listed
by the CIS and R&D performers those firms engaged exclusively in in-house and external
R&D activities (strictly technical innovators).
Our results show that the measure of investment to cash flow sensitivity is relevant
but not statistically different between broad innovators and non-innovators. Among broad
innovators, larger firms show a higher sensitivity than small ones, which is not in line
with the responses to the CIS wave 2010. In the light of descriptive statistics and of the
responses to the CIS, we interpret the higher sensitivity of physical investment to cash
flow for larger broad innovators as the result of the higher incidence of firms engaged in
R&D projects in this group. Being engaged in R&D, large firms are reticent to disclose
relevant information on their projects to external financiers and prefer to use internal
funds.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the Section 3.2, we review
the recent literature on the existence of financing constraints and preference for internal
funding among innovative firms. In the Section 3.3, we present the dataset and descriptive
statistics. In the Section 3.4, we explain the model and estimation methodology. In the
Section 3.5, we discuss the results and the last Section concludes the paper.
3.2 Literature Review
3.2.1 Innovation financing, information asymmetries, and finan-
cial constraints
Since the end of the 1980s, a relevant literature strand considered firms that are
subjected to asymmetric information on the capital markets as more affected by finan-
cial constraints (Fazzari et al., 1988; Hubbard, 1998). In particular, the literature on
financing constraints considers innovative firms and as most affected than other groups
by asymmetric information related problems in the capital market.
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Since Arrow (1962) unveiled the characteristics of non-rivalry, non-excludability, and
uncertainty of the invention process, a large and increasing body of theoretical and empir-
ical literature studied innovation financing and the intrinsic characteristics of innovative
projects that exacerbate information frictions. Several authors point out that R&D in-
vestments and high-tech related investments are particularly subjected to information
asymmetries on capital markets as follows (Hall, 1992; Hall and Lerner, 2010; Guiso,
1998; Bhattacharya and Ritter, 1983; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002).1 First, managers
are reticent to disclosing valuable technological information outside the firm for fund rais-
ing, as information produced within R&D projects is highly non-rival and non-excludable
and is subject to a value loss for the firm if disclosed to competitors (Bhattacharya and
Ritter, 1983). Second, innovation-related projects require advanced technological knowl-
edge to be evaluated and external financiers often do no possess the adequate skill for
in-depth assessment. Third, the highly uncertain payoff of innovation projects makes it
difficult for external financiers to rely on classic risk-return valuation measures based on
mean variance models. Finally, R&D investments are skilled-labor intensive, consisting
mainly of salary payments and highly specific physical assets, a characteristic that may
lead to low levels of collaterals, which enhances bankruptcy costs. All these features de-
termine a firm’s marked preference for internal funds in pursuing innovative projects and
enhance asymmetric information problems on capital markets, leading to higher costs
and\or a lack of fund availability. Therefore, R&D performer firms are hypothesized as
more likely to rely on internal funds and to face financial constraints.
We aim to assess whether financial constraints and the preference for internal funds
are higher for firms that are engaged in innovative projects in the broad sense (any innova-
tion listed under CIS) and for firms only engaged in R&D. We also consider the combined
effects of innovative attitude and size: an analysis of financial constraints cannot disre-
gard the firm’ size as small firms are hypothesized to be more subjected to asymmetric
information in the capital market and to be more likely to incur in information asymme-
tries in the capital market due to their opacity (Berger and Udell, 1995). To assess the
existence of financial constraints, we rely on an indirect indicator and on a direct indi-
cator. The first is based on a micro-econometric model of investment demand and the
second is based on survey data, where firms are explicitly asked about their perception
of financial obstacles for innovative projects.
The strand of empirical studies on innovation financing based on the micro-
econometric approach by Fazzari et al. (1988) assess whether financial constraints are
significant for innovation-related investments andor if financial constraints are higher for
1Other scholars, such as Parisi and Sembenelli (2003), pointed out to that the level of R&D spending
is negatively affected by the user cost of capital. Moreover, the user cost of capital tends to be higher
during recession times.
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innovative firms than non-innovative ones. This approach tests the existence of financial
constraints considering the sensitivity of investment to cash flow as a measure of financial
constraints (Fazzari et al., 1988).
This strand of empirical works considers several definitions of innovative firms. Com-
monly, following the theoretical literature, innovative firms are considered those perform-
ing R&D andor those involved high tech sector. Recently the European cohesion policy
recognized the importance of innovation inputs other than R&D as major recipient of
funding (Diukanova and Lopez-Rodriguez, 2014) and researchers in innovation related
topics started to use survey-based definition of innovators grounded on involvement in
non R&D inputs (see Mairesse and Mohnen, 2010 for an overview). Among studies on
financial constraints to innovative firms, Magri (2009) follows this approach by using a
survey-based definition of innovative firms as per those firms that gained revenues from
successfully introduced any product and or process innovation. We follow this approach
and we ground our definition of innovators on the survey-based literature on obstacles
to innovation. We adopt a broad input based definition of innovation as in D’Este et al.
(2012) where innovative firms are those that declare to be engaged in at least one of the
innovation activities listed in the CIS.
Regarding the choice of the dependent variable in the model of investment demand,
studies on innovation may rely on the sensitivity of physical investment to cash flow
and/or on the sensitivity of R&D expenses to cash flow. The approach undertaken by
the studies on innovation financing is mixed. Several authors (Himmelberg and Petersen,
1994; Ughetto, 2008) consider that, beside R&D expenses an analysis of physical invest-
ments’ sensitivity to cash flow is important to assess the existence of financial constraints
for innovative firms as the knowledge produced within R&D projects ends up being em-
bodied in plant and equipment. Some studies test two separate models using physical
investment and R&D expenses as dependent variables (Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994;
Bond et al., 2005), other only test the sensitivity of R&D expenses to cash flow and other
financing forms such as external equity for innovative firms (Brown et al., 2009; Brown
et al., 2012). Panel studies on the sensitivity of investment to cash flow for innovative
firms based in Italy (Ughetto, 2008; Magri, 2009) are subjected to a limitation since
R&D expenses data are not computable from the financial statements, thus for Italian
innovative firms only the sensitivity of physical investment to cash flow can be tested. In
our study we follow Magri (2009) and Ughetto (2008) by investigating on the sensitivity
of physical investment to cash flow. This is consistent with data availability but also
with the theoretical approach that considers that the output of R&D projects determines
physical investments.
The definition of innovators differs. The major part of these studies define innovators
on the basis of engagement in R&D activities or on the basis of the engagement in high
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tech sectors, being strictly based on technical innovation. Magri (2009) uses a survey
based definition that implies that the firm is engaged into a broader set of innovation
activities such as product and process innovation.
The main micro econometric studies on financial constraints to innovation on which
our work is based are reviewed in Table 1.
By relying on a model of physical investment demand and on the estimators employed
by Magri (2009) and Bond et al. (2005), our micro-econometric analysis presents a number
of contributions to the literature. First, we focus on firms operating in a homogeneous
macro-economic setting based on a regional context. Second, we rely on a broad input-
based definition of innovators grounded on CIS responses. Third, we analyze a longer
time span, encompassing the economic crisis.
Finally, we also rely on a direct, survey based indicator of financial constraints as
an alternative to the use of the sensitivity of investment to cash flow, as an indicator
of financial constraints, has been widely criticized by Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000).
One of the critiques is that the nature of the sensitivity of investment to cash flow can be
related to precautionary savings motives or irrational behaviors of managers who choose
internal funds over low-cost external ones. This critique is relevant for the financing
R&D and high-tech related investments, as managers may choose not to ask for external
financing because they do not want to reveal the details of innovative projects outside
the firm: in this case, the heavy reliance on internal funds can be unrelated to credit
rationing. Critiques to this approach have been also moved by the survey based literature
on innovation financing (Canepa and Stoneman, 2008; Savignac, 2008): the CIS responses
on lack of funds are more precise at pointing out the existence of external financial
constraints while a high sensitivity of investment to cash flow may reflect just a strict
preference for internal funds that could originate from reasons other than credit rationing
or high cost of external funds. We rely on the 2008-2010 CIS survey and we look at the
descriptive statistics on the perception of financial factors that hamper innovation to offer
support to the micro-econometric analysis. We use the survey responses to determine the
importance of the lack of internal and external sources of financing as hampering factors
for innovative firms of different sizes.
The main limit when comparing the CIS responses on financial constraints with the
sensitivity of investment pending to cash flow is that firms’ responses are valid only for
the three years covered by the survey, while the indirect indicator is calculated on a micro
econometric model based on data covering a longer time span. Nonetheless, we choose
a longer time-span for the econometric analysis in order to find robust estimates and we
rely on an important CIS wave that covers the years following the crisis and the credit
crunch.
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Table 1 - Main scholarly contributions
Authors Country Data Source Selection of firms
and definition of
innovators
Methodology Sample selection and split Results
Magri
(2009)
Italy Survey of Manufactur-
ing Firms (Mediocre-
dito Centrale), wave
1998-2000 + CAD for
accounting data 1993-
2000
Sample: all respondents
to the Survey of Manu-
facturing firms that also
display accounting data
in the CAD. Innovators:
those firms that gained
revenues from success-
fully introduced innova-
tion (output-based defi-
nition).
Test for differences in physical
investment sensitivity to cash
flow based on a dynamic er-
ror correction model of invest-
ment demand. Estimation
method: system GMM esti-
mation (Arellano and Bover
1995).
Sample encompasses both
innovative and non-innovative
firms. Sample is split by
innovation attitude and size
(small innovators, large inno-
vators, small non-innovators,
and large non-innovators).
Size: small firms with 20 or
less employees, large firms
with more than 20 employees.
Small innovators show lower sen-
sitivity of physical investment to
cash flow than the other groups.
Small innovators are considered
deep-pocket firms with abundant in-
ternal funds, higher than the de-
mand for investment spending.
Ughetto
(2008)
Italy Survey of Manufactur-
ing Firms, waves 1998-
200 and 2001-2003 +
AIDA database from
Bureau van Dijk, 1998-
2003.
Sample: all respondents
to both waves of the
Survey of Manufactur-
ing that also display ac-
counting data in the
AIDA database. Two
definitions of innovators
are used and confronted
in two separate mod-
els: 1. Innovators:
R&D performers. Non-
innovators: non-R&D
performers 2. Inno-
vators: high-tech sec-
tor. Non-innovators:
non-high-tech sectors.
Test for differences in phys-
ical investment sensitivity to
cash flow based on a sales ac-
celerator model of investment
demand. Estimation method:
within-firm and first difference
GMM (Arellano and Bond
1991).
Sample comprises both in-
novative and non-innovative
firms. The sample is split
by size following the European
Union classification. The two
groups of small and large firms
are further split in innovative
and non-innovative firms.
Among small firms, high-tech and
R&D performers show a higher
sensitivity of investment to cash
flow than non-high-tech and non-
R&D. Among large firms, innovators
(R&D, high-tech) show a lower sen-
sitivity than non-innovators (non-
R&D, non-high-tech).
Brown, Faz-
zari, and
Petersen
(2009)
US Compustat database
1990-2004
Publicly traded firms in
high-tech sectors.
Test of R&D expenses sensi-
tivity to cash flow and ex-
ternal equity financing (i.e.,
funds raised with new stock
issues) using an investment
model based on the dynamic
optimization of Euler condi-
tion for non-perfectly compet-
itive firms with a quadratic
adjustment costs of assets ac-
cumulation. Primary estima-
tion method: first difference
GMM (Arellano and Bond
1991).
The sample is composed by
only high-tech sector firms in
the Compustat and is split
into young and mature firms.
Younger firms show a significant sta-
tistical relation between R&D in-
vestment and both internal cash flow
and external equity, while mature
firms do not show a significant re-
lationship.
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Table 1 (continued) - Main scholarly contributions
Authors Country Data Source Selection of firms
and definition of
innovators
Methodology Sample selection and split Results
Brown,
Martins-
son, and
Petersen
(2012)
16 European
countries: Focus
on the UK, Swe-
den, Germany
and France
Compustat Global
Database 1995-2007
Firms that perform
R&D.
Test of R&D expenses sensi-
tivity to cash flow and ex-
ternal equity financing (i.e.,
funds raised with new stock
issues) with a Euler equation
also controlling for changes
in cash holdings. Estimator:
system GMM
The sample encompasses only
firms that perform R&D. The
tests are carried out for the
subgroups of young and ma-
ture, of small and large, and
of high dividend and low divi-
dend payout.
Firms in market-based financial sys-
tems (UK and Sweden) show higher
sensitivity of R&D to the selected
financial variables, especially for
younger and smaller firms. In Ger-
many, the sensitivity of R&D to the
financial variables is significant for
all firms while, in France, it is not
significant.
Bond,
Harhoff,
and Reenen
(2005)
UK and Germany Data stream online for
UK and Bundesanzeiger
for Germany. Period:
1985-1994
Firms that perform
R&D and firms that
operate in high-tech
sectors.
Test of R&D and fixed in-
vestment sensitivity to cash
flow through an error correc-
tion model. Estimator: sys-
tem GMM estimator (Arel-
lano Bover 1995).
Analysis 1: R&D performers
in the UK and R&D perform-
ers in Germany. Analysis 2:
High-tech sector firms in the
UK and high-tech sector firms
in Germany. Both groups are
further divided into R&D and
non-R&D performers.
For R&D performers: fixed invest-
ments are significantly correlated to
cash flow only for UK firms. R&D
expenses are not significantly cor-
related to cash flow for either of
the two countries. R&D performers,
among high-tech firms, shows fixed
investment significantly related to
cash flow only for UK.
Himmelberg
and Pe-
tersen
(1994)
US Compustat Period:
1983-1987
Small high-tech firms. Test for sensitivity of R&D
spending and physical invest-
ments to cash flow through
an accelerator and Tobin Q
model of investment demand.
No split of the sample. Significant sensitivity of R&D and
physical investment to cash flow.
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3.3 Data, variables, and descriptive statistics
3.3.1 Data sources and sample definition
Our analysis is based on a dataset obtained by merging firm-level data from two
different sources. First, we use the CIS wave 2008-2010, provided by the FVG’s Regional
Statistical Department for a representative sample of respondent firms of FVG2 both by
industry and size (number of employees).3 As per Magri (2009), small firms are those
with no more than 20 employees. Second, we rely on the Italian CAD (Centrale dei
Bilanci) to construct indicators of financial structure from 2005 to 2015 (see Appendix
Table A.1).
We adopt an input-based definition of innovative firm that considers the actual
engagement in product and process innovation. Following D’Este et al. (2012), we define
as innovative those firms that declare to be engaged in any innovative projects listed in
CIS wave 2010. We call these firms broad innovators to distinguish them from firms that
are only engaged in R&D projects (Table A.2 in the Appendix). Under the assumption
that an innovative status is persistent, our sample consists of all firms included in the
CIS survey for wave 2008-2010 and display accounting information from CAD for 2005-
2015 for at least five consecutive years. On average, during 2005-2015, CAD firm-level
accounting data match around 70.6% of the firms included in the CIS dataset, for a
sample of 800 firms of which 310 are broad innovators (Table 2). We further divide the
sample by innovation attitude and size (Table 3).
Following Magri (2009), the cash flow is computed as net profit plus depreciation and
amortization (non-monetary costs) and represents a broad measure of the self-financing
ability of the firm. Physical investment is taken directly from the flow of funds into the
CAD and is only referred to by tangible fixed assets. Both investment and cash flow are
scaled by the previous year capital stock, determined at the replacement value starting
from 2004 using the perpetual inventory method. The value of capital stock of tangible
fixed assets for firm i at time t is computed as:
Kit = Kit−1(1− δ) + Iit
where the investment flow at time t has been deflated in 2010 prices using the
Gross Fixed Capital Formation deflator by The United Nations Economic Commission
for Europe and a depreciation rate (δ) fixed at 0.05. Finally, firm i’s initial value of
2NUTS2, according to the Eurostat classification.
3CIS data provide qualitative and quantitative information on firms’ characteristics, such as undertaken
innovative activities, and factors that either hamper the innovation process or prevent firms from en-
gaging into innovative activities at all. The dataset includes all firms with 250 employees or more and
a random sample of those with at least 10 employees.
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capital stock has been obtained by multiplying the book value of capital at time 0 by the
estimated value of the average firm’s capital life:
Ki0 = K
book−value
i0 ∗
[︁
(sec− age× (δbook−valuei0 )× 0.5
]︁
where sec-age represents the sector useful life of capital, and δbook−valuei0 the share of
capital already depreciated at time 0. Finally, the parameter 0.5 allows us to consider
“that depreciation for tax purposes is faster than economic depreciation” (Magri, 2009,
p. 204).
We further investigate the financial constraints to innovation through a direct indi-
cator using the CIS responses on the perception of hampering factors to innovation. We
concentrate on the group of broad innovators and look at the differences between large
and small firms. The sample encompasses all firms engaged in at least one innovative
activity listed by the CIS and that display full accounting data in the CAD for 2010.
The analysis of the CIS responses is based on a sample composed of 346 innovative firms4
(firms that were declared to be engaged in an innovation project), which comprises 202
small and 142 large firms.
In the CIS wave 2008-2010, the firms were asked to rank the importance of several
factors in preventing or hampering innovation activities. Among the hampering factors,
firms were asked to express how important Lack of funds within your enterprises or group
(internal financial constraints) and Lack of finance from sources outside your enterprise
(external financial constraints) have been. Table A.2 in the Appendix reports all ham-
pering factors considered by CIS 2008-2010.
Following Canepa and Stoneman (2008) and D’Este et al. (2012), we consider ham-
pered a firm engaged in innovative activities if it perceives a certain obstacle of medium
or high importance. We construct the frequency rankings of each hampering factor for
the two groups of small and large broad innovators and grade their importance. Subse-
quently, we concentrate on financial constraints and assess the differences in the percent-
age of small and large broad innovators that declared that internal and external financial
constraints as hampering factors of medium or high importance.
A description of the variables drawn from the CIS and the definitions of other vari-
ables drawn from our CIS-CAD dataset are reported in Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Ap-
pendix.
4The sample is larger than the CIS-CAD one because we are considering the year 2010 only.
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3.3.2 Descriptive statistics
Following Magri (2009), we analyze the differences in general characteristics, finan-
cial structure, and investment attitude, dividing the sample according to the innovation
attitude (broad innovators and non-innovators). We also look at the combined effects of
innovation attitude and size (firms with 20 employees or less are considered small and
firms with more than 20 employees are considered large) by dividing the sample into four
sub samples: small broad innovators, large broad innovators, small non-innovators, and
large non-innovator firms.
We consider the general characteristic that may impact financial constraints and
investment spending. Age is considered relevant by the empirical and theoretical liter-
ature, as often mature firms with a recorded history and cumulated internal funds are
subject to lower information asymmetries on the capital market and may find less dif-
ficulties in accessing external funds. Involvement in R&D projects is linked to higher
uncertainty and reluctance from managers to disclose information, leading to a strong
preference for internal funds and higher information asymmetries. Being export oriented
is considered by the literature a signal of high productivity and diversification benefits,
which may lower information asymmetries on the capital markets (Campa and Shaver,
2002), although during the crisis, export in the region has been severely affected (see
Banca d’Italia, 2018). Partnership into groups may also lower financial constraints by
promoting the internal pooling of resources.
Table 2 compares broad innovators and non-innovators with respect to their general
characteristics, financial structure, and investment attitude for 2005-2015. Innovative
firms are, on average, more export oriented, more likely to be part of a group, show a
lower sales growth rate, and have a higher share of graduate-level education employees.
Regarding fixed assets composition, innovative firms show a higher proportion of intangi-
ble to fixed assets,5 which is in line with the fact that innovation needs resources linked to
knowledge and intangibles. Regarding debt composition for 2005-2015, innovative firms
relied more on financial debt6 than non-innovative firms on average, signaling that fi-
nancial debt has been important during the analyzed period to pursue innovation in the
region.
Table 3 compares small and large firms among broad innovators and non-innovators.
Among broad innovators, large firms are older, more export oriented, display a higher
share of firms that employ at least one graduate employee, and are more involved into
R&D projects. Larger firms are also more likely to be part of a group, be involved in
cooperation agreements, and they have easier access to public grants. Regarding prof-
5Fixed assets are expressed as the sum of tangible and intangible assets.
6Financial debts are considered as a share of total liabilities.
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Table 2 - Information on the CIS-CAD sample for FVG
Data descriptive statistics
(Means; Percentages)
Full sample Broad innovators Non-innovators p-value
General characteristics
Size (# employees) 67 (18) 123 (26) 34 (16) 0.001
Age (# years) 22 (21) 23 (20) 22 (22) 0.165
R&D projects 22.8 60.7 − −
Exporter 39.6 56.4 29.4 0.000
Part of a group 18.3 29.5 11.5 0.000
Cooperation agreements 9.3 24.9 − −
Graduate workers 55.9 73.7 45.1 0.000
Public grants 16.5 43.9 − −
Innovative product new to the market 17.7 47.1 − −
Profits (ROA) 3.8 (0.9) 1.7 (0.9) 4.9 (0.8) 0.366
Sales (euros) growth rate 1.4 (1.4) 0.5 (0.1) 5.0 (5.1) 0.000
Tangible assets/Total assets 22.5 (18.0) 23.0 (19.0) 22.6 (17.8) 0.793
Intangible assets/Fixed assets 12.1 (4.7) 14.3 (4.8) 10.3 (3.4) 0.001
Financial structure
Equity/Total liabilities 34.0 (34.4) 33.3 (33.6) 34.1 (34.0) 0.614
Financial debts/Total liabilities 31.6 (32.0) 34.3 (35.1) 30.5 (29.5) 0.001
Leverage 54.5 (49.2) 55.4 (52.4) 55.5 (47.9) 0.979
Short term debts/Total financial debts 65.4 (66.2) 66.3 (69.1) 64.6 (64.6) 0.321
Investment attitude
Cash flow/Capital(t− 1) 33.1 (12.1) 40.5 (13.9) 30.6 (11.6) 0.188
Physical investments/Capital(t− 1) 16.1 (6.4) 15.7 (7.0) 17.0 (6.3) 0.723
(Cash flow−Physical investments)/Capital(t− 1) 17.8 (4.6) 24.7 (6.0) 13.7 (4.1) 0.096
Number of firms 800 310 490
Note: Median values are reported between parentheses, The sample comprises firms surveyed by the 2008-2010 wave of the CIS, for which
corresponding accounting data were available in the CAD over the period 2005-2015 for at least five consecutive years. The last column
reports the p-values of the t-test for equal means (unequal variances) among subgroups.
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itability, small broad innovators are, on average, more profitable in terms of return on
assets (ROA) and display higher sales growth rates. The lower sales growth of innova-
tors relative to non-innovators in Table 2 is thus driven by larger firms, which display a
negative sales growth rate during the analyzed period (−0.03). For asset composition,
larger innovators show a higher proportion of tangible assets in total assets as a sign
of lower bankruptcy costs, which may facilitate the access to external debt. Regarding
liability, our descriptive statistics are at odds with Magri (2009) as, in our sample, small
innovators are more leveraged than large innovators. However, the difference in the ratio
of financial debt to total liabilities is not significantly different. Nonetheless, small inno-
vators display a lower equity to total liabilities (28.9versus36.3). Small innovators also
adopt a more aggressive investment policy than large ones as per the physical investment
rate (19.1versus13.2), which is in line with Magri (2009).
Among non-innovators, large firms are older, more export oriented, more likely to
be part of a group, and display higher sales growth rates. Regarding the composition of
fixed assets in terms of intangibles, no differences have been identified. Small firms are
more leveraged than larger firms, while regarding the investment attitude among non-
innovators, no significant differences have been found. Overall, size matters more for the
asset and financial structure of innovators than for non-innovators.
Table 3 - Information on the CIS-CAD sample for FVG
Data descriptive statistics
(Means; Percentages)
Broad innovators Non-innovators
Small Large p-value Small Large p-value
General characteristics
Size (# employees) 14 (14) 204 (64) 0.001 13 (13) 65 (35) 0.000
Age (# years) 19 (17) 27 (22) 0.000 21 (21) 24 (22) 0.005
R&D projects 44.6 72.7 0.000
Exporter 37.8 70.2 0.000 25.6 35.2 0.016
Part of a group 10.8 43.4 0.000 5.5 20.7 0.000
Cooperation agreements 14.2 32.8 0.000
Graduate workers 54.7 87.9 0.000 32.6 64.3 0.000
Public grants 34.5 51.0 0.002
Innovative product new to the market 46.6 47.5 0.000
Profits (ROA) 2.4 (1.1) 1.1 (0.7) 0.036 2.1 (1.2) 9.2 (0.4) 0.428
Sales (euros) growth rate 11.8 (12.4) -
0.3 (−0.3)
0.001 5.9 (5.8) 4.9 (4.9) 0.000
Tangible assets/Total assets 20.8 (15.5) 24.6 (22.9) 0.050 22.5 (16.9) 22.9 (18.5) 0.771
Intangible assets/Fixed assets 16.2 (6.0) 12.9 (4.7) 0.122 10.1 (3.1) 10.7 (4.3) 0.657
Financial structure
Equity/Total liabilities 28.9 (29.2) 36.3 (34.1) 0.009 34.4 (38.5) 33.6 (29.9) 0.706
Financial debts/Total liabilities 30.3 (28.9) 37.3 (38.0) 0.001 30.4 (28.4) 30.6 (31.0) 0.922
Leverage 63.2 (53.6) 49.6 (52.4) 0.099 60.9 (48.1) 47.2 (47.2) 0.012
Short term debts/Total financial debts 66.0 (70.8) 66.6 (68.6) 0.828 64.6 (65.4) 64.6 (63.8) 0.994
Investment attitude
Cash flow/Capital(t− 1) 43.9 (16.2) 37.9 (12.6) 0.548 29.7 (12.6) 32.1 (9.5) 0.856
Physical investments/Capital(t− 1) 19.1 (7.1) 13.2 (7.0) 0.007 18.1 (6.3) 15.2 (6.1) 0.587
(Cash flow−Physical investments)/Capital(t− 1) 24.8 (6.5) 24.7 (4.1) 0.989 11.5 (4.7) 17.0 (3.1) 0.643
Number of firms 129 181 289 202
Note: Median values are reported between parentheses, The sample comprises firms surveyed by the 2008-2010 wave of the CIS, for which
corresponding accounting data were available in the CAD over the period 2005-2015 for at least five consecutive years. The last column
reports the p-values of the t-test for equal means (unequal variances) among subgroups.
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Table 4 presents the survey responses analysis and shows the frequency rankings
associated with each hampering factor for the groups of small and large broad innovators.
The results show that the most important hampering factor is the high cost of innovation
for both large and small innovative firms. The lack of internal funds is ranked second by
small firms and third by large firms, while the lack of external finance is ranked second
by large firms and third by small firms. Therefore, the lack of internal and of external
funds are among the most important hampering factors for all innovators regardless of
their size.
Table 4 - Ranking of factors hampering broad innovators, 2010
Factors hampering innovation Small Large
Lack of funds within your enterprise or group 2 3
Lack of financing from sources outside your enterprise 3 2
Innovation costs too high 1 1
Lack of qualified personnel 7 6
Lack of information on technology 9 8
Lack of information on markets 8 9
Difficulty in finding cooperation partners for innovation 5 7
Market dominated by established enterprises 6 5
Uncertain demand for innovative goods or services 4 4
Number of firms 204 142
Note: Own elaborations using CIS data. Small firms are those with up to 20 employees.
Tables 5 and 6 respectively report the impact of the lack of external and internal
financing for innovators by firm size. The percentage of small firms that declared of
medium or high importance the hampering effect of the lack of external or internal funds
is significantly higher, suggesting that small broad innovators were affected more by
financial constraints during the onset of the crisis.
3.4 Micro-econometric methodology
We assess the importance of financial constraints for FVG’s innovative firms by test-
ing for differences in the sensitivity of fixed physical investment to cash flow by innovation
status and size. We then concentrate on innovative firms and assess the differences in the
perception of financial obstacles between small and large firms.
Usually, financial variables display a high degree of persistence. To control for this
feature and the dynamic nature of the relationship linking firm investment attitude and
financial variables such as the incidence of cash flow over capital stock, we need an
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Table 5 - Impact of the lack of external financing by firm’s size, 2010. Per-
centage of the sample of broad innovators
Degree of perception of the obstacle
Firm’s size
Small Large Chi-square (χ2)
No or low effect 39.7 43.7
Medium or high effect 60.3 56.3 0.54*
Number of firms 204 142
Note: Own elaborations using CIS data. Small firms are those with up to 20 employees.
H0: row and columns variables are independent. *statistically significant at 10%.
Table 6 - Impact of the lack of internal funds by firm’s size, 2010. Percentage
of the sample of broad innovators
Degree of perception of the obstacle
Firm’s size
Small Large Chi-square (χ2)
No or low effect 34.8 43.7
Medium or high effect 65.2 56.3 2.77*
Number of firms 204 142
Note: Own elaborations using CIS data. Small firms are those with up to 20 employees.
H0: row and columns variables are independent. *statistically significant at 10%.
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econometric strategy that allows us to cope with endogenous error terms. Following
Bond et al. (2005), we employ an Error Correction Model (ECM) estimated through a
system GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond,
1998), which allows us to work with a panel dataset featuring many firms over a short
period of time.
The ECM departs from a specification of the long-term capital level based on a
CES production function of a profit maximizing firm and allows for a flexible dynamic
adjustment model for capital stock. Without adjustment costs, the long-run capital stock
(kit) of firm i at time t is specified as a log linear function of the output (yit) and the user
cost of capital (jit):
(3.1)kit = α + yit − σjit
To control for adjustment costs without resorting to a fully micro-founded model,
we follow Bond et al. (2005), using a flexible specification nesting the long-run capital
stock level into Equation 3.1 into a general autoregressive-distributed lag (ADL) dynamic
regression model. The (2, 2) ADL is specified as:
(3.2)kit = α0+α1kit−1+α2kit−2+β0yit+β1yit−1++β2yit−2+γ0jit+γ1jit−1+γ2jit−2+ϵit
The model is reparametrized in error correction form, separating the short from
long-term effects:
(3.3)∆kit = α0 + (α1 − 1)∆kit−1 + β0∆yit + (β0 + β1)∆yit−1
+ γ0∆jit + (γ0 + γ1)∆jit−1 − (1− α1 − α2) (kit−2 − yit−2)
+ [β0 + β1 + β2 − (1− α1 − α2)] yit−2 + (γ0 + γ1 + γ2) jit−2 + ϵit
The coefficient [β0 + β1 + β2 − (1− α1 − α2)] allows us to test the long-run propor-
tionality restriction (β0 + β1 + β2) /(1− α1 − α2) = 1 (Bond et al. (2005)). The variation
of output is proxied by the sales growth rate, the variation of the users’ cost of capital
is controlled by adding to the model firm- and year-specific effects, and the variation of
capital stock is approximated by the investment rate as:
∆kit =
Iit
Kit−1
− δit
where the depreciation rate, δit, also captures firm-specific effects. To investigate
the explanatory power of financial variables Bond et al. (2005) we include both current
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and lagged terms in the ratio of cash flow to the beginning-of-period capital stock. The
model we estimate takes the following form:
(3.4)
(︃
Iit
Kit−1
)︃
= µt + ρ
(︃
Iit−1
Kit−2
)︃
+ ζ0∆yit + ζ1∆yit−1 + ξ (kit−2 − yit−2)
+ φyit−2 + λ0
(︃
CFit
Kit−1
)︃
+ λ1
(︃
CFit−1
Kit−2
)︃
+ ηi + ϵit
In our specification, I are the investments in tangible fixed assets, K is the stock of
capital determined through the perpetual inventory method, ∆y is the sales growth rate,
and CF is the cash flow (net profits plus amortization and depreciation). Time-fixed
effects (µt) and firm-specific effects (ηi) are included to control for the variation of the
user cost of capital.
Equation 3.4 controls for future profits expectations by including the sales growth
rate and presents advantages from using the market value of installed capital (see Ughetto,
2008), that is, the Tobin’s marginal Q (see Tobin, 1969). First, it allows us to include
in the analysis firms that are not publicly-traded. Second, it allows us to overcome the
critiques that empirical studies replace, by making strong assumptions, the marginal Q
with the average Q, that is, the value of a unit of capital derived from the firm’s value
on the stock market (see Schiantarelli, 1996).
Following Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), we use a system
GMM estimator, which controls for firm-specific effects by transforming equations in
first differences by using endogenous variables lagged over two or more periods as valid
instruments under the constraint that no serial correlation occurs in the time-varying
component of the error term. The original equations with variables in level are added
under the assumption that instruments are orthogonal to the firm-specific effects.
Given that equation we estimate is derived from a micro-founded economic model,
we do not need to carry out any specification tests (such as AIC or BIC criteria) to select
the optimal number of lags.
We estimate Equation 3.4 to test for the sensitivity of physical capital to the cash
flow interacted with two dummies for the groups of innovative and non-innovative firms.
We also run the model interacting the coefficient with four dummies that capture both
size and innovation attitude for small innovative, large innovative, small non-innovative,
and large non-innovative firms.
As in Magri (2009), to control for the presence of outliers, we estimate Equation
3.4 after dropping the observations belonging to the 1st and 99th percentiles for all the
variables. We also control for sector-specific factors using a dummy indicating if the firm
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belongs to the manufacturing, services, or construction sectors. We do not include the
first lag of the cash flow variable, as the coefficient estimates are never significant.
3.5 Results
We first estimate Equation 3.4 using the broad definition of innovators. The results,
reported in Table 7, show the model is correctly specified for all sub-samples and the
error correction terms are correctly signed.
Table 7 - Error correction model, system GMM, dependent variable: Iit
Kit−1
,
2005-2015
By firms’ size and engagement status
Dependent variable: Iit/Kit−1 By Firms’ Size and Engagement Status
Explanatory variables
By innovation status By innovation status and size
Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e.
CFit/Kit−1· broad innovators 0.074
*** 0.02
CFit/Kit−1· non-innovators 0.076
*** 0.02
CFit/Kit−1 · d1 0.050
*** 0.01
CFit/Kit−1 · d2 0.100
*** 0.02
CFit/Kit−1 · d3 0.063
*** 0.02
CFit/Kit−1 · d4 0.004 0.02
Iit−1/Kit−2 0.030 0.03 0.031
* 0.03
∆yit -0.003 0.02 -0.008 0.01
∆yit−1 0.037
*** 0.01 0.031*** 0.01
yit−2 -0.006 0.01 0.007 0.01
ecmit -0.022
** 0.01 -0.013 0.01
Hansen test (p-value) 0.20 0.20
Test AR(1) first diff.(p-value) 0.00 0.00
Test AR(2) first diff.(p-value) 0.46 0.35
Wald Tests (p-value)
CFit/Kit−1· broad innovators= CFit/Kit−1· broad inno-
vators
0.92
CFit/Kit−1 · d1 = CFit/Kit−1 · d2 0.05
CFit/Kit−1 · d1 = CFit/Kit−1 · d3 0.54
CFit/Kit−1 · d1 = CFit/Kit−1 · d4 −
CFit/Kit−1 · d2 = CFit/Kit−1 · d3 0.15
CFit/Kit−1 · d2 = CFit/Kit−1 · d4 −
CFit/Kit−1 · d3 = CFit/Kit−1 · d4 −
Number of observations 3, 290
Number of firms 738
Per firm observations 9 9
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Note: d1 = 1 for small broad innovators; d2 = 1 for large broad innovators; d3 = 1 for small non-innovators; d4 = 1 for large non-innovators.
For level equations, instruments are given by lags 2 and 3 of the model’s variables. The instruments are obtained by taking lags 1-3 of the
variables’ first differences. Year dummies have been included. Estimates have been obtained by using the xtabond2 program written by
Roodman (2009). Small firms are those up to 20 employees. First and 99th percentile observations have been dropped.
The sensitivity of physical investment to cash flow is given by coefficient λ0. In the
left column in Table 7 we consider a dummy for broad innovators and non innovators and
in the right column we consider four dummies that capture the effects of cash flow on
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physical investment for the four sub-groups of firms divided by innovation attitude and
size: small broad innovators (d1), large broad innovators (d2), small non-innovators (d3),
and large non-innovators (d4). Both coefficients for broad innovators (0.074) and non
innovators (0.076) are statistically different from zero, indicating a significant sensitivity
of investment to cash flow, but no differences have been found between the two group.
When looking at the four dummies that capture innovation attitude and size (right col-
umn), a higher sensitivity of investment to cash flow is found for large broad innovators d2
(0.100), followed by the group of small non-innovators d3 (0.063), small broad innovators
d1 (0.050), and large non-innovators, which show a coefficient not significantly different
from zero.
The results point out that innovative attitude enhances the investment to cash flow
sensitivity only for large firms. Small firms show a significant investment to cash flow
sensitivity regardless of their engagement in innovation, as the coefficient for small non-
innovators is not statistically different from that of small innovators. Nonetheless, among
broad innovators, small firms show a lower sensitivity than large ones.
The literature on financial constraints hypothesizes that small firms are subjected
more to financial constraints than large firms, thus the hypothesis drawn from the theoret-
ical literature is that small innovators should be more likely to suffer financial constraints,
hence this should be the group with the highest investment to cash flow sensitivity. There-
fore, if we consider the investment to cash flow sensitivity as an indicator of financial
constraints, we would expect a lower coefficients for larger firms. In this respect, our re-
sults for the group of broad innovators are at odds with the literature, but also with our
descriptive statistics. Indeed, regarding the financial structure, small innovators show
several characteristics that may negatively impact bank financing decisions, such as a
higher leverage and lower share of tangible assets to total assets, which determine a lower
level of collaterals.
Moreover, we compare the sensitivity of investment to cash flow with the direct
indicator of financial constraints based on CIS responses in Tables 5 and 6. The CIS
based indicator shows that a significantly larger percentage of small firms declared to have
suffered financial constraints of both external and internal nature during the crisis. The
CIS data analysis evidences that small firms, which show a lower sensitivity of investment
to cash flow declare to be more financially constrained. We thus want to understand if
the higher sensitivity of investment to the cash flow of larger broad innovators is linked
to financial constraints or if it is the result of a preference for internal funds due to the
type of innovation investment pursued by firms. We look at the percentage of firms that
introduced R&D projects among broad innovators, finding that the percentage of large
firms engaged in R&D is significantly higher than that of small firms (seeTable 3). We
re-estimate the model described above by defining as innovators only the R&D performer
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firms.
The results, shown in Table 8, point to a significantly higher sensitivity of investment
to cash flow for R&D performers than non-R&D performers (0.095 versus 0.052). For
the difference in R&D involvement and size, no statistically significant difference in the
level of the coefficient between larger and smaller R&D performers was identified, which
proves that the difference in the coefficients between small and large broad innovators is
driven by larger firms’ higher R&D involvement.
Table 8 - Error correction model, system GMM, dependent variable: Iit
Kit−1
,
2005-2015
By Firms’ Size and R&D Status
Dependent variable: Iit/Kit−1 By Firms’ Size and Engagement Status
Explanatory variables
By R&D status By R&D status and size
Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e.
CFit/Kit−1· R&D performers 0.095
*** 0.02
CFit/Kit−1· non-R&D performers 0.052
*** 0.02
CFit/Kit−1 · d1 0.067
*** 0.03
CFit/Kit−1 · d2 0.093
*** 0.02
CFit/Kit−1 · d3 0.042
** 0.02
CFit/Kit−1 · d4 0.029 0.03
Iit−1/Kit−2 0.018 0.03 0.027 0.02
∆yit -0.007 0.03 0.024 0.02
∆yit−1 0.035
*** 0.01 0.034*** 0.01
yit−2 0.001 0.01 0.001 0.01
ecm = kit−2 − yit−2 -0.023
*** 0.01 -0.017** 0.01
Hansen test (p-value) 0.21 0.19
Test AR(1) first diff.(p-value) 0.00 0.00
Test AR(2) first diff.(p-value) 0.36 0.46
Wald Tests (p-value)
CFit/Kit−1· R&D performers= CFit/Kit−1· non-R&D
performers
0.07
CFit/Kit−1 · d1 = CFit/Kit−1 · d2 0.42
CFit/Kit−1 · d1 = CFit/Kit−1 · d3 0.42
CFit/Kit−1 · d1 = CFit/Kit−1 · d4 −
CFit/Kit−1 · d2 = CFit/Kit−1 · d3 0.03
CFit/Kit−1 · d2 = CFit/Kit−1 · d4 −
CFit/Kit−1 · d3 = CFit/Kit−1 · d4 −
Number of observations 3, 290
Number of firms 739
Per firm observations 9 9
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Note: d1 = 1 for small R&D performers; d2 = 1 for large R&D performers; d3 = 1 for small non-R&D performers; d4 = 1 for large non-R&D
performers. For the level equations instruments are given by lags 2 and 3 of the model’s variables. The instruments are obtained by taking
lags 1-3 of the variables’ first differences. Year dummies have been included. Estimates have been obtained by using the xtabond2 program
written by Roodman (2009). Small firms are those up to 20 employees. First and 99th percentile observations have been dropped.
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3.6 Conclusions
We test for differences in the existence of financial constraints for innovative and
non-innovative firms in FVG (firms that declared to be engaged in at least one of the
CIS listed innovation activities) by considering the size class for 2005-2015. The analysis
is carried out using a micro-econometric approach to test the sensitivity of investment
to cash flow and is further developed by analyzing the CIS responses that shed light on
the determinants of investment level for the groups of innovative firms. Our estimates
show that, during the analyzed period, the sensitivity of physical investment to cash
flow was relevant for all firms but higher for innovative ones, although not statistically
different. We also divided the sample according to innovation attitude and size. Large
broad innovators show the highest sensitivity of investment to cash flow, followed by small
non-innovative firm and then by small broad innovators. Large non-innovative firms have
a non-significant coefficient.
We further carry out a descriptive analysis to better understand and interpret the
meaning of the sensitivity of investment to cash flow for broad innovators. We analyze
the CIS 2008-2010 responses on the hampering factors to innovation investment, concen-
trating on the importance of the lack of internal and external funds. Financial obstacles
are among the top three hampering factors for both small and large broad innovators, but
the percentage of small firms that declare that the lack of internal and external funds are
important hampering factors (high or medium importance) is significantly higher than
the percentage of larger firms.
A possible explanation for the higher sensitivity of investment to cash flow of large
innovators relative to small broad innovators is the higher share of large firms engaged in
R&D projects. The non-rivalry and non-excludability of R&D inputs and outputs can be a
deterrent for managers to disclose details related to these projects to external financiers.
Indeed, there is the risk that competitors may appropriate technological information
produced by the firm, so that their projects lose value. In this case, the sensitivity of
investment to cash flow signals a strict preference for internal funds for large innovators
and financial constraints for small innovators. Our interpretation is supported by the fact
that, when we run the model by considering the differences between R&D performers and
non-R&D performers, the group of R&D performers shows no significant difference in the
sensitivity of investment to cash flow between small and large firms.
The main policy implications are related to the severe financial constraints faced by
all small firms and, in particular, by small broad innovators in the analyzed period. Pol-
icy makers should stand ready to provide measures to facilitate access to finance for this
group of firms encouraging innovative behavior during economic downturns. Regarding
the R&D performers, we explained the higher sensitivity of investment to cash flow as
74
strict preference for internal funds on the basis of responses for the years 2008 to 2010.
We do not know if in the subsequent years with the ongoing of the crisis, once exhausted
these funds, this preference turned to actual financial constraints or, in the worst cases,
to underinvestment. Anyway, regarding this strict preference for internal funds, an im-
portant implication for policymaker is to encourage partnership between public entities
such as regional research centers and universities with those firms that pursue R&D in
order to jointly pursue these types of projects to avoid potential counter-cyclicality of
innovation. This is especially important after having observed long periods characterized
by several waves of recession such as the one that hit Italy between 2008 and 2014.
The main limits of our study are the following. First the measure of financial con-
straints from the econometric model is calculated on a 10 year time-span to obtain ro-
bust results, while the CIS based measure encompasses only 3 years, although relevant
to the assessment of financial constraints, being the years following the economic crisis
(2008 − 2011). Second, we made the very restrictive hypothesis of persistent innovation
status: a firm that declared to be engaged in innovative projects in CIS wave 2010 is
considered an innovator for the whole span 2005-2015.
Further research should consider including more than one CIS wave to check for
robustness when comparing direct and indirect indicators. A further nation based study
should consider a cross regional analysis.
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Appendix
Table A.1
CIS 2008-2010 and 2010-12 questionnaire: innovative activities
Classes Items Not engaged engaged
Technology acquisitions
Acquisition of extramural R&D  
Acquisition of machinery  
Acquisition of other technologies  
Training & Marketing
Training for innovative activities  
Marketing for new productprocesses  
Internal R&D
In-house R&D  
Design  
Other activities supporting innovation  
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Table A.2 - List of variables
Variables Source Type Definitions
Age CAD Integer
number
Difference between the current year and the date of firm i’s
establishment
Size CAD 0/1 1 if firm i has up to 20 employees at the end of 2010, 0 other-
wise
R&D projects CIS 0/1 1 if firm i is engaged in R&D projects, 0 otherwise
Exporter CIS 0/1 1 if firm i sells its products and services also on the interna-
tional marketplaces, 0 otherwise
Part of a group CIS 0/1 1 if firm i belongs to a group, 0 otherwise
Cooperation agreements CIS 0/1 1 if firm i innovation-related partnerships with other firms, 0
otherwise
Graduate workers CIS 0/1 At least one employee has a university degree in firm i
Public grants CIS 0/1 1 if firm i has received public funded grants for innovation-
related investments, 0 otherwise
Sector Dummies CIS 0/1 Sector dummies capturing the macro sector to which firm i
belongs to
Cash flow CAD Euros Net profits plus depreciation allowances
Capital stock CAD Euros The economic value of the net capital stock (property, plant,
and equipment) is measured at replacement value by using the
perpetual inventory method
Return on assets (ROA) CAD Percentages Earnings before interest and taxes / Total assets
Sales (euros) growth rate CAD Percentages Total revenues growth rate
Tangible assets/Total as-
sets
CAD Percentages Net equipment and gross plants/Total assets
Intangible assets/Total as-
sets
CAD Percentages Immaterial assets/Total assets
Equity/Total liabilities CAD Percentages Capital and reserves/Total liabilities
Financial debts/Total lia-
bilities
CAD Percentages Total bank and other financial debts /Equity plus financial
debts
Leverage CAD Percentages Financial debts / Equity plus financial debts
Short term debts/Total fi-
nancial debt
CAD Percentages Financial debts expiring in less than one year/Total bank and
other financial debts
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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to connect the literature on firm obstacles to innovation
to the concept of regional economic resilience by empirically assessing the relationship
between the intensity of firms’ engagement in innovative activities and self-reported ob-
stacles to innovation during the unfolding of the latest economic and financial downturn.
The analysis is grounded on a unique dataset on firm-level accounting data (CAD) as
well as information drawn from two waves (2008-10 and 2010-12) of the Community
Innovation Survey (CIS) for a representative sample of firms in the Italian region of Friuli
Venezia Giulia. Our data point out that the economic system of the region has been
vulnerable to the recent economic and financial crisis. Moreover, our main results support
the existence of severe deterring barriers in the region and that during the recent eco-
nomic crisis firms’ uncertainty about the evolution of market conditions dominated any
pre-existent relationship between non market-related hampering factors and the intensity
of innovative activities. Furthermore, in correspondence with the sovereign debt crisis
firms’ perception of market-related obstacles rose dramatically while that of financial and
human resources-related obstacles decreased, suggesting that the firms of the region have
not been resilient with respect to sizeable exogenous shocks that severely hit the economy.
JEL Classification Numbers: O31, O32, O33.
Keywords: Obstacles to innovation, Engagement in innovation activities, Regional
resilience, Economic and financial crisis.
4.1 Introduction
The role of innovation in fostering economic growth has been at the core of the
policy debate particularly in the most recent years, as policy makers have been trying
to remove obstacles to innovative investments and introduce incentives to facilitate the
engagement with new ideas of firms willing to recover from the aftermath of the economic
and financial crisis started in 2008. Firm innovation capabilities have been recognized
as one of the main determinants of regional resilience, or “the capacity of a regional
or local economy to withstand or recover from market, competitive and environmental
shocks to its developmental growth path [...]” (Martin and Sunley, 2015, p. 13). Given
that investing in innovation does not automatically imply that firms will come up with
new products, processes or organizational structures, managers and policy makers have
actively sought to identify and remove those factors that may hamper the innovation
process. In the extant literature, most of the contributions have focussed either on the
driving forces behind firm innovation or on the determinants of regional resilience, with
little overlap between the two research lines. This paper investigates the relationship
between the intensity of firms’ engagement in innovation activity and their perception of
such obstacles in the Italian region of Friuli Venezia Giulia (FVG), and considers how
such a relationship was affected by the financial and sovereign debt crisis that hit most
European countries between 2008 and 2012.
Since the 1960s the region of FVG, a small and heavily industrialized region located in
the North-East of Italy, has been characterized by high GDP growth rates. Unfortunately,
the credit crunch that followed the 2011 economic and financial crisis severely hit the
region’s economy and the reduction in firms’ investments was sharper than in the rest of
Italy between 2012 and 2014 Banca d’Italia (2018).
The study presents a number of original contributions to the still sparse literature on
the regional dimension of obstacles to innovation and firms’ behaviour in the aftermath
of economic and financial shocks. First, the focus is on firms located in FVG, a region
characterized by industrial clusters of SMEs operating mostly in traditional sectors. Fo-
cussing on within-region firms’ innovative behaviour provides interesting insights on the
environmental components of firms’ risk perceptions and their potential contribution to
the resilience of the local system as a whole. The case of FVG is especially interesting for
a reflection on the many medium-income regions in Europe still competitive and wealthy
relative to the mean of their country, which however were severely hit by the crisis that
added up to an enduring decline in the most recent decades brought about by technolog-
ical change and globalization pressures (Iammarino et al., 2018). Second, we introduce a
new qualitative measure of innovation intensity that represents a proxy of the efforts with
which firms carry out innovative activities: more complex operations need a wider range
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of investment channels, thus a deeper intensity. The lowest ranking in innovation activ-
ity is the external acquisition of technology that mainly requires economic resources; the
highest ranked activity is R&D that entails not only financial efforts, but also relational,
human and knowledge capital.
Third, the study is based on a unique dataset that comes from matching two dif-
ferent sources: the Community Innovation Survey (CIS), providing detailed information
on firms’ innovation activity, and the Company Accounts Database (CAD), containing
accounting information in order to widen the range of firms’ characteristics and have a
better coverage of financial features. The combination of these data sources, and the tim-
ing of the panel structure (matching a subset of 317 potential innovators present in two
CIS waves, 2008-2010 and in 2010-2012), allow us to grasp some effect of the consecutive
waves of the economic and sovereign debt crisis.
Fourth, regarding the empirical strategy, the major concern is to control for the
selection bias issue arising when firms display heterogeneity in their propensity to inno-
vate. We therefore operate a careful choice of the relevant sample to analyse by focusing
only on the firms that showed a real interest in innovation, that we define potential in-
novators (D’Este et al., 2012). Next, we address endogeneity issues by working along
two directions: enriching our model by exploiting firm-level accounting information and
relying on the most robust estimation techniques.
Our results grasp several aspects of the relationship between the intensity of en-
gagement in innovative activities and reported obstacles of firms in the FVG region.
Overall, the emerging picture points to the existence of strong deterrent barriers (i.e.
those literally preventing firms from innovating), in particular related to financial and
market factors while obstacles related to human resources are instead pervasive, affecting
innovation-active and deterred firms alike. In the second stage of the crisis (2010-12)
firms’ perception of the relevance of financial barriers is the highest at the extreme of the
distribution, i.e. for non-innovators and for firms more intensely engaged in innovative
investments, while that of market-related obstacles remains distinctively high for deterred
firms. After the crisis hit, the relevance of demand risk and uncertain competition market
is perceived even more acutely by all local firms, and particularly by the non-innovators,
further curtailing investment in innovation in the region and countercyclical strategies to
cope with the crisis effects.
Based on a descriptive analysis of the evolution of Friuli Venezia Giulia’s economic
system in terms of innovation capabilities and employment levels before and after the
sovereign debt crisis we point out that the regional economic system has been vulnerable
the recent economic downturn. This evidence seems connected to the lack of resilience
of FVG’s non-innovative small and medium enterprises, i.e. those firms that are less
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export oriented. Thus we conclude that firms’ perception of market-related obstacles rose
dramatically during the recent sovering debt crisis reflecting the general vulnerability of
the regional economic systems to exogenours sizeable shocks.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 discusses the literature background;
Section 4.3 describes the data, presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in the
analysis and a descriptive analysis to assess the resilience of the regional economic sys-
tem; Section 4.4 explains the econometric approach and discusses the estimation results;
Section 4.5 concludes and presents policy-making implications.
4.2 Literature background
4.2.1 Firms, innovation obstacles and engagement
A large body of scholarly literature has addressed the relationship between firms’
engagement in innovative activities and factors that may hamper firms’ aspiration to in-
novate (see, for a review, D’Este et al., 2012). This eminently empirical literature, mainly
based on data from innovation surveys such as the European Community Innovation Sur-
vey (CIS), has largely focused either on the factors that affect the firm’s perception of the
importance of obstacles to innovation (e.g. Mohnen and Rosa, 2001; Baldwin and Lin,
2002; Baldwin and Hanel, 2003; Galia and Legros, 2004; Iammarino et al., 2009), or on
the impact of such obstacles on the propensity to innovate (e.g. Arundel, 1997; Tourigny
and Le, 2004; Mohnen and Roller, 2005; Savignac, 2006 and 2008; Mohnen et al., 2007;
Mancusi and Vezzulli, 2010).
The first approach - which is closer to our empirical analysis here - focuses mainly
on why firms perceive differently the obstacles to innovation and the extent to which
individual obstacles are complementary. Common results are that the greater the firm’s
engagement in innovation activities, the higher the importance attached to obstacles to
innovation; and that the latter are perceived differently depending on firms’ characteris-
tics (e.g. size, sector). One explanation for the positive association between engagement
in innovation and perception of barriers is that innovative firms are more likely to en-
counter obstacles (selection bias) and that the decision to innovate is influenced by some
latent variable that is also correlated with obstacles. Baldwin and Lin (2002), for exam-
ple, using a representative sample of Canadian firms, point out that the perception of
obstacles to innovation is higher for innovators than for non-innovators: in their view,
innovators’ awareness of obstacles is a signal of their ability to solve problems relating to
the innovation process. Galia and Legros (2004), relying on a sample of innovation-active
French firms, reach similar conclusions and provide an important contribution by iden-
tifying as complementary those obstacles that are positively correlated and that can be
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grouped in homogenous sets. In the same vein, D’Este et al. (2012) distinguish between
two kinds of barriers to innovation: the first corresponds to revealed barriers and reflects
the steepness of the innovation process and the firm’s learning experience in investing in
innovation; the second type, deterring barriers, encompasses the obstacles that prevent
firms from committing to innovation investment tout court. To apply such a distinction,
D’Este et al. (2012) identify potential innovators according to their aspiration to innovate,
regardless of whether they were engaged or not in innovative activities: non-innovators,
who self-report having faced barriers, fall in the group of potential innovators. This allows
mitigating the selection bias problem by ruling out from the analysis firms that are not
interested in investing in innovation at the observed point in time, either because they
had done it previously or because it is not justified on the basis of market and competitive
conditions.
One of the main merits of the second approach, which focusses on the opposite causal
relationship - i.e. the role of obstacles perceptions in affecting the probability to engage
in innovation -, is the emphasis put on the possible endogeneity of the regressors (e.g.
Mohnen and Roller, 2005; Savignac, 2006; Mohnen et al., 2007). More recent studies,
particularly concerned with financial barriers, point out that the positive relationship
between firm’s perception of obstacles and engagement in innovation can be attributed
to a combination of several sources of bias (e.g. Canepa and Stoneman, 2008; Savignac,
2008; Mancusi and Vezzulli, 2010; Silva and Carreira, 2012), such as the presence of
heterogeneous unobserved firm-specific factors (such as entrepreneurial behaviour, risk
propensity or market opportunities) that may impact on both aspects of the relation-
ship, or the simultaneous determination of the obstacle perception and the decision to
innovate.
The perception of obstacles to innovation is an inherently firm-specific dimension
(Sitkin and Pablo, 1992; Ferriani et al., 2008). On the other hand, as the conceptualization
of risk perception in the geography literature (e.g. Cutter et al., 2000) as pointed out, the
extent to which a population (in this case, of firms) perceive external risks depends on
both subjective evaluations, which are specific to the actors, and objective environmental
conditions, which apply to the probability of occurrence of a certain shock under specific
temporal and spatial contexts. In recent studies following the Schumpeterian tradition,
innovation strategies have been considered as cyclical, inasmuch as firms (in specific
industries and regions) tend to reduce their innovative efforts in presence of uncertain and
risky market conditions (e.g. Francois and Lloyd-Ellis, 2009); however, it has also been
suggested that periods of economic instability or crisis generate a fertile environment for
firms (in specific industries and places) to adopt counter-cyclical strategies and innovate
(e.g. Aghion and Saint-Paul, 1998; Archibugi and Filippetti, 2011).
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4.2.2 Firms’ perceptions and regional resilience
The relationship between innovative behaviour and perception of barriers cannot
thus be properly understood without considering the set of opportunities and constraints
firms face as a result of their external - industrial, technological and institutional - en-
vironment and its evolution (e.g. Nelson and Winter, 1982; Shane, 2001). The 2008
economic and financial crisis across Europe and the rest of the world uncovered a highly
uneven geographical distribution of environmental factors, thereby drawing attention to
differences between regions in their vulnerability to economic shocks and their ability to
adapt to serious disruptions in the economic environment (e.g. Davies, 2011; Martin,
2011, 2012; Fingleton et al., 2012; Cellini and Torrisi, 2014; Sensier et al., 2016).
Despite the overriding attention paid to regional economic resilience in the last
decade, the conceptual framing of the notion remains the subject of considerable aca-
demic debate (e.g. Bristow and Healy, 2014; Martin and Sunley, 2015; Boschma, 2015).
Evolutionary theorists have emphasised the importance of selection environments, firm
fitness, sectoral variety, innovation capacity and institutional arrangements, and asserted
the need to grasp the “capacities to withstand or resist the shock in the first place, the
robustness of its firms and institutions in responding to it, and the extent and nature of
the regional economy’s recovery from it” (Sensier et al., 2016, p. 131; Martin, 2012; Mar-
tin and Sunley, 2015). Little effort has been devoted so far in considering the relevance
of firms’ innovation perceptions and strategies in determining regional vulnerability and
resilience to shocks.
Long-standing research on innovation and regional development has emphasised that
in dynamic regional innovation systems, often characterised by large urban agglomera-
tions, firms tend to perceive barriers - of the revealed type - as a result of the steep
learning curve behind their innovative efforts (e.g. Iammarino et al., 2009): agglomera-
tion externalities andor diversification of the local knowledge base support firms’ explo-
ration of emerging opportunities and new markets (e.g. Rodriguez-Pose, 1999; Gordon
and McCann, 2005; Todtling and Trippl, 2005; Escribano et al., 2009), contributing to
the resilience of the system as a whole to future shocks. Conversely, in technologically
stable or inert regional systems, relatively more specialised, oriented toward exploitation,
refinement and efficiency improvements, firms experience more deterrent barriers and are
discouraged from innovative ventures (e.g. Gagliardi and Iammarino, 2018).
Distinct geographical patterns in the perception of the obstacles to innovation char-
acterise in particular single domestic firms and SMEs: the perception of barriers, in other
words, does not significantly differ across regions if firms are multinationals or multiplants
(see Iammarino et al., 2009 for Italy; and Gagliardi and Iammarino, 2018 for the UK). In
addition, in the Italian case, domestic firms located in the macro-regions of Northern and
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Central Italy tend to perceive obstacles to innovation as relevant significantly less than
their counterpart located in the South Iammarino et al. (2009). While these studies have
considered cross-regional differences within one national innovation system, the present
work offers an additional perspective on firms’ innovation investments and perception of
obstacles, and their reactions during a global economic shock, within the context of a
specific regional innovation system, FVG. Looking specifically to the resilience of the in-
novative activities to exogenous environmental variables, Cruz-Castro et al. (2017) study
the effect of firm-specific factors on the probability to continue in-house R&D activity
during and after the crisis in Spain. Cruz-Castro et al. (2017) find out that larger firm
size, export-orientation, high productivity, access to public grants, the share of R&D
employees and engagement in cooperation agreements lowered the probability to quit in-
novative projects during the 2008-2012. Beside firm-specific characteristics, Cruz-Castro
et al. (2017) find out that the probability of continuing in house R&D also depend on
the economic size of the specific regions and on the regional innovation system.
North-Eastern Italy - the macro-region of FVG - is a striking example of the Italian
economic miracle of the 1960s that turned a land of poverty and migration into a highly
industrialized and wealthy region. The industrial development has mainly been driven
by industrial clusters of SMEs operating in traditional industries. In particular, FVG’s
leading specializations include furniture and electric appliances and heavy industry, such
as machinery, metals and steel production (FVG, 2015). Even if FVG presents a per-
centage of workers with higher education in sciences and technologies and a percentage
of workers employed in high technology sectors below the Italian average, the region has
a high incidence of innovative firms with a relevant presence of small and medium size
enterprises (SMEs). According to the Italian National Institute for Statistics (Istat),
during the 2010s FVG has been a leading innovation-oriented region in Italy in terms
of percentage of innovators, rate of patents per million of inhabitants and expenses in
Research and Development (R&D) activities as a ratio to regional GDP (see Istat-Cnel,
2013; Istat, 2015, Istat, 2016 and Istat, 2017).
Many enterprises, especially the suppliers with low export capacity, have suffered
increasingly from globalization processes; more in detail, despite in the years preceding the
crisis the export of the region raised more than the national average it suffered a sharper
reduction than in the rest of Italy between 2007 and 2013, recovering only between 2014
and 2016 FGB (2014, 2017). The economic crisis severely hit the propensity of FVG’s
firms to innovate as, on the basis of the CIS surveys for the waves 2010-12 and 2012-14,
the percentage of firms that innovated went down from 58.8% in 2012 from to 42.2% in
2014.
FVG is also very weakly internationally integrated, with a share of only 1.6% of all
foreign-owned enterprises located in Italy at the end of 2015 - the lowest of the North
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of the country - and very limited active internationalization of local firms abroad (ITA,
2018). Moreover, after the economic crisis export drop more severely compared to the
rest of the Italy and the ability to attract foreign direct investment is low. Recently, the
financial and economic crisis has severely affected the regional economic performance:
the GDP growth was negative in 2008 (−2.0%) and 2009 (−6.7%), and after a weak
recovery in the following two years, it turned negative again in 2012 (−2.1%), following
the national trend Faggian et al. (2018). Despite being above the national average in
terms of level of economic wealth measured by GDP per capita, indicators point out that
during the economic and financial downturns the difficulties of the regional productive
sectors were deeper and longer than the country average.
4.3 Data, Variables and Descriptive Evidence
4.3.1 Data sources and sample definition
Our analysis is grounded on an original dataset that was built by matching micro-
data from two different sources. The first is the Community Innovation Survey (CIS),
provided by the Regional Statistical Department for a representative sample of firms of
the FVG region.1 CIS data, collected according to EUROSTAT harmonized rules (see, for
all, Mairesse and Mohnen, 2010), represents an extremely rich source of qualitative and
quantitative information on firms’ characteristics and innovative behaviours, including
their perception of the obstacles obstructing the innovation process. The survey, that
covers all firms with 250 employees or more and a random sample of those with at least
10 employees, is representative of the regional productive sector by both industry and
firm size (i.e. number of employees).
The 2008-2010 CIS wave collected answers from 1, 134 respondent firms in the region,
while the 2010-2012 wave consisted of 1, 139 units. Starting from the 2008-10 wave, 835
potential innovators, i.e. those firms that were truly interested in innovation in the period
observed, were selected.2 As some of the respondents were surveyed in both waves, a
panel of 317 potential innovators (634 observations) was extracted across 2008-10 and
2010-12.
The second source is represented by the Italian Company Accounts Database (CAD,
Centrale dei Bilanci). This dataset, which is maintained by a consortium of banks, con-
tains firms’ accounting information especially related to the enterprise’s financial struc-
ture. One minor drawback of this source is that CAD data are available only for firms
borrowing from banks belonging to the consortium. A further limitation is that account-
1NUTS2 according to Eurostat classification.
2Potential innovators were selected from the CIS as the subsample of firms that either engaged in inno-
vation activities or reported to have been hampered by at least one obstacle.
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ing data, reflecting Italian accounting rules, are more detailed for larger firms than for
smaller ones. We extracted firm-level financial data for the years 2006 to 2014 that match
about 80 percent of the firms included in the 2008-10 CIS wave: the resulting CIS-CAD
sample consists of 925 firms, of which 691 potential innovators including the 317 firms of
our panel. Our empirical analysis in Section 4.4 uses first the CIS-CAD cross-section sam-
ple to run a multivariate probit model to grasp insights on the relationship between the
perception of obstacles and firms’ innovation behaviour, and then performs a random-
effect panel probit on the 317 firms’ subsample to study how firms’ attitudes toward
innovation obstacles were affected by the unfolding of the sovereign debt crisis.
4.3.2 Variables and main indicators
Defining barriers to innovation
The survey allows to identify a direct measure of obstacle perception through each
firm’s own assessment. The CIS questionnaire has a dedicated Section reporting various
categories of obstacles: all respondent firms (both engaged and not engaged in innovation
activities) reported the importance of each obstacle type according to a Likert scale
ranging from 0 to 3 (not at all, low, medium or high importance). We collapsed answers
into binary indicators taking value 1 if the firm perceived the importance of an obstacle
as high, and 0 in all other cases.
After checking for cross-correlations between individual obstacles in each survey
wave, we harmonised the 2008-10 and 2010-12 CIS questionnaires and we grouped them
in three categories: financial, human resources and market obstacles (Table A.1 in the
Appendix).3 The classification is coherent with that used by Galia and Legros (2004) and
D’Este et al. (2012), and reflects the structure of the CIS questionnaire administered to
firms. Financial barriers refer to difficulties in financing innovation investments deriving
from lack of appropriate funding; human resources obstacles are related to the scarcity
of qualified personnel; market barriers reflect the presence of incumbent firms with high
market power, and/or the uncertainty of demand for innovative products or services.
Measuring engagement in innovation
We model innovation intensity by sorting firms’ involvement with respect to the
specific forms of investment required to implement the project (Koschatzky, 1999). The
wider is the range of channels necessary to undertake a particular innovation project, the
more complex and risky is to implement it, and therefore the higher the intensity of the
firm’s engagementeffort.
3To ensure coherence between the slightly different questionnaires adopted in the two CIS waves in
relation to the obstacles to innovation, the analysis here is based on the shorter obstacles list reported
in the 2010-12 wave, thus on the cross-wave harmonised information included in our dataset.
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The simplest way to innovate is through the external acquisition of technology, since
it mostly requires financial resources. Innovation intensity deepens when new available
knowledge, whatever the source, has to be disseminated inside or outside the firm involv-
ing relational and communication investments (e.g. Rogers, 2004): for instance, in the
case of process innovations the new technologies become truly effective when employees
feel confident in using them as a result of training programs; while in the case of new
products or services, marketing schemes are crucial to promote goods’ quality to poten-
tial customers. Internal R&D is generally considered the most demanding form of firm’s
engagement in innovation, in that it requires significant amounts of financial, relational
and technological resources that only a relatively small number of firms can deploy.
Both 2008-10 and 2010-12 CIS questionnaires asked firms to report whether they
engaged in any of eight listed innovative activities. We grouped them into three indicators
that grasp different qualitative aspects of innovation investments according to the above
considerations. They were defined as dummy variables taking value 1 if the firm has
engaged in that particular innovation effort in the reference period (Table A.2 in the
Appendix): such dummies are mutually exclusive since for each firm only the dummy
representing its highest degree of innovation effort takes value 1. Starting from the
highest, the ranking is: Internal R&D, Training & marketing, Technology acquisition.
Whereas previous literature has mainly relied on quantitative measures (e.g. the number
of undertaken innovative activities or the amount of expenses), our measure of innovation
intensity, that ranks the intensity of the firm’s innovative engagement on the basis of the
qualitative variety of investments, offers a deeper understanding of the relation under
study.
Potential innovators
The existing literature has showed that the correlation between innovative activities
and obstacles is severely affected by selection bias issues if the estimation is performed
on the full available sample. As mentioned in Section 4.2.1 above, in order to tackle this
problem we need to identify firms that did not innovate because they were overcome by
deterrent barriers, from those that were simply not interested in carrying out innovation
projects in the reference period. This latter category of firms represents an important
source of upward selection bias and it should be left out from the analysis (Hajivassiliou
and Savignac, 2008).
As in Savignac (2008), Hajivassiliou and Savignac (2008), Mancusi and Vezzulli
(2010) and D’Este et al. (2012), we focussed our analysis on firms that showed an aspira-
tion to innovate, i.e. the potential innovators. Our selection rule was the following: either
the firm engaged in some form of innovation investment as described above (innovation-
active), or it did not and was deterred by at least one obstacle (deterred). This criterion
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restricted our selected sample to 835 firms from the 1, 134 respondents of the 2008-10
CIS wave: the remaining firms were excluded from the analysis, as considered ’not in the
innovation contest’ D’Este et al. (2012) since, albeit not constrained by any barrier, they
declared not to have engaged in innovative activities either because of the lack of demand
for innovation from the relevant market’s competitive conditions, or because still relying
on previously (to the surveyed period) introduced innovations.
4.3.3 Descriptive analysis
Tables 1 and 2 report the main characteristics of firms in the FVG region included
in the CIS 2008-2010. Table 1 shows that, restricting our analysis to potential innovators
only, the sample reduces from 1, 134 to 835 units; among them 47.7 percent reported
financial barriers as important obstacles to innovation, while human resources and mar-
ket obstacles were each reported by 11 and 35.7 percent of the sample. Thus, potential
innovators perceive as the most pervasive obstacles those related to the lack of financ-
ing opportunities (both internal and external) and market factors such as the demand
uncertainty and the presence of incumbent firms.
Table 1 - Information on the CIS Wave 2008-2010 sample of Friuli Venezia Giulia
Data descriptive statistics
(percentage of firms)
Full sample Potential innovators
p-value
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Types of obstacles*
Financial obstacles 35.1 47.7 35.1 47.7 0.000
Human resources obstacles 8.1 27.3 11.0 31.3 0.032
Market obstacles 26.3 26.3 35.7 47.9 0.000
Firms’ characteristics**
Technology acquisitions 31.9 46.7 43.4 49.6 0.000
Training & Marketing 18.3 38.7 24.9 43.3 0.000
R&D 21.1 40.8 28.6 45.2 0.000
Organizational innovation 34.9 47.7 40.8 49.2 0.008
Marketing innovation 26.5 44.2 31.0 46.3 0.031
Exporter 36.4 48.1 39.3 48.9 0.196
Public grants 15.0 35.7 20.4 40.3 0.002
Part of a group 17.2 37.8 18.9 39.2 0.327
Cooperation agreements 8.6 28.0 11.6 32.1 0.027
Graduate workers 52.6 50.0 55.4 49.7 0.217
Abandoned innovation projects 3.6 18.7 4.9 21.6 0.165
Ongoing innovation activities 18.7 39.0 25.4 43.5 0.000
More than 20 employees 41.7 49.3 41.4 49.3 0.903
Revenues above 50 million euros 5.6 23.1 6.5 24.6 0.452
Number of observations 1,134 835
*Percentage of firms assessing items as highly important.
**Percentage of firms presenting a specific characteristic.
Table 2 focuses on potential innovators to show the main differences between the
firms engaged in innovation activities and those that were deterred by the obstacles.
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As expected, innovation-active firms show on average a lower incidence of obstacles’
perception, while they display much higher firm size (in terms of both workforce and
revenues), incidence of graduated employees, participation in corporate groups, export
capacity; the introduction of organizational and marketing innovations is about three
times higher as that of deterred firms.
Table 2 - Potential innovators of the CIS Wave 2008-2010 sample of Friuli Venezia
Giulia
Innovation active and hampered firms
(percentage of firms)
Engaged in innovative activities?
No (Deterred) Yes (Innovation-active) p-value
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Types of obstacles*
Financial obstacles 58.2 49.4 36.3 48.2 0.000
Human resources obstacles 12.9 33.6 9.0 28.6 0.065
Market obstacles 46.9 50.0 23.6 42.5 0.000
Firms’ characteristics**
Technology acquisitions - - 90.0 30.0 -
Training& Marketing - - 51.7 50.0 -
R&D - - 59.5 49.2 -
Organizational innovation 18.5 38.9 64.9 47.8 0.000
Marketing innovation 14.3 35.1 49.0 50.1 0.000
Exporter 27.3 44.6 52.2 50.0 0.000
Public grants - - 42.3 49.5 -
Part of a group 10.4 30.6 28.1 45.0 0.000
Cooperation agreements - - 24.1 42.8 -
Graduate workers 41.6 49.3 70.4 45.7 0.000
Abandoned innovation projects - - 10.2 30.3 -
Ongoing innovation activities - - 52.7 50.0 -
More than 20 employees 30.0 45.9 53.7 49.9 0.000
Revenues above 50 million euros 1.6 12.6 11.7 32.2 0.000
Number of observations 433 402
*Percentage of firms assessing items as highly important.
**Percentage of firms presenting a specific characteristic.
Descriptive statistics also provide a first insight about the relationship under study.
Table 3 shows the incidence of firms perceiving each obstacle as highly important ac-
cording to the intensity of their engagement in innovation: null (innovation deterred),
or investing in innovation through different, increasingly demanding, channels - i.e. ex-
ternal acquisition of technology, marketing and training activities, and R&D projects.
The first observation is that obstacles to innovation are very relevant for deterred firms,
supporting the existence of deterrent barriers of financial, market and, to a lesser extent,
personnel-related nature preventing firms’ innovation efforts. We also find evidence of
a statistically significant non-linear relation between innovation intensity and obstacles
related to financial and market factors: as firm innovation engagement becomes posi-
tive, at first the perception of obstacles decreases (deterrent barriers on simpler forms
of innovative investment are no longer effective), then it rises again possibly reflecting
the relevance of revealed barriers when investing in more involving and risky innovation
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projects.
Table 3 - Firm innovation intensity and perception of obstacles
Innovation active and hampered firms : CIS Wave 2008-2010
(Percentage of potential innovators assessing the obstacle as highly important by innovation intensity)
Degree of engagement in innovation
Deterred firms
Innovation-active firms
Type of obstacles External acquisitions Training & Marketing R&D Chi-square (χ2)
Financial 58.2 31.0 38.1 38.1 41.52***
Human resources 12.9 10.0 6.4 9.2 3.93
Market 46.9 18.0 25.4 25.5 50.94***
***statistically significant at 1%.
**statistically significant at 5%.
Table 4 shows the same relationship but referring to the subset of 317 firms that
represents the panel component. Interestingly, during the second CIS wave 2010-12 a
lower percentage of potential innovators appear to be deterred by financial and human
skill barriers with respect to the previous wave, while the perception of market obstacles
sharply rises for any level of innovation intensity. Innovation active firms, as expected, be-
coming more aware of the credit crunch and of the unfolding of the sovereign debts crisis,
perceive a higher relevance of financial constraints, but the main concern for most firms’
in the region remain the uncertainty coming from market and demand conditions.
Table 4 - Firm innovation intensity and perception of obstacles in CIS panel sub-
sample 2008-2012
Innovation active and hampered firms: CIS panel subsample
(Percentage of potential innovators assessing the obstacle as highly important by innovation intensity in each CIS wave)
Degree of engagement in innovation
Deterred firms
Innovation-active firms
Types of obstacle External acquisitions Training & Marketing R&D Chi-square (χ2)
2008-2010 Wave
Financial 50.0 16.7 32.0 31.5 18.21***
Human 13.5 5.6 8.0 8.3 3.09
Market 47.3 16.7 16.0 19.4 30.64***
2010-2012 Wave
Financial 28.5 35.0 28.6 35.0 0.85
Human resources 2.1 0.0 3.6 1.3 0.98
Market 60.6 50.0 32.1 56.6 8.44**
***statistically significant at 1%.
**statistically significant at 5%.
H0: row and column variables are independent.
The innovation capabilities and vulnerability of Friuli Venezia Giulia economic
system during the crisis
In this Section we assess the performance of Friuli Venezia Giulia region’s innovation
capabilities during the crisis and its aftermath and we explore the role of different firms
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and sectors with respect to the vulnerability of the regional economic system to 2011
sovereign debt crisiss following the procedure proposed by Bristow and Healy (2018).
First, we use macro level data on employment to detect turning points in the regional
economy business cycle. Second, we move to a micro level analysis to grasp some indi-
cation on which kind of firms played a major role in the vulnerability of the economic
system. Finally, we connect descriptive results to the previous Section evidence of the
sharp rise in market obstacles perception.
According to the Regional Innovation Scoreboard (European Commission, 2017),
the Italian region Friuli Venezia Giulia is a “moderate+ Innovator”4 and, since 2011, its
innovation performance has been increasing over time. More in detali, data reported in
the Regional Innovation Scoreboard (European Commission, 2017) highlight that Friuli
Venezia Giulia is a strong innovator in the Italian context while it is only a moderate
innovator compared to the EU average (see Table 5). The labor market of the region
shows a higher incidence of people working both in the manufacturing and public ad-
ministrations sectors with respect to the Italian and the EU averages and also per capita
GDP is slightly above the Italian and EU averages.
Table 5 - Composition of the Regional Innovation Scoreboard 2017
Score Standardized score
(normalized for outliers) (as a % of the benchmark area)
FVG Italy European Union
Enablers of innovation Percentage of population (age 25-64) with a university degree 0.348 109 63
Public R&D expenditures (% of GDP) 0.554 111 101
Employment in knowledge-intensive services and 0.545 98 102
medium-high/high-tech manufacturing (% of total workforce)
Innovation activity Business R&D expenditures (% of GDP) 0.367 109 81
Public-private co-publications 0.316 129 106
EPO patent applications per billion GDP (in PPP) 0.492 162 126
Innovation capacity Regional Innovation Index 2017 0.399 119.2 87.8
Regional Innovation Index 2011 0.383 114.9 86.6
Source: (European Commission, 2017). See Bristow and Healy (2018) for more details.
According to the Regional Innovation Scoreboard (European Commission, 2016),
the innovation capability of the region increased also during the recent sovereign debt
crisis hitting its peak in 2014 and then it went down during the period 2015-16 (Figure
4.1).
To assess the resilience capability of the Italian region Friuli Venezia Giulia and to
grasp its interplay with the performance of the innovative and non-innovative firms of
the region we decided to follow a two-step analysis. First of all, we assess the resilience
of the region according to the procedure suggested by Bristow and Healy (2018), i.e.,
4“Moderate Innovators are all regions with a relative performance between 50% and 90% of the EU
average in 2017. The RIS 2017 introduces three subgroups within each performance group to allow for
more diversity at the regional level: the top one-third regions (+), the middle onethird regions, and
the bottom one-third regions (-), creating the following 12 performance groups: Innovation Leaders +,
Innovation Leaders, Innovation Leaders -, Strong + Innovators, Strong Innovators, Strong - Innovators,
Moderate + Innovators, Moderate Innovators, Moderate - Innovators, Modest + Innovators, Modest
Innovators, and Modest - Innovators.” (see European Commission, 2017, Methodology Report, p. 31.)
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Figure 4.2
representative of the regional economic system, we believe that they are a good proxy of
macro level dynamics:
Table 6 - Employment dynamics in Friuli Venezia Giulia
Average number of employees 2008 2010 2012
Total 71.8 71.5 71.1
Innovation-active 132.2 132.8 137.3
Innovation-inactive 38.6 37.9 33.1
Source: Authors’ elaborations on CIS waves 2008-2010 and 2010-12
Table 6 shows that, on average, innovative firms beside having a larger number of
employees were also able to increase their labor force even after the 2011 economic shock
while for non-innovative firms we observe a reduction in the number of employees. This
is not a conclusive evidence, but it suggests that non-innovative firms, i.e. SMEs firms,
were not able to respond to the downturn following the sovereign debt crisis.
4.4 Empirical analysis
4.4.1 Dealing with endogeneity
We are interested in estimating the relationship between the probability that an
obstacle is perceived as important and the intensity of innovation engagement. After
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selecting the sample of potential innovators, we tackled the endogeneity of innovation
intensity regressors.
The first source of endogeneity is associated to the existence of unknown hetero-
geneous factors that are correlated with both the probability to perceive obstacles as
important and the decision to innovate. We deal with the potential bias deriving from
relevant variables left out from the regression by widening the set of our controls relying
on the additional information provided by the CAD dataset. In particular, we add two
important exogenous variables from the accounting data: 1. the return on assets (ROA)
i.e. the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes on total assets, calculated as a 4-year
average; 2. the ratio of financial debts to the sum of firm’s own resources and financial
debts (leverage). The first index is an indicator of the ability to generate returns, and
is therefore correlated with productivity. The second, computed as the share of external
debt on total resources (external and internal) captures the general stability of the firm
financial structure, its sustainability over time and its resilience to external shocks. Firms
able to generate positive and sustainable returns are better equipped to cope with the
risks entailed by innovation investments and therefore they should perceive obstacles as
less threatening.
The second endogeneity source derives from the fact that the choice to innovate and
the assessment of obstacles could be simultaneously determined at firm level. In fact,
firms are likely to examine the opportunity to innovate by considering both potential
benefits and costs as early as in the planning stage of their innovation strategies. Such
preliminary assessment also includes estimates of risks and obstacles, even though fur-
ther barriers might come into consideration during the project implementation phases.
Moreover, the problem of simultaneity in obstacle assessment and innovation decision is
enhanced by the particular nature of the dataset: CIS data comes from survey waves
each covering a three-year period considering it as a single time span. The fact that an-
swers, potentially referring to different moments of the innovation process, are collapsed
to the same time dimension would imply by itself a structure of simultaneity even for
decisions that are temporally consecutive. Therefore, we consider the assessment of ob-
stacles and the decision about the intensity of innovation investment as simultaneously
determined.5 We start our analysis by first focusing on the cross-sectional data CIS-CAD
2008-10: as reported in Section 4.3.1, the resulting sample CIS-CAD is made of 691
potential innovators innovators covering the years from 2006 to 2014.6 A multivariate
5For instance, D’Este et al. (2012) employed a multivariate probit model to study the effects of several
classes of endogenous constraints on firms’ innovation propensity relying on survey data.
6Merging the data implies losing some observations and selection bias may affect the distribution firms’
propensity to innovate. As a robustness check, we therefore estimated our equations relying on the full
set of CIS potential innovators. Under this setup the signs of the estimates obtained using CIS data
match those we got using CIS-CAD data although they exhibit a smaller magnitude.
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probit model (MVP) takes into account the fact that the obstacles are simultaneously
determined. We then try to overcome the limits imposed by cross-sectional methods and
control for firm-specific unobservables by estimating a random-effect probit model relying
on the CIS-CAD panel subset of 317 potential innovators that were surveyed in both CIS
waves.
4.4.2 Cross-sectional analysis: the multivariate probit model
On the cross-section 2008-10 CIS-CAD we run a multivariate probit (MVP)7 model
that represents the multiple-equation extension of the univariate probit model.8 It allows
the joint estimation of two or more probit equations through the interaction of their errors
terms. The disturbances are jointly distributed as a standardized multivariate normal,
with zero mean, unit variance and free cross-correlations. When the correlation coefficient
between two equations’ disturbances is significantly different from zero, this specification
accounts for the existence of omitted or unobservable factors that affect both dependent
variables simultaneously; whereas, when the correlation is not different from zero, the
two equations can be estimated separately as univariate probit models. Relying on the
estimation procedure developed by Cappellari and Jenkins (2003), we estimate a system
of three equations, one for each obstacle group (financial, human resources, and market).
For each firm i = 1, . . . , N and each set of obstacles yij:
(4.1)Prob (yij = 1) = αj + β
′
jxik + γ
′
jzir + ϵij
with j indicating the class of obstacle: yij={Financial, Human resources, Market}; k
indicating the intensity level of innovation activity: xik={technology acquisition, training
& marketing, internal R&D}; and zir is the set of control variables.
We tested several specifications of our model including the relevant CIS indicators
and extending and refining the set of regressors with accounting variables drawn from
CAD. Our final specification includes a set of control variables capturing firm-specific
characteristics such as macro-sector of activity, size, human capital endowment, and
several dummies capturing whether the firm belongs to a group, and measures of inno-
vativeness and failures. Size is expected to be negatively related with high perception
of financial obstacles (Savignac, 2008), being an indicator of lower financial constraints.
From the CAD data we included two variables that have been found to affect the proba-
bility to suffer financial constraints, following Savignac (2008), who finds that measures
7The starting point would be the univariate probit model with three equations, one for each obstacle
group considered. However, such model imposes two restrictions on the data: that the assessment
of each obstacle is not correlated with that of the others, and that innovation intensity variables are
exogenous. Both restrictions conflict with the hypothesis of simultaneous determination of obstacles
and innovation investment, therefore we opted for a more flexible model.
8In the case of the linear regression model the analogous extension is the seemingly unrelated regression.
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of profitability and own funds impact on the probability to suffer financial constraints.
The first measure we consider is ROA which accounts for the productivity and it is hy-
pothesized to be negatively related with the perception of financial obstacles. The other
measure is the share of financial debt on total asset (leverage) which accounts for the
financial structure of the firms and it is hypothesized to be positively related with the
perception of financial obstacles as it signals the difficulty of getting credit for highly
indebted firms. All variables are ratios so to exclude any scale effect, that is already
captured by the size dummy. The complete list of variables is reported in Table A.3 in
the Appendix.
Table 7 shows several aspects of the relationship between innovation activity and
reported obstacles. Overall the emerging picture points to the existence of high and sig-
nificant deterrent barriers in relation to financial and market factors. When obstacles
are not binding so severely to prevent innovation tout court, firms can and do engage
in innovation activity: external acquisition of technology, in-house training, and mar-
keting and R&D activities significantly reduce firms’ perception of financial and market
obstacles. On the other hand, firms’ perceptions of human resources-related obstacles do
not show any strongly significant relation with our innovation intensity variables. This
means that these obstacles have been relevant for both innovation- active and deterred
firms alike.
The strong correlation between innovation intensity and lower relevance of financial
and market constraints reflects the peculiar time span of our data: the years between
2008 and 2010 were deeply marked by the inversion of the economic cycle started in
September 2008 with the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the leading American investment
bank. The financial crisis spread from the United States’ larger banks to all over the
world, and from the financial sector to the real sector through a severe credit crunch.
Banks heavily reduced their lending activity, and interest rates on outstanding debts
increased significantly. Therefore, firms’ perception of financial and market obstacles is
likely to markedly differ between those firms already ’on the innovation ladder’ and those
non-innovators that did not innovate because of discouraged by such barriers.
Regarding the effect of other controls, as expected, financial constraints are felt sig-
nificantly less by the largest firms in terms of both number of employees and revenue
(more than 50 million euros highly significant). Firms worries related to demand and
market entry barriers are associated with the regional sectoral structure, being less rel-
evant for firms operating in non-manufacturing sectors.9 Lack of human resources and
demand uncertainty are neither exacerbated nor mitigated by CAD-based financial in-
9Looking at the FVG economy value added, firms operating in the sector of services account for roughly
70% of the total while manufacturing and construction firms represent respectively the 23 and 4% of
the total (Banca d’Italia, 2018).
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Table 7 - Cross-section regression CIS-CAD 2008-10
Results of multivariate probit - CIS-CAD: 2008-2010
Dependent variablesa
Explanatory variables
Financial Obstacles Human Resources Obstacles Market Obstacles
Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e.
Technological acquisition -0.762*** 0.174 -0.247 0.221 -0.905*** 0.179
Training&Marketing -0.573*** 0.213 -0.593* 0.303 -0.596*** 0.211
R&D -0.460*** 0.165 -0.427* 0.229 -0.864*** 0.170
Part of a group -0.098 0.157 0.157 0.201 0.061 0.159
Less than 10 years in busi-
ness
0.150 0.127 0.026 0.165 0.077 0.129
More than 20 employees -0.227* 0.122 0.086 0.158 -0.050 0.123
Revenues between 10 and 50
million of euros
-0.130 0.171 -0.028 0.228 0.013 0.173
Revenues above 50 million of
euros
-0.741*** 0.294 0.014 0.333 -0.130 0.265
Graduate workers -0.157 0.116 -0.250
textsuperscript* 0.152 0.066 0.117
Construction sector 0.137 0.138 -0.100 0.173 -0.253* 0.139
Service sector 0.069 0.129 -0.248 0.167 -0.241* 0.130
Return on Assets (RoA)b -0.016* 0.008 0.013 0.009 0.006 0.008
Leverageb 0.008*** 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.002
Abandoned innovation
projects
0.202 0.254 0.329 0.306 0.403* 0.251
Ongoing innovation activi-
ties
0.285* 0.154 0.234 0.210 0.048 0.158
Constant -0.153 0.166 -0.979*** 0.171 0.208 0.166
Number of observa-
tionsfirms
691
aWhether the firm assesses at least 1 barrier-item as highly important, for each set of barriers.
bAverages over the periods 2006-2014.
* p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01
dicators. Considering financial obstacles instead, the behaviour of firm-level financial
indicators is coherent with the expectations on firms’ management theory on the one
hand and with the financial conditions prevailing in the reference period on the other
hand. The measure of profitability, ROA, shows a significant negative correlation with
financial barriers: higher returns on assets mean more internal resources that the firm can
manage freely, therefore lowering perception of financial constraints. In times when the
functioning of ordinary credit flows was severely impaired, cash availability was likely to
be essential in order to pursue the firm’s strategic purposes, including risky investments
in innovation. The index of firm financial structure (leverage) shows a small, albeit highly
significant, impact. As expected, being part of a group is negatively correlated to the
probability of perceiving financial obstacles to innovation. On the other side, we found
that the perception of human and market-related obstacles is enhanced for firms that
belong to a group perhaps because these firms are more aware of these types of obstacles
than independent firms that are usually smaller, less oriented to international markets
and less engaged in R&D activities.
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4.4.3 Robustness analysis
We conducted a robustness analysis of the results obtained for Equation 4.2 over
two dimensions. First, we collapsed the three obstacles in one single obstacle and we find
that as expected our estimates are sharper than the estimates obtained considering the
three obstacles separately. However, this new obstacle measure is not very informative
as it implies that almost every potential innovator in our dataset is constrained. Thus,
we conclude that our approach allows us to shed some light on the role of each of the
obstacles.
Second, we aggregated consider simple innovators thus in our innovation intensity
measure we collapse low, medium and high levels of importance. We estimate again
Equation 4.2 and we did not notice any qualitative difference in the results except that
the variable that identifies the innovation status gives sharper a coefficient especially for
market obstacles.
4.4.4 The random-effect panel probit model
We exploit both CIS survey waves in order to control for firm specific heterogeneous
unobserved factors. By matching firms’ records we obtain a balanced panel of 317 poten-
tial innovators surveyed in both waves.10 For the j-th obstacle yijt and the k-th measure
of innovation intensity xikt, we estimate the following univariate equation:
(4.2)Prob (yit = 1) = αj + θi + β
′
jxikt + γ
′
jzirt + ϵijt
where each wave is denoted by t with t = {1, 2}, xikt is the vector of variables measur-
ing innovation intensity, and zirt contains the set of control variables as for Equation 4.2.
As in Greene (2012), to control for the incidental parameter problem and the presence of
firm-specific unobserved factors θi, we run a random-effect probit model relying on the
estimation procedure suggested by Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1980).
Results reported in Table 7 show, first of all, that innovation-deterred firms continue
to perceive financial obstacles rather more acutely than firms active in the simplest form
of innovative investment: in other words, financial obstacles preoccupations are equally
relevant at the extreme of the distribution (either non-innovators or highly innovators)
also during the unfolding of the crisis. This is consistent with all the controls for financial
obstacles: firm size in terms of revenues negatively affect financial barriers’ perception;
the latter are heavily associated to the financial indicators. The ROA index negatively
10As mentioned above, as the CIS questionnaire for the 2010-2012 wave differs slightly from that for
2008-2010, we use the three barriers indicators (financial, human resources, and market) that are
homogeneous throughout the whole 2008-2012 span.
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affects the probability that financial barriers are perceived as important, while leverage
has a significant, positive effect. Thus, an imbalanced financial structure, such as an
excessive weight of external debt, signals the firm’s weakness: it exposes the firm to the
risk of a higher burden should interest rates raise and, therefore, it increases the likelihood
of insolvency.
Table 7 - Panel regression CIS-CAD 2008-10
Multivariate probit results - Wave: 2008-2010
(subsample panel for the CIS-CAD Waves 2008-2010 and 2010-2012)
Dependent variablesa
Explanatory variables
Financial Obstacles Human Resources Obstacles Market Obstacles
Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e.
Technological acquisition -0.542** 0.252 -0.194 0.379 -0.799*** 0.224
Training&Marketing -0.148 0.241 -0.109 0.361 -0.854*** 0.236
R&D -0.230 0.201 0.127 0.282 -0.626*** 0.184
Part of a group -0.236 0.158 -0.131 0.244 0.282*** 0.184
Less than 10 years in busi-
ness
0.051 0.161 0.051 0.237 -0.112 0.149
More than 20 employees -0.115 0.149 0.062 0.222 -0.129 0.138
Revenues between 10 and 50
million of euros
-0.416** 0.223 -0.075 0.345 0.144 0.197
Revenues above 50 million of
euros
-0.706*** 0.285 0.252 0.389 0.122 0.236
Graduate workers -0.117 0.143 -0.428*** 0.220 -0.150 0.132
Construction sector 0.074 0.191 -0.075 0.266 0.423** 0.176
Service sector -0.137 0.180 0.266 0.184 0.448** 0.179
Return on Assets (RoA)b -2.941*** 1.027 0.397 1.479 -3.026*** 0.993
Leverageb 1.182*** 0.227 -0.112 0.308 -0.213 0.199
Abandoned innovation
projects
0.480 0.305 0.599 0.418 0.609** 0.283
Ongoing innovation activi-
ties
0.309* 0.191 -0.399 0.298 -0.207 0.172
Constant -0.662*** 0.226 -1.250*** 0.343 0.096 0.204
Number of observations 631
Number of firms 317
aWhether the firm assesses at least 1 barrier-item as highly important, for each set of barriers.
bAverages over the periods 2006-2010 for the first wave and 2010-2014 for the second wave.
* p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01
The lack of adequate human resources again is not linked to the intensity of the
engagement in innovative activities, suggesting that the lack of qualified personnel has a
similar impact on both innovative firms and non-innovators. However, the engagement in
any of the three levels of innovation intensity, still significantly reduces the perception of
market barriers as important: innovativeness is intrinsically linked to control of market
conditions. The second phase of the crisis sees an increase in the dominance of market
and competitiveness risks for firms, particularly SMEs with no previous innovation in-
vestment. Consistently, a high and sustainable ability to generate income, measured by
the ROA, becomes strongly significant in reducing perceptions of market and demand
constraints; whilst the presence of recently abandoned innovation projects and operating
in the construction sector substantially increase the likelihood that firms regard market
obstacles as important.
Furthermore, we use our CIS-CAD 317 firms’ panel dataset to grasp additional
105
insights on how the relationship between the probability of perceiving barriers to inno-
vation as important is affected by the deteriorating macroeconomic conditions following
the sovereign debt crisis. Results are presented in Table 8 showing that for the second
CIS wave 2010-2012 the probabilities that all firms perceive financial and human re-
sources obstacles as important are considerably reduced - both coefficients of the dummy
2010-12 are negative and significant at the 1% level: this might indicate that in the
second stage of the crisis such barriers become more pervasive, affecting innovators and
non-innovators alike. The perception of market-related obstacles instead rises substan-
tially, and particularly for non-innovators, suggesting that the worsening of the internal
and external macroeconomic environment further discourage them from innovative (and
counter-cyclical) strategies, undermining the overall capacity of the system to react to the
crisis. Consistently with the findings of Gagliardi and Iammarino (2018), this outcome is
likely to be triggered by the high incidence of SMEs in the FVG productive structure, as
well as its relative specialization in traditional sectors that were already facing tougher
competition from emerging economies in the years before the crisis.
Table 8 - Panel regression CIS-CAD 2008-10
Results of multivariate probit - CIS-CAD: 2008-2010
(subsample panel for the CIS-CAD Waves 2008-2010 and 2010-2012)
Dependent variablesa
Explanatory variables
Financial Obstacles Human Resources Obstacles Market Obstacles
Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e.
Dummy 2010-12 -0.494*** 0.132 -1.304*** 0.399 0.640*** 0.123
Technological acquisition -0.637** 0.263 -0.470 0.514 -0.737*** 0.241
Training&Marketing -0.137 0.252 0.193 0.486 -0.914*** 0.251
R&D -0.307 0.212 0.024 0.378 -0.575*** 0.196
Part of a group -0.061 0.172 0.311 0.349 0.049*** 0.157
Less than 10 years in busi-
ness
0.069 0.170 0.077 0.330 -0.130 0.161
More than 20 employees -0.144 0.158 0.022 0.309 -0.116 0.149
Revenues between 10 and 50
million of euros
-0.464** 0.236 -0.259 0.483 0.218 0.214
Revenues above 50 million of
euros
-0.811*** 0.303 0.105 0.530 0.242 0.258
Graduate workers -0.138 0.150 -0.500* 0.391 -0.141 0.142
Construction sector 0.071 0.202 -0.101 0.371 0.466*** 0.191
Service sector -0.153 0.191 -0.410 0.375 0.042 0.174
Return on Assets (RoA)b -3.822*** 1.121 -1.063 2.171 -2.514** 1.046
Leverageb 1.236*** 0.242 -0.187 0.438 -0.184 0.215
Abandoned innovation
projects
0.444 0.322 0.772 0.599 0.702** 0.304
Ongoing innovation activi-
ties
0.286 0.198 -0.752 0.476 0.238 0.185
Constant -0.426* 0.245 -1.067** 0.491 -0.265 0.230
Number of observations 634
Number of firms 317
aWhether the firm assesses at least 1 barrier-item as highly important, for each set of barriers.
bAverages over the periods 2006-2010 for the first wave and 2010-2014 for the second wave.
* p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01
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4.5 Conclusions
In this study we investigated the relationship between the intensity of firms’ engage-
ment in innovative activities and self-reported obstacles to innovation for a representative
sample of firms in the Italian region of Friuli Venezia Giulia in the years of the big re-
cession (2008− 2010) and the sovereign debt crisis (2010− 2012). Results support the
existence of severe financial and market obstacles hampering mostly non-innovator firms
in the region while barriers related to human resources are more pervasive, affecting both
innovation-active and deterred firms alike.
Relying on a subset of firms that were surveyed both in 2008-2010 and 2010-2012
we provide evidence that innovativeness is intrinsically linked to a stronger control of
the market and demand conditions. The CAD-based indicators of firms’ financial health
increase their overall influence on the perception of obstacles for our panel, and their sign
is in line with expectations: profitability (ROA index) mitigated financial and market
obstacles; leverage points to much higher perception of financial barriers for firms with
an imbalanced financial structure. In correspondence with the sovereign debt crisis, the
perception of market-related obstacles rose dramatically for all firms, while the perception
of financial and human resources-related obstacles decreased.
Estimation results and our analysis on the FVG’s economic system vulnerability
point out that the sharp rise in firms’ perception of market obstacles to innovation, and
the associated uncertainty, reflect the high level of vulnerability of FVG’s firms to sizeable
exogenous shocks to the economic activity. This interpretation is coherent with the
dynamics observed, especially in the labour market, in the regional economic environment
as the rise in market-related obstacles is closely linked to the sharp reduction in the
propensity to invest and to innovate of FVG’s firms. Moreover, during the credit crunch
the downfall in the investments and exports of FVG’s firms, two main characteristics of
innovative firms, was sharper than in the rest of Italy.
Clearly it is very difficult for local policy makers to address the need of tools that can
help firms to mitigate the consequences of a rise in market-related obstacles. In line with
the findings of the existing scholarly contributions on the link between regional economic
resilience and innovation, we identify few directions in which the problem could be tackled
in a traditional but still lively economic system such as FVG. First, innovation-related
activities should be supported through a system of financial incentives to stimulate the
propensity to innovate of firms.
Second, it is important to provide counselling services to help firms, especially the
SMEs, that want to look for new markets and be informed on the new directions of the
market demand. This implies the set-up of regional policy tools to help firms, especially
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SMEs, to move from the traditional sectors to high-tech ones.
Third, it is important to empower the regional system of innovation by promoting
the clustering of innovative firms and the sharing of knowledge.
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Appendix
Table A.1
CIS questionnaire (2008-10 and 2010-2012 harmonised): obstacles to innovation
Classes Items
Degree of importance
Not experienced Low Medium High
Financial obstacles Lack of adequate finance    
Human resources obstacles Lack of qualified personnel    
Market obstacles
Lack of demand    
Dominant market share held by competitors    
Table A.2
CIS 2008-2010 and 2010-12 questionnaire: innovative activities
Classes Items Not engaged engaged (highest engagement only)
Technology acquisitions
Acquisition of extramural R&D  
Acquisition of machinery  
Acquisition of other technologies  
Training & Marketing
Training for innovative activities  
Marketing for new productprocesses  
Internal R&D
In-house R&D  
Design  
Other activities supporting innovation  
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Table A.3 - List of variables
Variables Source Type Definitions
Any innovation output in-
troduced
CIS 0/1 1 if firm i introduces a process or a product innovation into the
market in years 2008-10 or 2010-12, 0 otherwise. A process inno-
vation is the implementation of a new or significantly improved
production process, distribution method, or support activity for
goods or services, such as maintenance systems or operations for
purchasing, accounting, or computing (exclude purely organiza-
tional innovation). A product innovation is the market introduc-
tion of a new or significantly improved good or service with respect
to its capabilities, user friendliness, components or sub-systems.
Process or product innovations (new or improved) must be new
to the enterprise, but not to the market.
Organization inn. CIS 0/1 1 if firm i introduces an organizational innovation in year t, 0
otherwise. An organizational innovation is a new organizational
method in the enterprise’s business practices (including knowl-
edge management), workplace organization and decision making,
or external relations that has not been previously used by the
enterprise. It must be the result of strategic decisions taken by
management. It exclude mergers or acquisitions, even if for the
first time.
Marketing inn. CIS 0/1 1 if firm i introduces a marketing innovation in year t, 0 oth-
erwise. A marketing innovation is the implementation of a new
marketing concept or strategy that differs significantly from the
enterprises existing marketing methods and which has not been
used before. It requires significant changes in product design or
packaging, product placement, product promotion or pricing. It
exclude seasonal, regular and other routine changes in marketing
methods.
Innovation intensity CIS 0/1 As explained in the paper, used to build firms’ engagement in
innovation, see Table A.3 above.
Part of a group CIS 0/1 1 if firm i belongs to a group, 0 otherwise
Less than 10 years CAD 0/1 1 if firm i is less than 10 years old, 0 otherwise
More than 20 employees CAD 0/1 1 if firm i has more than 20 employees at the end of 2010 or 2012,
0 otherwise
Revenue 10-50 mil. euros CAD 0/1 1 if firm i has an average revenue between 10 and 50 millions of
euros per year, 0 otherwise
Revenue greater 50 mil.
euros
CAD 0/1 1 if firm i has an average revenue above 50 millions of euros per
year, 0 otherwise
Graduate workers CIS 0/1 At least 1 employee has a university degree in firm i
Abandoned inn. projects CIS 0/1 1 if firm i abandoned innovation activities in the years 2008-10 or
2010-12, 0 otherwise.
Ongoing inn. projects CIS 0/1 1 if firm i had innovation activities still ongoing at the end of 2010
or 2012, 0 otherwise.
Sector Dummies CIS 0/1 Sector-specific component captured by sector dummies
Time Dummy 0/1 Time-specific component captured by time dummy
Return on assets (ROA) CAD Percentages Earnings before interest and taxes / Total assets
Leverage CAD Percentages Financial debts / Equity plus financial debts
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